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This research examines the determinants and consequences of corporate social 
responsibility performance in family firms. Concretely, it has two closely related 
objectives. First, to examine how family firms behave towards social and environmental 
performance considering governance and environmental aspects as contingency 
factors. Second, to examine how corporate social responsibility impacts on tax 
avoidance and earnings management practices and how, family ownership and 
management could moderate these relationships. This research makes use of an 
international sample for the period 2006-2014 and proposes several regression models 
for panel data.  
The evidence reported is as follows. First, the results support family firms behave 
towards corporate social responsibility, aiming to preserve their socioemotional wealth. 
Moreover, the socially responsible behavior of family firms is greater: (i) under the large 
presence of family members on the management team and family directors on the 
board of directors (governance factors) and (ii) in munificent contexts (environment 
factor).  
Regarding the second objective, two main evidence is reported. On the one hand, social 
and environmental performance is negatively related with tax avoidance so that firms 
with a greater socially responsible performance show a lower tax saving practices. 
However, this negative relation is lower in family-owned firms, what suggests that 
despite the fact that family firms show a greater socially responsible behavior aimed to 
preserve their socioemotional endowments, family ownership is positively associated 
with tax avoidance practices. On the other hand, evidence is opposite by examining 
earnings management practices. At this respect, social and environmental performance 
is positively related with earnings management; firms with a greater socially responsible 
performance show a higher discretionary behavior by promoting actions that mask the 
real financial and economic performance of the firm. But, again, this positive relation is 
lower – moderated - in family-owned firms, mainly because of the fact that family firms 
show a greater socially responsible behavior aimed to preserve their socioemotional 




Esta investigación se centra en analizar los determinantes y las consecuencias del 
rendimiento socialmente responsable en la empresa familiar. Concretamente, se 
diferencian dos objetivos altamente relacionados. En primer lugar, examinar el 
comportamiento de la empresa familiar hacia el desempeño social y medioambiental, 
considerando factores de contingencia como moderadores, asociados a aspectos de 
gobernanza y del entorno. En segundo lugar, examinar cómo la responsabilidad social 
corporativa impacta en las prácticas de evasión de impuestos y manipulación contable 
y cómo, la propiedad y la gestión familiar podrían moderar estas relaciones. Esta 
investigación hace uso de una muestra internacional para el período 2006-2014 y 
propone varios modelos de regresión para datos de panel.  
La evidencia obtenida es la siguiente. Primero, los resultados respaldan la mayor 
orientación de la empresa familiar hacia el compromiso socialmente responsable con el 
objetivo de preservar su riqueza socioemocional. Además, el comportamiento 
socialmente responsable de la empresa familiar se ve reforzado: (i) cuando es mayor la 
presencia de miembros de la familia en el equipo directivo y en el consejo de 
administración (factores de gobernanza) y (ii) en contextos munificentes (factor 
ambiental).  
Respecto al segundo objetivo, se documentan dos evidencias principales y opuestas. Por 
un lado, el desempeño social y medioambiental está relacionado negativamente con la 
evasión fiscal y positivamente con prácticas de manipulación contable; las empresas 
socialmente más responsables muestran una menor orientación hacia prácticas de 
ahorro fiscal, pero también un comportamiento discrecional al promover acciones que 
enmascaran el rendimiento financiero y económico real de la empresa. No obstante, la 
principal evidencia es el efecto moderador de empresa familiar. La relación negativa y 
positiva entre responsabilidad social y prácticas de evasión de impuestos y mayor 
comportamiento discrecional al promover acciones que enmascaran el rendimiento 
financiero y económico real de la empresa, respectivamente, es moderada por la la 
propiedad y gestión familiar. La propiedad y gestión familiar está asociada 








































































I. GENERAL APPROACH FOR THE RESEARCH 
I.1.1.     Introduction 
Within the framework of worldwide firms and the existing current environmental, 
financial and economic situation, the main aim of this project is to analyze the possible 
existing relationship among Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), tax avoidance and 
earning management (EM), as well as the moderating role that the inclusion of family 
firm can play on these relationships.  
Organizations, nowadays, find themselves under an increasing scrutiny from the 
society in terms of behavior and commitment to the existing legal rules, environmental 
attitude, conduct patterns and all those non-written specifications that they must 
follow. Companies must adopt different strategies to engage environmentally friendly 
and social activities. These activities let them maintain their legitimacy and image in 
markets and societies. It is generally known that there exists a growing concern about 
improving social and environmental performance, which leads companies to the use of 
CSR activities in order to influence the general public perceptions of themselves. 
In addition, there is also a balance between societal objectives and economic 
concerns in order to maximize shareholders’ wealth. That is why in this vein and leaving 
aside social and environmental matters, concern about the percentage that taxes 
represent in corporate costs is gaining importance. At this moment, companies and 
intellectuals start to use the term tax avoidance. Although there are several definitions, 
according to Chen et al. (2010) tax avoidance is defined as a “downward management 
of taxable income through tax planning activities”; while, Frischmann et al. (2008) 
defined it, in a simpler way, as the act of “engaging in significant tax positions with 
relatively weak supporting facts”. 
There exist a high range of opportunities for research on tax avoidance because 
of the field is very fertile. But, what’s more, there exist a wide focus of attention not 
only from tax authorities but there exists also a broad target of audience, as for example 
managers, investors and other regulators (Beng et al., 2016), that might also focus their 
attention on the level of CSR commitment that tax aggressive companies approach in 
order to account for their financial and economic results. 
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When we analyze this term along with CSR behavior, we can defend that it has 
been clarified along various and numerous studies that socially responsible firms have 
incentives or motivation to maintain their good reputation and image; therefore, 
because of the consequences that tax avoidance may have on their reputation, socially 
responsible firms might therefore be less tax aggressive. Nevertheless, this is not always 
the case and some firms, apparently, behave in a socially responsible way even when 
they engage in tax avoidance activities (e.g.,   Preuss, 2010;  Sikka, 2010). Because of this 
lack on homogeneous results, we research on this field in order to fill the gap. 
What’s more, there have been a substantial number of accounting and financial 
scandals, all along the years, which have derived from manager decision-making. 
Generally, this wrong decision-making from managers is caused by their willing of 
meeting their own interests and needs instead of the shareholders’ ones. In order to do 
so they might achieve different activities, among which we can find the fact that they 
might modify the accountancy with the aim of masking their discretionary behavior. 
These activities are usually named as earning management (EM). 
In this respect, managers may also release information with the objective of 
improving social and environmental performance or they might also use CSR activities 
to influence the general perceptions that third parties may have regarding their 
behavior within the company (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975). It has also been previously 
suggested by different authors (Salewski and Zülch, 2014; Martínez-Ferrero et al., 2015, 
among others). As these authors state, companies with such managers may mask 
earning management, indeed, by providing huge quantities of CSR information and, 
therefore, ensure their legitimacy, all this in order to compensate for their poor quality 
financial information. However, in this sense, as there exist opposite streams and given 
the importance of earning management potential damage (Chih et al., 2008), our aim 
with this research is try to shed light on such mixed results. 
Thus, as explained above, the aim of this PhD study is to research on the field of 
CSR in connection or related to some other concepts such as tax avoidance and earning 
management, that we have briefly seen above and we will deeply see further on this 
study. We will try to fill those gaps in the literature where the relationships mentioned 
are not clear, give rise to misunderstandings or are uncertain. 
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Furthermore, all of the previous mentioned has been analyzed as well from the 
family firm perspective due to the enormous importance that this type of organization 
possesses on the current moment due to the fact that family firms represent the 
majority of all businesses in all countries (IFERA, 2003). Moreover, it has also been taken 
into account those practices related to internal and external stakeholders, and to several 
contingency factors. The first ones include behavior towards employees and governance 
through the board of directors and the external stakeholders include the companies’ 
relationship with the environment, human rights and stakeholders, considered as 
customers and suppliers.  
As the main contribution, we include moderating contingent factors, which are 
based on governance and environment. These factors take into consideration variables 
such as family managers and directors – as governance aspects - and munificence, 
defined as the ability of a company to be able to use the resources in an industry to 
support their growth, and long term orientation of the society – as environmental 
aspects -. 
So, following from here, in the following chapters we will focus on the 
relationship between the mentioned concepts as well as their individual effect, including 
the analysis of the moderation role that family ownership can play in every analysis. 
Nevertheless, prior to this chapters in this introductory one, our aim is to briefly 
introduce the issue that we will address along the thesis, explain the motivational 
environment that surrounds this research. Afterwards we will conceptualize and 
determine the following elements that surround the theoretical framework: CSR and 
family firms and all the theories that support this research. Then, the general objectives 
are presented. At the end of this first chapter the methodological tools and designed 
used are explained. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 develop the objectives of this thesis. Finally, 
Chapter 5 analyses the general conclusions of this PhD as well as limitation and possible 






I.1.2.     Motivation  
The concept of Corporate Social Responsibility has found a high support over the years 
by researchers and practitioners involved in business (Gallardo-Vázquez and Sánchez-
Hernández, 2014; Fernández-Feijoo et al., 2014 among others). Its application and the 
disclosure of accounting and tax information is highly correlated on terms of reliability 
of the information provided by CSR practices. Companies may adopt different strategies 
for achieving and maintaining their legitimacy (Suchman, 1995) and their image in 
markets and society. These practices mentioned before, CSR and information disclosure, 
are the key for companies to be able to gain the trust of all the community where their 
activity is settled.  
In the same line, the concept of family firm has been analyzed in many cases 
during the last few decades and although there is no universal definition of a family firm 
(Miller et al., 2007), generally, it refers to management, ownership or secession-related 
issues. According to Chen et al. (2008) the typical family business has been characterized 
as a firm in which one or more family founders operate in a top managerial position and 
control a large portion of at the company’s shares or participate as a board member. 
Nowadays, however, as family firms represents the majority of all businesses (IFERA, 
2003) we found it interesting to research deeply on the effect that family ownership 
might have on company’s socially responsible behavior as well as the consequences 
towards tax avoidance and earning management, due to the lack of homogenous results 
on this field. 
Thus, previous literature has suggested along the years that family firms can have 
both a greater or a smaller compromise towards CSR activities, however, as we were 
saying, there exist a lack of homogeneity on all these results, there exist no definitive 
answer for the payed out question. However, even though there can exist a relationship, 
there can also exist different factors, what we call contingency factors, that can 
determine the previous relationship. What’s more, even if we could confirm that there 
is a relationship between CSR and family firms, our objective is to analyze which is the 
aim that all these firms pursue which the use of such activities oriented to CSR. It is in 
this moment when we brought up the idea of finding variables that can be affected or 
that, in deed, previous literature has found a link with the effects or consequences of 
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CSR, but nevertheless there is again no unanimity on the results. We are referring to the 
concepts of tax avoidance and earning management, which have as well gain 
importance in the last years due to the pressure that companies have to face on terms 
of disclosure of information and clarity and frankness on it. 
Therefore, different questions have arisen in this regard: are companies in favor 
of developing CSR activities? Do these companies, which meet their socially responsible 
obligations, meet at the same time their economic responsibilities regarding tax 
payments? Do these socially responsible companies disclosure their true information or 
it is under-covered? Above all this questions, does the fact of family ownership change 
in any way their behavior? These are, among others, the questions that motivate our 
study on this field. 
 
I.2.     OBJETIVES 
The doctoral thesis is composed by three objectives related in between them, all of them 
examined providing theoretical and empirical analyses that support the relationships. 
The main line of this objective is analyzing whether there exists a difference in the family 
firm spectrum or if they behave in the same line than non-family firms. Overall, 
specifically talking, the objectives of this research are as follows: 
1. To examine the family firm behavior towards CSR approaches and, therefore, their 
focus on social and environmental friendly activities, including the effect on internal 
and external stakeholders. At the same time, we focus our analysis on the moderation 
that this relationship may experience regarding different contingency factors related 
to governance and environmental stages.  
2. To examine the moderating effect of family business on the impact of CSR 
performance on tax avoidance, due to the existence of mixed results on this field and 
in particular in the family firm framework. This issue is analyzing also the balance 
between economic objectives and social and environmental activities. As in the 
previous objective, we also examine the moderation that family ownership may 
exhibit in the relationship. 
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3. To examine the moderating effect of family business on the impact of CSR 
performance on earnings management. Is it responsible commitment really ethical? 
This research question has been included in order to understand the effect that 
socially responsible commitment reflects on earning management practices and with 
the aim as well of reinforcing the gap that exist as well about the moderating effect 
of the family spectrum. 
These research issues have been examined with an internal sample of analysis 
composed of 6,442 firm-year observations from 2006 to 2014. Methodologically, several 
panel-data regressions for panel data are proposed for all cases. Results in all three 
situations support that the inclusion of the family ownership in the main relationship 
analyzed works as a moderation role among them. This is, when the inclusion of the 
family variable is done, the analysis results change and therefore, we can state that the 
family firm objectives, behavior and decision-making process clearly differ from non-
family firms, in these studied terms. 
 
I.3.     THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: FAMILY BUSINESS AND CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY  
This doctoral thesis is framed on the stakeholders’ theory (Freeman, 1984) in the 
grounds of distortion between companies’ objectives and society’s objectives or, what 
it is to say, corporate ethics and society’s objectives. In the line of this theory, we also 
found of great importance to mention the legitimacy and the signaling theory, which 
allows us to understand the importance of information outgoing from all companies. 
Finally, we also explain the theories linked to the family ownership structure of the 
company and the attachments that the family members might have with it. We are 
talking about the agency theory and the socio-emotional wealth theory.  
On what follows, we are going to give a brief explanation of these theories, to be 
able to realize the background of this research, which allowed us to develop this 
doctoral thesis.  
I.3.1.      Corporate social responsibility: Stakeholders theory, Legitimacy 
Theory and Signalling Theory.  
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What is considered as Corporate Social Responsibility? CSR has been explained by many 
scholars since the beginning of the nineteenth century. CSR refers to strategies where 
firms conduct their business in a way that is ethical and society friendly and can involve 
a variety of activities starting on working in partnership with local communities, socially 
sensitive investment, developing relationships with employees, customers and their 
families, as well as involving in activities for environmental conservation and 
sustainability. Despite of the great number of studies around the issue of CSR, there is 
still not a general and consensual definition of CSR. In 1953, Bowen initially introduced 
the concept of CSR in the field of business management, stating that companies have an 
ethical duty to act in a socially responsible way towards society and for future 
generations (Capron and Quairel-Lanoizelée, 2004). The European Commission defines 
CSR as "a concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in 
their business operations and in their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary 
basis.” In the same line, Maller Baker in 2004, an expert on CSR matters, stipulated that 
"CSR is about how companies manage the business processes to produce an overall 
positive impact on society”. 
However, we have focused our explanation for this term on Carrol (1979) who 
defined it as those responsibilities integrated in the company encompassing legal, ethic, 
economic and philanthropic expectation that the society looks for in organizations. The 
author introduced the idea of a “CSR pyramid” – Figure I.1 -, where each expectation 
should be taken into account in the daily basis of the company as those are the 
requirements that society and third parties expect from the firm. The economic level of 
the pyramid refers to the ability of the company to sustain itself and be profitable. The 
legal level encompasses all those rules and sanctions that the society establishes for all 
companies. The ethical level includes all those standard or norms that are not included 
in the law but that the society expects from the company to achieve. Finally, the 
philanthropic level, the top level of the pyramid, refers all those voluntary activities that 
the company carries out, not required by law and not expected from the business but, 





Once the concept of CSR that we make use of is clear we would like to introduce, 
as we said before, different theories that, accompany this term and that were analyzed 
before by those researchers who studied this concept: stakeholders’ theory, legitimacy 
theory and signaling theory. 
 
Stakeholders Theory 
Before any possible explanation about the Theory, we should be able to understand the 
meaning of the term “stakeholders”.  This term was firstly introduced by Freeman in 
1984, who stated that stakeholders are “individuals or groups of individuals who affect 
companies’ activity and objectives, but who are also affected by them”. The list of 
possible stakeholders is wide, as their nature and classification - which can be modified 
and determined by the company’s characteristic-, among others we can enumerate: 
clients, suppliers, competitors, society, community, local government, labour unions, 
etc. Clarkson (1195) split the collective of stakeholders in two sub-groups in order to 
assist companies when facing the identification of these stakeholders, due to the 
different peculiarities and interests that each of them have. He explained that (i) primary 
stakeholders are “those without whose continuous participation the company could not 
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outlast”. On the other hand, he defined (ii) secondary stakeholders as those who 
“influence, affect, or are influenced and affected by the company, but do not operate 
with it and are not essential for its survival”. 
Once the definition of a stakeholder has been made we can state that the 
Stakeholders theory was set up in order to give an answer to the demands of a new 
strategic direction that satisfies the interests of employees, clients, suppliers and 
society, as well as, of course, of stakeholder (Freeman, 1984; Boatright, 1994; Jones, 
1995). This theory did also find necessary all those groups who create and distribute 
economic value (Asher et al., 2005). 
This theory has created an idea that understands companies as pluralistic 
organizations and makes the crossing between corporate ethics and society’s objectives 
possible (González-Esteban, 2007). Thus, there is no single frame were companies can 
be classified, understanding this frame as two different spheres were the main agent is 
shareholders or another one where the support of values and principles is a dual 
relationship between owner and manager. The basis of this theory, as Donaldson and 
Preston (1995) stated, is a descriptive and instrumental sphere. Where the descriptive 
point of view faces companies as groups of competitiveness and cooperative interests 
(González-Esteban, 2001) and stakeholders are described in terms of different attributes 
(as power, urgency and legitimacy) (Navarro, 2008). However, the instrumental point of 
view works on the way that relationships between organizations and stakeholders 
function. In this case, the objectives and interests are mainly focused on all different 
stakeholders and frames them into the corporate strategy. This second focus does not 
consider stakeholders’ interests a way to maximize shareholders’ interests, which are 
legitimately legend and the company should act in an ethical and moral responsible way 
towards them. 
From the above, it can be deduced that the correct functioning, growth and 
expansion opportunities, business competitiveness and all the other companies’ 
strategic debates depend not only on shareholders, but on each and every stakeholder. 
Companies’ long-term survival and existence depends on a large group of stakeholders. 
Furthermore, the basic concern of the Stakeholders Theory is the treatment 
towards stakeholders, which should be ethical, because they can moderate any 
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company’s economic objective, leading the company to keep in mind their role in the 
society and the numerous social effects that they have in citizens and society in general 
(Stone and Winstanley, 2001). 
The idea of this Theory is that there exists a group of collectives to whose needs 
companies must be able to respond, so they do not operate in an empty sphere but with 
a whole group of interest. They must be able to show these groups their ability to adapt 
to the environment that is continuously updating and creating new needs or modifying 
the existing ones. 
Overall, we could say that this theory states that companies’ ability to raise 
sustainable wealth is arranged by their relations with the huge range of relevant 
stakeholders, and not only with one single agent, the society (Freeman, 1984; Carroll, 
1989; Donalson and Preston, 1995). This can be understood as the idea that disclosing 
sustainable information could be regarded as a way of disguising stakeholders’ 
demands. Therefore, companies are able to obtain the support of different agents, long-
term results, their strategy can be accepted and, ultimately, survive (Gray et al, 1995). 
Thus, the objective of this theory is trying to align owners’ objectives with the different 
involved agents’ objectives, due to the fact that the company is considered an 
organization with interdependent parts that have opposite interests (Gray et al. 1995, 
Deegan, 2002). So, in conclusion, CSR practices are considered an instrument used by 
companies to face stakeholders’ demands, which guarantees their support and restrains 
their activism (Adams, 2002). 
 
Legitimacy Theory 
As previously, we consider important to understand the term underlying this theory. 
The basis is found on the definition that states that legitimacy is considered as a 
generalized perception or assumption that all different actions of a company are 
desirable or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, 
beliefs and definitions (Suchman’s, 1995). What’s more, legitimacy is a concept dealing 
with the social system where the company is framed, in a particular moment and in 
certain place. Although this moment and place are “fixed” the set of rules, values, beliefs 
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and definitions is not and, therefore, companies must be able to arrange changes to 
adapt themselves to the environment where they work. 
Therefore, it has been previously mentioned by literature that this Legitimacy 
theory is based on the idea that there exists a “social contract” between the 
organization and the society where it operates (Deegan and Unerman (2011). This is the 
reason why, companies try to legitimize their corporate actions by reporting their CSR 
information in order to be approved by the society and be able to continue operating 
successfully, acting within the bounds and norms that society identifies as socially 
responsible behavior. According to authors like Maignan and Ralston (2002) legitimacy 
of a firm depends on the reciprocal relationship with its stakeholders, taking into 
account that the company has moral obligations as well. We could say that it is a 
dependence to guarantee the company’s medium and long-term survival. 
The “social contract” previously mentioned is very difficult to establish, but it is 
linked to a large range of society’s implicit and explicit expectations in terms of the way 
companies should carry out their activities (Deegan, 2000). The first type of expectations 
refers to those not codified and variable depending on people due to the perception of 
each of them and the explicit ones are all those requirements imposed by the law. These 
expectations have varied all along the years and have been adapted to the changing 
environment. Particularly, social expectations have been deeply modified, they are not 
static. 
As all the “social contracts” of all the implied agents must be satisfied, the 
Legitimacy Theory goes beyond only economic objectives but it also includes social and 
environmental ones, where CSR practices are used to satisfy the society’s and 
shareholders’ expectations and to guarantee the survival and growth of the organization 
(Lindblom, 1993; Archel et al., 2009). What’s more, this theory is the most used one to 
justify the reason of sustainable information disclosure. O'Donovan (2002) stated that 
this theory is based on companies’ objective of a satisfactory and successfully 
continuation, always operating inside the limits that society considers socially 
acceptable. Suchman (1995) considers the principles of this theory to be reflected by 
information disclosures. Among those principles, the disclosure of information allows 
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investors to know if all strategies and actions developed by organizations are inside 
those considered as desirable limits. 
Companies are considered legitimate when they operate within a series of 
objectives, rules, values and principles that move according to social rules and behaviors 
approved by the society. In this sense, Nasi et al. (1997) state that “a corporation is 
legitimate when it is judged to be support worthy” (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975). 
Legitimacy Theory, unlike Stakeholders Theory, is focused not only on stakeholders’ 
need but on values, principles and the moral system coherent all of them with the 
society. Legitimacy Theory must be constantly adapting to social changes and the 
environment and, in particular, to behaviors and patterns. 
 
Signaling theory  
A signal can be defined as those mechanisms that broadcast information on a constant 
basis and in equilibrium from those who possess more information to those who possess 
less of it (Spence, 2002).  This Signaling theory is based on the asymmetries between the 
information available to managers and stakeholders, as well as the way they 
communicate or interpret, in each case, the information provided or received. 
Thus, the Signaling theory, which is closely related to agency theory (Watson et 
al., 2002), is about the study of the signals of sellers that might influence the market 
price of a good or service. In this sense, the mechanism utilized to control managers may 
be used as signals to capital markets and as a way of reporting good management 
behavior and decreasing the information asymmetry that often exists between 
managers and other individuals with the aim of optimizing financial costs and increasing 
as well corporate value. It provides companies with incentives to divulge information 
quality in their CSR reporting. Therefore, Spence (1973) argued that one party can use 
observable mechanisms, such as diplomas, to demonstrate its unobservable 
characteristics, such as productivity or efficiency. Inspired by this idea, many scholars 
have used this theory to explain the potential benefits for firms of adopting CSR 
practices (Montiel et al. 2012; Ramchander et al. 2012) 
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In this sense, CSR practices may be a signal that reveals additional information 
to relevant stakeholders, especially in the so-called emerging economies. Adopting CSR 
practices meets two conditions for a quality signal (Spence 1973). First of all, it’s costlier 
and takes more effort to adopt CSR practices for those low- capability firms than for 
high-capability firms. Second, the premium for firms to engage in CSR is only sufficient 
for compensating the costs for high-capability firms. 
By disclosing CSR activities companies are signalling that they are ‘doing the right 
thing’. Signalling theory argues that the company gives signals to the shareholders and 
stakeholders in order to enhance its’ value. In a first moment the signalling theory was 
developed in order to clarify the information asymmetry in the labor market (Spence, 
1973) but as time has passed it has been used to explain voluntary disclosure in 
corporate reporting (Ross, 1977). Therefore, answering to the information asymmetry 
problem, companies signal certain CSR information to investors to prove their better 
outcomes than other companies’ ones in the market in order to attract investments and 
enhancing a favorable reputation (Verrecchia, 1983). CSR disclosure is one of the 
signaling means, where, although it is not required by laws and regulations, companies 
disclose more CSR information in order to signal that they are better than the rest in the 
market (Mahoney, 2012; Thorne et al., 2014). 
 
I.3.2.      Family firm: agency theory and socio-emotional wealth theory. 
What is a family firm? Although, as we have previously mentioned, there is no general 
definition of what a family firm is (Miller et al., 2007), generally, it refers to all those 
issues in firms related to management ownership or succession-related issues. Usually, 
a family business has been characterized as an organization where one or more family 
founders operate in a top managerial position and have the control of a proportion of 
the company’s shares or is present on the board of directors (Maury, 2006). Previous 
literature has suggested that not all family firms operate in the same way in terms of 
initiatives and risk facing (Miller, Le Breton-Miller, Lester and Cannella, 2007; Boling, 
Pieper and coven, 2014; Chrisman and Patel, 2012) due to the particular idea that these 
type of companies have of preserving their wealth or because of differences with other 
top members of the company.  
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It is in this moment when we can analyze those theories that were pioneer on 
this area but now have been deeply investigated by many scholars and which have now 
a strong and deep base on this family firm atmosphere. Those are the agency theory and 
the socioemotional wealth theory. 
 
Agency theory 
This theory arises when there exists a separation between ownership and control, as 
generally occurs in these family firms. This separation leads to a conflict of interests 
between the demands of the owners and demands of company managers. Nevertheless, 
this theory can also be applied to all stakeholders, as a part of the agents implied in this 
relationship, and not only to owner and shareholder. Young et al. (2008) noted that this 
separation can also exists in different situations from separation of ownership and 
control but as a principal-principal conflict. In this case, there exists a strong ownership 
concentration and a week situation of those minority shareholders, which are not 
correctly protected. 
The aim of the Agency Theory is solving the conflicts that arise as a consequence 
of the agency relationships. First of all, the differences between the principals’ and the 
agents’ interests and the attitude that the show towards risk (Eisenhardt, 1989). This 
main differences were groups by Jensen and Meckling (1976) as follows: (i) the agency 
conflict is generated because of the differences in objectives and motivations between 
both of them, (ii) each of them operates in different conditions and with different 
amounts of information and (iii) the risk aversion of each one is heterogeneous. What’s 
more, the main idea of this Theory is trying to find the most efficient contract for the 
principal-agent relationship. 
From the above, in terms of family ownership, three branches of the agency 
theory were created (Shukla, Carney and Gedajlovic, 2014). First of all, the principal-
agent approach, which focuses on the economic actors’ intereactions; secondly, the 
principal-principal approach, which focuses on ownership issues (Morck and Yeung, 
2003); and, finally, the behavioral agency model, which focuses on risk preferences. 
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Deeply developing these three branches, the principal-agent one is the most 
common agency problem and focuses on the information conflicts between the 
principal (owner) and the agent (manager) (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). There are three 
main sources of agency costs in this perspective: costs of monitoring agents, alignment 
costs and the remaining ones for the non-efficient practice of diverging costs.  
The principal-principal perspective analyses agency costs when arising through 
conflicting interests when more owners, being in equal authorization, or majority and 
minority shareholders are involved. It is generally a problem of publicly listed family 
firms (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). It can as well arise problems in the determination of 
the one responsible or with power to control and make decisions (Morck and Yeung, 
2003). 
Finally, the behavioral agency model or BAM focuses on the fact that family 
owners have different risk levels or preferences than investors in non-family firms. It is 
based in the assumption that risk preferences of decision makers are not consistent and 
depend on the situation (Wiseman and Gómez-Mejía, 1998). The fact of being loss-
averse suggests that self-interested individuals are more likely to prefer diminishing 
current losses over the idea of maximizing future gains (Shukla et al., 2014). For family 
firm owners, long-term considerations play an important role, possibly in such a loss-
averse risk preference.  
It is in this theory when literature suggests that conflicts of interests arise in 
family firms between majority and minority shareholders. Private benefits are 
expropriated by the family, which acts as a controlling shareholder, at the expense of 
the minority shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). 
The manager as agent might profit from information asymmetries and might 
exploit or expropriate business resources, whether using the firm’s assets for private 
use, coordinating budget/bonus relationships, or including private expenses as firm 
ones. The presence of a large shareholder, mainly the family might reduce this agency 
costs and might enhance company value (Morck, Shleifer & Vishny, 1988). Owner 
management generally is considered to reduce agency costs and to align the interests 
of the owner and the manager (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Owner-managed firms should 
save costs by not needing control mechanisms to handle management. 
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It is important to mention that this Agency Theory is highly correlated with the 
socioemotional wealth theory (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007), which we will develop in the 
following paragraphs, which focuses on the importance of the social and emotional 
interests of family firms. 
 
Socio-emotional wealth theory 
In this theory, it is highlighted the role of emotions on influencing a family firm’s 
management. Besides emotions, the preservation of the family firm plays a very 
important role in the family. Handler (1990) and Casson (1999) noted that family values 
and the family dynasty would be preserved in the family firm. Other authors pointed out 
that culture is very important to the owner family (Astrachan, Klein & Smyrnios, 2002), 
and that altruism is as well supposed to be an important factor. 
SEW was introduced by Gomez-Mejia et al. in 2007 and represents the main 
reference point for understanding family strategic decision making and dealing with the 
uniqueness of family firms. The risk of undertaken to preserve the endowment is 
balanced by the gains of the family SEW, even though the transaction may have 
uncertain economic benefits. Literature has widely provided that family firms’ owners 
are more likely to achieve social performance, even when there is no clear economic 
profitability in the activity undertaken, however, they give more importance to the 
socioemotional rewards that it implies to the family.  
SEW has five different dimensions, summarized as FIBER (Berrone, Cruz & 
Gomez- Mejia, 2012): (i) family control and influence, (ii) identification of family 
members with the firm, (iii) binding social ties, (iv) emotional attachment of family 
members and (v) renewal of family bonds to the firm through dynastic succession. 
Family control and influence are the major component of the SEW and the key 
point is that family members have significant control over the firm’s strategic direction 
(Chua et al., 1999). This can arise when family members are part of the management or 




Regarding the identification of the family members with the firm, it provides 
family members the proudness of the company as an extension of the family center. It 
can happen that the firm and the family have the same name, giving rise to a unique 
family firm identity (Berrone et al., 2010; Dyer & Whetten, 2006) and therefore, the 
family is eager to maintain a positive image and reputation.  
Binding social ties, the third dimension, relates to social relationships. This ties 
can exist not only internally, members enjoying the feeling of being closed to other 
members and benefiting from the solidarity among the group, but also with external 
groups as suppliers or costumers (Uhlaner, 2006) and the community  
Emotional attachment of family members points out the fact that emotions, 
positive or negatives, and affections in family firms are likely to be more complex than 
in other firms (Flechter, 2000), even though they are part of every organization they are 
more pronounced in family businesses. The family firm is the place where the needs for 
belonging, affect and intimacy are met (Kepner, 1983) and the firm is part of the family 
legacy; thus, a potential loss could be translated into a highly emotional situation for the 
owners (P. Sharma and Manikuti, 2005; Shepherd et al., 2009). 
Finally, the renewal of family bonds to the firm through dynastic succession ends 
with the explanation about the SEW theory.  The time horizon of family firms compared 
to non-family firms is longer and, furthermore, it has important implication for the 
decision making process in the company. In this case, the family members do not 
consider the firm an asset that can be easily sold (Casson, 1999; Tagiuri & Davis, 1992). 
The main aim of the family is to keep and maintain the business for future generations 
(Kets de Vries, 1993; Zellweger, Kellermanns et al., 2011). Two points are crucial in the 
family firm: the preservation of the dynasty and the continuation of the family’s values. 
 
I.4.      EMPIRICAL DESIGN: TECHNIQUE OF ANALYSIS 
The objective of this section, which is previous to the research itself, is avoiding the 
duplication of the methodological aspects to measure variables and the sample, as well 
as to detail the main models of analysis included in Chapter II to IV. With the aim of 
providing our research results with more consistency and of unifying the different 
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sections of our research, the sample used is constant and formed by international 
companies that will be described below. 
I.4.1 Sample and Data 
The data for the doctoral thesis are the result of a combination of information 
availability in two databases for a period of analysis from 2006 to 2014: (a) Thomson 
One Analytics, for the accounting and financial information (such as business 
classification, balance sheets, income and cash flow statements, stock data, global 
ratios, analyst estimates, corporate actions and events, officers and directors, corporate 
governance and ownership, activism, and other fields) provided in consolidated financial 
statements; and (b) the Ethical Investment Research Service4 (EIRIS) database, for CSR 
data. 
The following sample procedure was used. First, in Thomson Reuters Eikon, we 
took into consideration information for all the firms from the global benchmark stock 
indices from America, Europe, the Middle East, Africa (EMEA) and Asia, comprising of 
3,594 companies from 31 stock indices once duplicated companies were removed. 
Second, we combined the firms’ social and environmental performance from the Ethical 
Investment Research Service (EIRIS) database, a database that compiles information on 
social and environmental performance for more than 30,000 firms.  
After excluding observations with missing financial, economic and CSR 
information, a final sample of 6,442 firm-year observations (956 firms)—spanning nine 
years (from 2006 to 2014)—was available to test the hypotheses. The sample was 
unbalanced, because not all companies were represented in all periods (6,442 
observations in nine years instead of 8,604 if it was a balanced panel data). As Table I.1 
shows, the firms were engaged in activities in different sectors and were from 28 
different countries (i.e., Australia, Belgium, Bermuda, Canada, China, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Macau, Mexico, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US)). Table 





I.4.2 Variables measurement: family ownership and CSR 
The main subject of this doctoral thesis is focused on two fundamental questions that 
will be addressed in the next chapters: family business and CSR performance. The aim 
of this sub-section is to determine the measurement of all the variables and to explain 
them in detail in order to avoid duplications along the following empirical chapters.  
Family Business 
According to O’Boyle et al., (2010, p. 311), ‘family involvement represents a substantial 
family presence in ownership, governance, management, succession, and/or 
employment’. Among these aspects, we focus on family ownership. Although other 
studies use not only family ownership but also other indicators of family control, such 
as the frequent involvement of family members in management (Block and Wagner, 
2013; Dyer and Whetten, 2006; Gomez-Mejía et al., 2007; Marques et al., 2014), which 
are strongly correlated with the percentage of equity ownership held by the family 
(Berrone et al., 2010).  
Thus, a family business is most commonly measured by means of the percentage 
of voting rights held or the ownership and threshold values applied, including 5% 
(Berrone et al., 2010; Chen et al., 2008), 10% (Mok et al., 1992) and even 25% (Chau and 
Leung, 2006). Among the ample range of possibilities, in our study, the explanatory 
variable of ownership concentration is taken as ‘Family’, a dummy variable (Kashmiri 
and Mahajan, 2010; Landry et al., 2013) that takes the value of one (1) if the largest 
shareholder is a family member with more than 20% of the votes and, otherwise, zero 
(0) (Cruz et al., 2014; Martínez-Ferrero et al., 2016b; Rodríguez-Ariza et al., 2017). A 
dichotomous measure of family control has been used in numerous family business 
studies (Berrone et al., 2012). Also, the 20% cut-off should be interpreted in light of a 
long stream of research on control of large publicly traded firms that use an ownership 
threshold as low as 5% to proxy a principal’s capacity to exert major influence over the 
firm’s affairs (Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1995). 
Table I.2 represents the distribution of the sample and of the family firms, by 
industry and country. The 6.77% (436 observations out of 6,442) of the companies were 
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family business. Regarding their distribution, the countries with the highest percentages 
of family business were France, Germany, Spain and Hong Kong while the country with 
the lower presence, among the ones that had presence of family firms, was Japan. 
Regarding the industries, there is no presence of family firms in several industries but, 
among those which had, the highest presence lays on Automobiles and components 
(23.97%) and the smallest presence on Materials (2.66%). 
 
Table I.2. Descriptive statistics of family by industry and country 
  Non family firms Family firms 
  Absolute Relative (%) Absolute Relative (%) 
Total 6.006 93.23% 436 6.77% 
Panel A. Industry         
Automobiles & Components 111 76.03% 35 23.97% 
Capital Goods 687 93.72% 46 6.28% 
Commercial & Professional Services 193 100% 0 0.00% 
Consumer Durables & Appearel 226 94.96% 12 5.04% 
Consumer Services 206 96.26% 8 3.74% 
Diversified Financials 154 95.65% 7 4.35% 
Energy 568 97.26% 16 2.74% 
Food & Staples Retailing 136 79.07% 36 20.93% 
Food, Beverage &Tobacco 240 76.68% 73 23.32% 
Health Care Equipment & Services 269 97.11% 8 2.89% 
Household & Personal Products 87 79.09% 23 20.91% 
Insurance 25 100% 0 0.00% 
Materials 731 97.34% 20 2.66% 
Media 175 90.21% 19 9.79% 
Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology & Life Science 244 91.04% 24 8.96% 
Real Estate 229 87.74% 32 12.26% 
Retailing 264 87.71% 37 12.29% 
Semiconductors & Semiconductor Equipment 146 100% 0 0.00% 
Software & Services 322 100% 0 0.00% 
Technology Hardware & Equipment 190 100% 0 0.00% 
Telecommunication Services 186 95.88% 8 4.12% 
Transportation 245 95.7% 11 4.3% 
Utilities 372 94.66% 21 5.34% 
Panel B. Country         
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Australia 497 100% 0 0.00% 
Belgium 9 100% 0 0.00% 
Bermuda 6 100% 0 0.00% 
Canada 424 84.46% 78 15.54% 
China 135 100% 0 0.00% 
Denmark 9 100% 0 0.00% 
Finland 9 100% 0 0.00% 
France 163 80.3% 40 19.7% 
Germany 147 81.22% 34 18.78% 
Hong Kong 149 82.32% 32 17.68% 
Ireland; Republic of 89 100% 0 0.00% 
Italy 9 100% 0 0.00% 
Japan 636 98.76% 8 1.24% 
Jersey 9 100% 0 0.00% 
Luxembourg 4 100% 0 0.00% 
Macau 5 100% 0 0.00% 
Mexico 6 100% 0 0.00% 
Netherlands 85 91.4% 8 8.6% 
New Zealand 30 100% 0 0.00% 
Norway 16 100% 0 0.00% 
Papua New Guinea 6 100% 0 0.00% 
Russia 28 100% 0 0.00% 
Singapore 142 97.93% 3 2.07% 
South Africa 31 100% 0 0.00% 
Spain 93 81.58% 21 18.42% 
Sweden 126 100% 0 0.00% 
Switzerland 105 92.92% 8 7.08% 
United Kingdom 491 93.88% 32 6.12% 
United States of America 2.551 93.82% 168 6.18% 
N= 6,442 firm-year observations. 
 
CSR performance: External and internal stakeholders 
Following Fabrizi, Mallin, and Michelon (2014) and Martínez-Ferrero et al. (2016a,b), 
CSR performance is measured using a multidimensional construct that addresses all the 
activities carried out by the firms in question, especially with regard to social and 
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environmental aspects (Carroll, 1979). CSR information was compiled from the EIRIS 
database, following many previous studies in this field (e.g., Dam and Scholtens, 2012; 
Fabrizi et al, 2014; Martínez-Ferrero et al.; 2016b). The EIRIS process starts with the 
information disclosed by companies. Then, targeted questionnaires are sent to 
companies regarding areas in which the public data are unclear. These result in 
considerable focused dialogue with companies that helps to clarify any concerns and 
refine their opinion. Sector specialists within each team review the research before the 
score is released. EIRIS gathers data annually through questionnaires and surveys across 
six different areas: environment, governance, human rights, positive products and 
services, stakeholders’ issues and ethical concerns. EIRIS assigns grades to specific 
attributes in such different areas (Table I.3). As Martínez-Ferrero et al. (2016) stated, 
“this procedure might involve a subjective assessment of relevant corporate practices, 
but the topics addressed and the questions posed are designed in such a way as to 
enable a reasonable assessment of the activities evaluated”.  
Moreover, EIRIS research is based on a fully transparent and holistic research 
methodology, which is certified according to external industry quality standards. EIRIS 
combines the broadest range of environmental and socio labour data points to assess 
how companies are responding to the various sustainability challenges that they face. It 
looks for corporate leadership in tackling environmental and social challenges through 
policies, systems, reporting and demonstrated performance improvements. The ratings 
also consider how companies deal with public controversies when they arise – 
companies with a higher score will have taken steps to mitigate the impacts. They also 
take into account each company’s sector, business activities and geographical location.  
To obtain the level of CSR of companies, we make use of an aggregate measure 
that takes into consideration a range of important issues (i.e., environmental, human 
rights, stakeholders, employees and ethical) across companies, according to the 26 
issues shown in Table I.3. Similar to Fabrizi et al. (2013) and Martínez-Ferrero et al. 
(2016b), we transform the EIRIS criteria rating for each measure into a numerical rating. 
According to the scoring criteria of EIRIS (i.e., inadequate, weak, moderate, good and 
exceptional), we assign five values: 0, 1, 2, 3 and 4. Overall, companies are considered 
socially responsible with regard to a specific aspect when the score is above the 
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threshold of 2 and are otherwise not considered sustainable. Because ‘CSR’ is 
determined based on the non-weighted sum of these 26 items, it ranges from 0 to 104.  
Moreover, as observed in Table I.3 and in accordance with Cruz et al. (2014), the 
SEW perspective requires us to consider two groups of stakeholders: internal (i.e., 
employees and ethical issues) and external (i.e., the environment, stakeholders and 
human rights issues). Accordingly, our 26 items were grouped following the design used 
by these authors: orientation of the company towards internal stakeholders, including 
behavior towards employees and ethical issues (‘Int_CSR’), and orientation towards 
external stakeholders, including strategies related to the environment, human rights 
and stakeholders, such as customers and suppliers (‘Ext_CSR’). More concretely, Table 
I.3 reflects the composition of the internal and external stakeholders based on the items 
related to the CSR strategy. Following the criteria of Cruz et al. (2014), ‘Ext_CSR’ covers 
procedures, policies and systems related to: (a) human rights (items 1 to 3), (b) 
environmental issues (items 4 to 8), (c) customer-supplier issues (items 9 and 10) and 
(d) stakeholders´ concerns (items 11 to 16). Meanwhile, ‘Int_CSR’ covers strategies and 
issues related to: (a) employee policies, procedures and systems (items 17 to 22) and (b) 




In addition, several studies adopt a similar instrument for measuring CSR 
performance, but scarce are those that examine reliability of their instrument. In this 
vein and following Rhaman and Post (2012) and Pérez and Rodríguez-del-Bosque (2013), 
among others, it is necessary to examine the validity of our CSR performance.  
As was pointed out in the description of it, for measuring CSR performance, a 
total of 26 statements. First, items 1 to 3 refer to CSR activities oriented to human rights 
issue; items 4 to 7 refer to CSR activities oriented to environmental issues; and items 8 
to 15 refer to activities oriented to stakeholder´s issues. Following Cruz et al. (2012), 
human rights, environmental and stakeholders´ items refer to CSR actions related to 
external stakeholders. Second, items 16 to 21 refer to CSR oriented to employees and 
items 22 to 26 refer to ethical issues. Again following the above authors, employees and 
ethical issues refer to CSR actions related to internal stakeholders.  
Several studies adopt a similar instrument for measuring CSR performance, but 
scarce are those that examine reliability of their instrument. As Rhaman and Post (2012) 
and Pérez and Rodríguez-del-Bosque (2013) recommend and employ, we test for 
reliability for the proposed CSR measured by using the Cronbach alpha for the items 
within each of the five categories of our CSR instrument: human rights, environmental, 
stakeholders, employees and ethical issues.  
The results of this analysis (Table I.4) support the adequacy of the classification 
of CSR performance into five dimensions that then, will composed CSR internal and CSR 
external dimensions: human rights, environmental, stakeholders, employees and ethics. 
Ethical issues accounts for 14.255% of the variance in the analysis, while the values in 
the rest of dimensions are somewhat lower: human rights (11.406%), environmental 
(13.576%), stakeholders (13.878%) and employees (13.346%). Moreover, the KMO test 
and Barlett´s sphericity test were 0.943 and 53,327.584 (p =0.000), respectively, 
indicating sampling adequacy.  
Accounting for reliability, it is also adequate for each dimension and the global 
scale (α Cronbach = 0.949). These values offer convincing evidence of internal 
consistency reliability of our proposed CSR instrument as they are over the minimum 
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recommended by Hair et al. (2010) of 0.70 for the Cronbach alpha 1 .  Thus, the 
Cronbach´s alpha values indicate good reliability for the research instrument: 0.879 for 
the first factor (human rights-3 items), 0.851 for the second (environmental-4 items), 
0.899 for the third (stakeholders-8 items), 0.767 for the fourth (employees-6 items) and 
0.852 for the fifth (ethics-5 items). In addition, we have examined the Cronbach alpha if 
the item is eliminated and in neither case does the overall value increase.
                                               
1 For Gliem and Gliem (2003), values of the Cronbach alpha above 0.7 are acceptable, above 0.8 are good 
and above 0.9 excellent, for ensuring the reliability of the tool. 
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Table I.4. Exploratory Factor Analysis: Reliability of CSR instrument  





What is the extent of policy addressing human rights issues?                                                                                                                                                                                   ,683   
What is the extent of systems addressing human rights issues?                                                                                                                                                                                 ,731   
Does the Company report on human rights issues?                                                                                                                                                                                                ,767
How does EIRIS rate the Company's environmental 
                                                                                                                                                                      
 ,654    
How does EIRIS rate the Company's environmental policy 
 
 ,683    
How does EIRIS rate the Company's environmental reporting 
                                                                                                                                                                      
 ,514    
What level of improvements in environmental impact can the 
                                                                                                                                                         
 ,669    
Does the Company have policies on maintaining good relations 
                                                                                                                                                                      
  ,407   
How clear is the evidence of systems to maintain good relations 
                                                                                                                                                                   
  ,415   
How many stakeholder issues have been allocated to board 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
  ,752   
How clear is the Company's commitment to community or 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
  ,516   
What level of engagement with stakeholders is disclosed by the 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
  ,452   
How good are the Company's policies towards its stakeholders 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
  ,742   
How good is the Company's quantitative reporting on 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
  ,522   
How good are the Company's management systems for 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
  ,507   
How good is the Company's policy on equal opportunity and 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
   ,435  
How clear is the evidence of systems and practices to support 
                                                                                                                                                                   
   ,405  
How clear is the evidence of health & safety systems?                                                                                                                                                                                                            ,333  
How clear is the evidence of systems to manage employee 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
   ,711  
How clear is the evidence of systems to support employee 
                                                                                                                                                                                
   ,555  
How clear is the evidence of systems and practices to advance 
                                                                                                                                                                           
   ,746  
Does the Company have a code of ethics and, if so, how 
                                                                                                                                                                                       
    ,797 
Does the Company have a system for implementing a code of 
                                                                                                                                                                  
    ,717 
What is the extent of the Company's policy for countering 
                                                                                                                                                                              
    ,663 
What is the extent of the Company’s system for countering 
                                                                                                                                                                              
    ,607 
What is the extent of the Company’s reporting on countering 
                                                                                                                                                                            
    ,575 
% Variance 11.406 13.576 13.878 13.346 14.255 
Total %     66.461 
α Cronbach 0.879 0.851 0.899 0.767 0.852 
Number of ítems 3 4 8 6 5 
Barlett´s sphericity test Χ2  
KMO index  
   53,327.584 (p 
=0.000) 
 α Cronbach (26 items)      0.949 
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I.4.3 Models and technique of analysis 
This research has three main purposes related to the three general objectives described in 
previous sections: 
1. Examining the CSR commitment of family firms accounting internal and external 
stakeholders; in addition, examining the moderating effect of the several contingency factors 
associated to governance and environment aspects. 
2. Examining how CSR performance could affect tax avoidance and the moderating effect of 
family ownership under the premise that they exhibit a greater CSR commitment and 
performance and higher tax avoidance. 
3. Examining how CSR performance could affect earning management and the moderating 
effect of family ownership under the premise that they exhibit a greater CSR commitment and 
performance and lower earning management behavior. 
For the first aim, these associations may be represented by Eq. 1, Eq. 2 and Eq.3 as 
follows: 
CSR = f(family ownership, control variables) [Eq.1] 
CSR_internos/CSR_externos = f(family ownership, control variables) [Eq.2] 
CSR/CSR_internos/CSR_externos = f(family ownership, governance −
environment factors, family ownership ∗ governance −
environment, control variables)[Eq.3] 
For the second aim, these associations may be represented by Eq. 4 and Eq. 5 as 
follows: 
Tax Avoidance = f(CSR, control variables) [Eq.4] 




For the third aim, these associations may be represented by Eq. 6 and Eq.7 as follows: 
Earnings Management = f(CSR, control variables) [Eq.6] 
EarningsManagement = f(CSR, family ownership, CSR ∗
family ownership, control variables) [Eq.7] 
Analysis of the propositions could be tested by estimating the corresponding 7 
regression models. All models will incorporate a firm-specific effect, ηi, which controls the 
unobservable heterogeneity that affects firms’ decision-making processes, while μit 
represents the disturbance term.  
The econometric models used will be based on dependence techniques for panel data 
(i.e., repeated observations of the cross-section of companies over time). As noted, our 
sample is composed of 6,442 firm-year observations (i.e., 956 firms, observed from 2006 to 
2014). The use of a panel data set allows us to overcome the limitations of cross-sectional (i.e., 
several companies in a period) and time-series (i.e., one company for several periods) 
analyses, especially those related to low explanatory capacity, which are closely linked to the 
period of analysis considered.  
Panel data models provide greater consistency and explanatory power by considering 
several periods (Petersen, 2009). In addition, this technique allows us to control for 
unobservable heterogeneity, which refers to the particular behavior and characteristics of 
each company included in the sample. These characteristics differ among companies but are 
invariant over time, making it difficult to measure them, because they are unobservable to 
researchers. However, if we do not consider them, the results could be biased. Thus, 
unobservable heterogeneity is controlled for by modelling it as an individual effect, ηi, which 
is then eliminated by taking the first differences of the variables.  
Moreover, panel data allow us to study the dynamics of cross-sectional firms as well 
as to eliminate the bias of aggregation that arises when time-series analyses are used to 
characterize the behavior of individuals. Panel data methodology has additional advantages 
that enhance the possible econometric specifications as well as the parameter estimations; 
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for example, more informative data, greater variability, less collinearity among variables, 
more degrees of freedom and greater efficiency than cross-sectional or time-series methods 
(Martínez-Ferrero and García-Sánchez, 2016a, b). 
It must be recognized that we will apply different regression models to the panel data, 
with the decision regarding which analytic technique to use, depending on the nature of the 
dependent variable and the type of function that is proposed to relate X and Y. For continuous 
variables, the dynamic panel estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991), based on the 
generalized method of moments (GMM). For censured variables, using the maximum 
likelihood method, Tobit models provide efficient and consistent estimates of coefficients, 
because when the likelihood function is maximized, it incorporates information from both 
censored and uncensored observations. These technique of analysis will be explained in detail 
in the corresponding chapter.  
 
I.5.     PHD STRUCTURE 
The general structure of this doctoral thesis is made up by an introductory chapter where we 
give a general idea of this research and we show the theoretical grounds on which our 
research is focused. Afterwards the development of the three main chapters is addressed, 
where we deal with the main implications that the inclusion of family ownership may exhibit 
in different spheres of the social and economic environment. Finally, we give an end to this 
research with a chapter where the main conclusions for the overall analysis are made and 
where we also expound the main limitations and future lines of investigation in this area of 
study. 
I.5.1.      Chapter 2 
CSR is nowadays one of the most important or studied variables in literature in terms of ethical 
compromise since the beginning of the nineteenth century. What’s more, according to the 
IFERA 2003, family firms represent the majority of all business around the world. Taking these 
two statements into considerations, CSR and family firms are the main two variables that 
appear all along the doctoral thesis and they are both two terms that remain constant in all 
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chapters. This is the reason why, we started introducing them in the first chapter for later on 
analyze them including some other variables in the matter of research. So, in chapter two we 
examine the family firms’ behavior towards CSR activities and the possible moderating role 
that several contingency factors based on governance and environmental aspects may exhibit.  
In this sense, the mentioned variables were settled as follows: from the government 
factors we used family directors and family managers, and from the environment factors we 
took into account munificence level of the market and long term orientation of the society. In 
this analysis it should not be forgotten that we have always kept a differentiation between 
internal and external stakeholders.  
With the previous understanding, in this chapter we try to give an answer to three different 
questions: 
1.  How do family firms behave towards CSR actions? 
2. Are there any differences in the CSR commitment of family firms towards internal and 
external stakeholders? 
3. How can contingency factors moderate the relationship analyzed? 
4. Do family firms behave differently from non-family firms? 
 
I.5.2.      Chapter 3 
Once the relationship between CSR and family firms has been analyzed, including all hints, in 
this chapter, we try to shed light on the effect of CSR in terms of tax avoidance. Although 
previous authors have analyzed the relationship of CSR and tax avoidance (Landry et al., 2013; 
Laguir et al., 2015; Lin et al., 2017), the existence of mixed results particularly on the family 
firm framework, concretely in the area of ownership structure, has taken us to delve into this 
three dimensional relationship. It is in this moment when we start talking about the agency 
conflict, trying to figure out if there appears any different in behavior when the implication of 
the family is made on the ownership structure, as we were mentioning before. In this chapter, 
the variables that have been taking into account in the tax sphere where, the effective tax rate 
(ETR) and the cash effective tax rate (CETR). 
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The questions that we address with the development of this chapter are the following: 
5. Do socially responsible companies meet their economic responsibilities regarding tax 
payments? 
6. Considering that outcomes of companies vary from each other’s, is there a difference 
according to family ownership? 
 
 I.5.3.      Chapter 4 
According to the existence of mixed results between CSR and earning management (Kim et 
al., 2011; Gargouri et al., 2010; Shen and Chih, 2005) and particularly within the family 
framework, where evidence is scarce, the aim of this chapter is reinforcing the understanding 
of the effect played by socially responsible commitment in earning management (EM), 
understanding them as those accounting results that do not correspond to those actually 
achieved (Kim et al., 2012). It is as well the aim of this chapter to explore the research gap 
found on the moderating effect of family business in the mentioned relationship of this 
chapter.  
In this case, with the support of the results from the first chapter regarding the 
moderation that family ownership plays on CSR, we try to understand if, indeed, the fact that 
family firms tend to be more socially responsible might lead them to show, as well, a fair lower 
level of earning management in the development of their activities or, in the contrary, if they 
try to mask earning management activities with the outcome of using CSR practices. 
Therefore, this chapter let us find an answer to the following issues: 
7. Do socially responsible companies follow more earning management practices? 
8. Are family firms a moderation between CSR and earning management practices because 
they try to be more socially responsible and show lower earning management level? Or the 
use of CSR activities is only with the aim of masking the use of earning management 
practices? 




I.6.     CONTRIBUTIONS  
As have been described in previous sections, the present research will examine several closely 
related issues in the family business sphere. The first objective is to bring evidence the 
conditions that compromise towards CSR from family firms also by accounting for internal and 
external stakeholders. We examine how several contingency factors associated to governance 
and environment aspects could play a moderating role. The second objective is to shed light 
on the effect of CSR on tax avoidance and examine whether family ownership affects tax 
avoidance practices by socially responsible performance. The third objective is to examine 
how CSR performance could affect earning management and analyze the moderating role 
played by family ownership. 
Briefly, the main contributions of this research to academia are the following. First, 
this research is focused on the family firms´ sphere. We focus on family business as prevalent 
among listed companies around the world (Burkart et al., 2003). But also, because  
Second, this PhD aims to bring evidence about the non-conclusive topic of CSR in family 
firms, due to the fact that there are contradictory results in this area; ones in favor of the 
moderation role that family firms represent on CSR schemes and opposite to it. Although the 
influence of the family ownership on CSR has been examined in prior literature (Berrone et 
al., 2010; Cruz et al., 2014; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2011), results are not clear and provide mixed 
evidence. By examining the relationship between family firms and CSR, we provide more 
generalized results for an international sample of analysis.  
Third, one of the novelties of our research, regarding existing literature in this field, is 
the inclusion of the moderation role of contingent factors in the analysis of the CSR 
commitment of family firms. We follow the argument that Minichilli et al. (2010) introduced 
regarding the involvement of the family in the management team. We contribute to this by 
examining how governance and environment conditions impact CSR performance, 
conditioning to the family ownership. This chapter thus contributes to the literature by 
providing new insights into socially responsible behavior as result of contingent conditions. 
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Fourth, we try to fill the gap between opposite results in the analysis of the relationship 
between CSR and family firms, extending the analysis introducing the differentiation made by 
Cruz et al. (2012). So, we also make a difference between internal and external stakeholders 
in this analysis; family businesses act differently, not only depending on the above-mentioned 
contingencies but also on the type of stakeholders (i.e., internal versus external). 
Fifth, our research also advances in the consequences of the agency conflict between 
majority and minority family shareholders by examining tax avoidance strategies and earning 
management actions in family firms. At this respect, we again contribute by clarifying how CSR 
is associated to tax avoidance strategies where previous evidence is not conclusive. Moreover, 
the analysis of the moderating role played by family ownership enriches this perspective. 
Mainly because as far as we know, this is the first study that examine the relationship between 
CSR and tax avoidance in the family firms’ context. We contribute so by examining how family 
ownership could reinforce or limit the tax saving actions of firms in accordance with their CSR 
commitment.  
Sixth, this PhD also sheds some light on the two streams do not previously established 
by several authors in the family business context: CSR performance and earning management 
activities. The above relationship has been examined by previous studies (e.g. Prior et al., 
2008; Kim et al., 2011). Our research contributes by clarifying this relationship where evidence 
offers mixed results and by providing additional evidence about the link between CSR and 
earning management through the moderating analysis of family ownership. 
Finally, and as subtler contribution, we highlight the use of an international sample of 
analysis composed by 28 countries. Most of previous studies focused on a single country or 
region of analysis; mainly, USA, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and Japan. But, scarce are 
the studies that examine and develop a cross-country analysis. Moreover, our evidence will 
be obtained by regressing several dependency models for panel data. In contrast with some 
previous studies that propose and discuss evidence by descriptive statistics, surveys or other 
univariate analysis, we propose and test our research hypotheses by using technique of 














CHAPTER II.  
CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY IN FAMILY FIRMS: 
























II. 1. INTRODUCTION  
As some scholars like Cruz et al. (2014), Le Breton-Miller and Miller (2016), Berrone et al. 
(2010) and Campopiano and De Massis (2014) have extensively studied, CSR is increasing its 
importance at the forefront of firms’ agendas—specifically at family firms. In all countries, 
family firms represents the majority of all businesses (IFERA, 2003). Thus, during the last few 
decades, family business literature has received consistent attention by examining their 
ethical compromise, not only being developed as itself but also compared with those 
companies that differ in composition: non-controlled family firms (Boling et al., 2016; Cruz et 
al. 2014; Marqués et al., 2014; Sánchez-Medina and Díaz-Pichardo, 2017). However, despite 
the analysis of prior literature, there is still a lack of information on whether they are more 
socially responsible or not, due to controversial results.  
As was pointed out, some authors focus on the role of family firms in the engagement 
of social activities to pursue their socioemotional wealth (SEW) and maximize shareholders’ 
value (Cennamo et al., 2012). Despite general opinion, however, others have stated that 
family firms could not be focused on arranging CSR (Burak and Morante, 2007; Morck and 
Yeung, 2004): some of them due to the opportunism that emerges in public family firms when 
they reach certain positions (Le Breton-Miller and Miller, 2016). Berrone et al. (2012) 
proposed that those differences on results are based mainly in the distinction family firms may 
make along their life; that is, giving more importance to protecting their image and reputation 
or letting their control-power and influence in the company surpass their SEW. Similarly, the 
differences among the governance and environmental factors of family firms can influence 
the engagement of family firms towards CSR activities. For instance, some authors (e.g., Le 
Breton-Miller and Miller, 2016) propose what they call ‘moderating contingencies’, which 
make family firms behave towards a more sustainable approach.  
Thus, attending to those authors, the contingencies analyzed will be associated with: 
(i) the presence of family directors and members on the board; and (ii) the influence of the 
environment in which the firm operates—in relation to the level of munificence and the long-
term orientation of the country. Respectively, prior literature has mentioned that the efforts 
to ensure CSR are higher when the family is completely involved in the company business 
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(Chrisman et al., 2005); whereas, Tan and Litschert (1994) found evidence regarding the 
change of behavior that companies experience when they stay in munificent markets, and 
Hofstede and Hofstede (2005) introduced the idea of long-term orientation as the connection 
between the past and the future of the company. 
Attending to the lack of unanimity on the issues of family firms’ compromise towards 
CSR and the need of exploring those contingencies that moderate such compromise, our 
chapter focuses on the following. First, this chapter analyses the effect that family firms may 
have on their behavior towards CSR approaches and, thus, their focus on social and 
environmental friendly activities. Second, we also focus our analysis on the moderation that 
the family firms-CSR relationship may experience on the presence of different contingency 
factors regarding governance and environmental stages. According to Berrone et al. (2012) 
family businesses act differently, not only depending on the contingency factors but also on 
the type of stakeholders; therefore, we then examine the differentiation between internal 
and external stakeholders.  
In summary, this chapter addresses the following questions: (1) How do family firms 
behave towards CSR actions?; (2) Are there any differences in the CSR commitment of family 
firms towards internal and external stakeholders?; and (3) How can contingency factors—
governance and environment aspects—moderate the relationship between family firms and 
CSR? These research questions are examined for an internal sample of analysis, from 2006 to 
2014. Methodologically, several Tobit regressions for panel data are proposed.  
The main evidence of the chapter supports the notion that family firms conduct their 
activities on the path of social and environmental behaviours, showing a greater CSR 
commitment with external and internal stakeholders. Moreover, the greater CSR commitment 
of family firms is even superior: (i) under the large presence of family members on the 
management team and family directors on board of directors (i.e., as governance factors) and 
(ii) in munificent contexts (i.e., as an environment factor). 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 2, we describe the 
theoretical background that supports our research hypotheses. Section 3 describes the 
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research model, data and sample. Finally, Sections 4 and 5 present the results obtained and 
the conclusions drawn, respectively. 
II. 2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
II. 2.1. CSR performance in family firms 
Along the first pages of this research we have highlighted that the concept of CSR has 
increased interest over prior years for both economic researchers and practitioners involved 
in business (e.g. Gallardo-Vázquez and Sánchez-Hernández, 2014; Fernández-Feijoo et al., 
2014). CSR has been thoroughly explained by many scholars since the beginning of the 
nineteenth century. At this regard, Carrol (1979) defined CSR as the responsibilities integrated 
in the company encompassing legal, ethic, economic and philanthropic expectations that the 
society expects from organizations, which is called the “CSR Pyramid” (Carrol, 1991). Form the 
Carrol´s perspective of CSR Pyramid, the “economic” responsibility to the society is based on 
the idea that the society is expecting the company to be able to sustain itself and, therefore, 
it needs to be profitable and have resources to continue with its activity. Regarding the “legal” 
expectation, it is understood as the legal basis or rules that the society has establish for the 
companies to operate as well as the sanctions that they may have in case of breaking the rules. 
The “ethical” expectation regards the attainment of the company to activities, standard or 
norms that are expected from the society but not guided or codified by the law, but expected 
nevertheless. Finally, the “philanthropic” expectation includes activities that the company 
voluntarily carries out, that are not required by the law or expected from the business, in an 
ethical sense.  
Later in time, Freeman (1984) proposed the notion of stakeholders which became 
essential on the implementation of CSR by companies. This author defined a stakeholder as a 
group or single identity that may be taken into account in the objectives of an organization 
but who can also be affected by them. Within the stakeholder theory framework, firms must 
not only to serve the interests of shareholders, but also have responsibilities towards society 
and the manager's role is to search for a balance between the needs and demands of multiple 
stakeholders and Freeman (1984).   
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In the same vein but years later, the European Community Commission stated in 2001 
that the voluntary integration of social and environmental practices in a company’s daily 
transactions and relationships with stakeholders can be defined as CSR. Thus, the main 
purpose of a company is to create value for its owners and stakeholders, while contributing 
to the welfare of the society. In this vein, several benefits are associated with CSR 
performance2, such as superior performance (Orlitzky et al., 2003), lower cost of capital (El 
Ghoul et al., 2011), greater company value (Petersen and Vredenburg, 2009) and greater 
customer attraction and brand reputation (Mason and Simmons, 2013)—among a large list of 
positive CSR outcomes. Moreover, most of the previous studies agree that one of the most 
important consequences of developing proactive CSR performance is the increase in the firm´s 
reputation, which leads, above all, to the increase of the favorable general level of perception 
that the stakeholders have on the company: driving to their considerable increase in the trust 
towards the company relative to other companies and their own expectations (Deephouse 
and Carter, 2005; Fombrun et al, 2000; Young and Marais, 2011). 
Indeed, there is a great focus of research regarding CSR on the field of family firms. 
Although there is no universal definition of a family firm (Miller et al., 2007), in general, it 
usually refers to management, ownership or succession-related issues. The typical family 
business has been characterized as a firm in which one or more family founders operate in a 
top managerial position and control a large proportion of the company’s shares or participate 
as a board member (Chen et al., 2008).  
                                               
2 Meta-analyses, such as those performed by Margolis and Walsh (2003) and Orlitzky et al. (2003), have shown 
inconclusive results regarding the relationship between CSR and firm value or shareholder wealth. Numerous 
authors state that the benefits of CSR are often intangible, long-term, uncertain and difficult to obtain (e.g. 
Harrison et al., 2010). In this sense, some authors defend the possible promotion of CSR to obtain managerial 
benefits at the shareholders’ expense and therefore reflect an agency problem (Barnea and Rubin, 2010), 
decreasing shareholders value (Hillman and Keim, 2001). However, there are other authors that argue that 
socially responsible strategies’ expenditures improve firm performance and shareholder satisfaction (Matten 
and Moon, 2008) and value (Flammer, 2015). Similarly, Godfrey et al. (2009) find that CSR strategy could at times 
create shareholder value for their secondary stakeholders, if this strategy is public knowledge and creates a 
reasonable and credible declaration of unselfish intention. What’s more, authors like Fonseca and Ferro (2006) 
found a positive association between social performance and financial performance, also in studies conducted 
on SMEs  
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In many cases, family ownership is characterized by large investments in company 
capital and by the presence of family members on the board (Maury, 2006).  In this vein, prior 
research has shown that family and non-family firms operate in different ways (Miller, Le 
Breton-Miller, Lester and Cannella, 2007; Miller, Minichilli and Corbetta, 2013; among others) 
regarding entrepreneurial initiatives (Boling, Pieper and Covin, 2014) and risk taking (Chrisman 
and Patel, 2012) because of their different priorities to preserve their wealth. But it is not only 
because of this but family ownership has a moderation role due to, among other things, their 
performance and non-financial goals (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Naldi, Cennamo, Corbetta 
and Gómez-Mejía, 2013, Kotlar and De Massis, 2013), planning horizons (Kellermanns and 
Eddleston, 2006; Lumpkin et al., 2010), resource allocation (Carnes and Ireland, 2013) and 
certain strategic postures (Sciascia, Mazzola and Chirico, 2013; Short, Payne, Brigham, 
Lumping and Broeberg, 2009). 
Nevertheless, family firms possess unique capabilities and resources (i.e., human, 
social and relational capital) that differentiate them from non-family firms and lead them to 
have competitive advantages. In that respect, prior literature analyses the fact that family 
firms act in a different manner according to economic and environmental points of view, in 
order to properly focus on their ‘responsibilities towards society’: CSR. In fact, some studies 
have found that companies in which the family is completely involved, the efforts made to 
ensure CSR is larger (Aronoff and Ward, 1995; Chrisman et al., 2005). As mentioned before, 
the attainment of CSR leads to the creation of a favorable reputation. In terms of family firms, 
according to several authors, this reputation means the attraction of both more competent 
family members—leading to a greater possibility of a family firm’s survival (Deephouse et al., 
2013)—and more external candidates with a higher level of quality in different aspects (Collins 
and Ham, 2004; Turban and Cable, 2003; Williamson et al., 2010). It can also be considered as 
a way to help companies to achieve their socioemotional objective of continuity of the family 
employment (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2011; Schulze et al., 2003), as well as a way of escaping from 




One of the reasons that support the engagement of CSR activities in family firms is 
supported by the SEW approach (Berrone et al., 2012; Cruz et al., 2014; Gomez-Mejía et al., 
2000).  The SEW Theory is an extension of the Behavioral Agency Model or BAM (Wiseman & 
Gomez- Mejia, 1998; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2000), where the principal of the BAM, key decision-
makers, are the reference point for firm choices in order to preserve endowment inside the 
firm; it is transferred to or applied in the family firm environment, where they make decisions 
based on socioemotional points and not only in economic ones. Gomez-Mejía et al. (2007) 
applied it to the special case of family agents or principals and stated that upholding 
socioemotional endowment is the main reference point for understanding family strategic 
decision making and dealing with the uniqueness of family firms. In fact, they also affirm that 
when the family is willing to make a decision, they are usually driven by the risk undertaken 
to preserve the endowment. According to Berrone et al. (2010), although some theories (e.g., 
the agency or stewardship theory) have contributed to explain the behavior of family firms, 
the SEW theory represents the main reference point for understanding family strategic 
decision making and dealing with the uniqueness of family firms. Moreover, they also stated 
that the risk is balanced by the gains of the family SEW, although the transaction has uncertain 
economic benefits. Thus, literature has proven that owners of family firms are more likely to 
go further with social performance, even though there is no clear economic profitability in the 
activity undertaken; however, they appreciate the socioemotional reward that it implies to 
the family.  
Due to the fact that family firms are, usually in most cases, concerned with taking care 
of their SEW through their image and their reputation, they are highly more responsible to 
demands of the external stakeholders than non-family firms (Berrone et al., 2012). The 
traditional view is that family firms are usually characterized by non-financial aims, such as 
identity, reputation, longevity and the preservation of a positive image in the public domain 
(Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Berrone et al., 2010), and that they tend to be more responsive to 
social issues and stakeholders than are non-family firms (Van Gils et al., 2014). Thus, a family 
business is traditionally expected to be proactive in developing connections with stakeholders, 
acting as a good steward in the community in which it is operating and caring for employees’ 
welfare and the working environment (Bammens et al., 2014; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007).  
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In addition, Cruz et al. (2014) evidenced that family owners give different priority to 
stakeholders’ demands and concerns, according to those stakeholders that are vital to the 
continuance and survival of the firm (Berrone et al., 2010). Cruz et al. (2014) classify those 
stakeholders as: (i) internal, such as shareholders, employees and suppliers (Clarkson, 1995); 
and (ii) external, such as the local community, media or environment. 
According to existing research that addresses concerns about corporate reputation, 
family businesses should be particularly keen to meet the demands of internal stakeholders 
by following responsible work actions (Zellweger et al., 2012). In the CSR context, Berrone et 
al. (2010) support the notion that family owners show a greater preference for promoting a 
socially responsible strategy, focusing on internal stakeholders that are vital for the survival 
of family firms and allowing family owners to have perpetual and direct or indirect control and 
influence. Thus, literature frames socially responsible performance associated with internal 
stakeholders as essential for legitimizing family firms (Mayo et al., 2016).  Meanwhile, 
compromise with external stakeholders allows family firms to create confident relations with 
them (Cennamo et al., 2009; Laplume et al., 2008) that favour a good reputation, image and 
other intangible assets (Aragón-Correa and Sharma, 2003). 
In view of the controversies about the family firms orientation towards internal and 
external stakeholders, we expect that family firms could be more focused on promoting CSR 
independently associated with dimensions for internal and external stakeholders, ensuring 
the preservation of their SEW and their corporate reputation (Cennamo et al., 2012); that is, 
family owners and managers avoid any action that could lead to a loss of legitimation and that 
could conceptualize them as not responsible (Deephouse and Jaskiewicz, 2013) without 
showing a greater preference for internal or external stakeholders´ demands. Based on the 
above arguments, the following hypotheses are proposed, breaking down into internal and 
external stakeholders: 
H1: family firms show a greater effort in developing CSR performance activities.  




H1b: family firms show a greater effort in developing external CSR performance 
activities. 
II. 2.2. Contingency as moderating factors 
Le Breton-Miller and Miller (2016), in their research, proposed certain contingency factors 
(i.e., ‘moderating contingencies’) that are focused on the organizational structures of the 
government and the company’s contextual situations that may make families channel their 
behavior towards a more sustainable approach. They divided these forces into four different 
streams, starting from the main aspect of these types of companies: the family and its 
educational background. From this, they questioned if the involvement of ethical standards 
during the childhood played a crucial role once the person has taken part in the company. In 
the same line of analysis, parenting and educational experiences were studied. From thereon, 
the remaining three forces were related to explicit issues belonging to the company at hand: 
governance, environment and organization.  
The governance characteristics taken into account in this chapter are similar to those 
these authors introduced by Le Breton-Miller and Miller (2016), regarding the structure of the 
management department and the board of directors of the company. Likewise, in the 
environmental aspect, those authors were considering, among others, the scarcity and 
hostility of the contextual framework. However, apart from these, we contribute to their study 
by testing the level of munificence as an environmental condition and the long-term 
orientation of the society in which a firm may have on its CSR improvement. In the following, 
we detail each contingency factor as well as its possible moderating effect. 
II. 2.2.1. Governance 
Governance encloses several aspects that may have an impact on whether a family firm tends 
to be more or less proactive in CSR activities. Governance factors in the family firms’ field are 
associated to the presence of family members on the managerial team as well as the family 
presence on the board of directors (Le Bretton-Miller and Miller, 2016). At this regard, it is 
necessary to remark the previous literature about the concept called ‘familiness’, which 
assesses the involvement that a family has in a corporation and the resources and capabilities 
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arising from that relationship (Habbershon et al., 1999). Some authors stated that this term 
(i.e., ‘familiness’) has two different views or approaches: one regarding the essence of the 
involvement, and the other regarding the components of this family involvement—
contending the ownership and the management or control of a family business (Chrisman et 
al., 2005). In this last approach, we focus our governance analysis by examining management 
and control.  
On the one hand, in family firms, the governance of a firm is influenced by a member 
of a family group, among other determinants (Déniz-Déniz and Cabrera-Suarez, 2004). In this 
regard, there are some studies that support the idea that employees who belong to the family 
group have better condition of promotion and responsibilities than those non-family 
employees (Beehr et al., 1997; Poza et al., 1997) or job security and flexibility (Cromie and 
Sullivan, 1999). All of it, even considering that some of those employees who are part of the 
family group do not have the qualification to run the business (Chua et al., 2009). 
In order to measure involvement in firms, some authors have used family presence on 
the governing team, both in management and on the board of directors (Chen et al., 2008; 
Shanker and Astrachan, 1996). Berrone et al. (2010) showed that families who are involved in 
decision making direct their firms to pursue SEW: the main argument for the greater CSR 
commitment of a family firm. According to the agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976), managers are the firm’s agents that have the right to decide, but they do not 
bear the consequences of their own decisions. Young et al. (2011), in their research, took the 
consideration of this theory upon studying the managerial ownership, posing that there exists 
a positive relationship between ownership in hands of the management team and CSR 
engagement. Likewise, empirical data prove that family firms pursue more environmental-
focused activities, due to the reward that this means to the family name (Berrone et al., 2010).  
Similarly, Sharma and Sharma (2011) confirmed that, no matter the financial 
considerations that their actions hold, family owners tend to be more environmentally 
focused (i.e., CSR concentrated) when they control the company. Moreover, as CSR activities 
may derive into a favorable reputation of the family firm, family members in the management 
team may be proud of the fact that they have taken the firm to a glorious status (Cialdini et 
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al., 1976) and given it a so-called prestige (Bergami and Bagozzi, 2000). On the contrary, if they 
do not achieve this ethical and responsible goal, they may feel ashamed of their managerial 
mistakes (Berrone et al., 2010).  
It is also important to reiterate some previous family firms literature, which suggest 
that there was a direct relationship between the family involvement in the management team 
or, what Minichilli et al. (2010) called the ‘top management team’ (TMT). TMT deals with goals 
as the reputation of the firm (Deephouse and Jaskiewicz, 2013), SEW preservation (Gómez-
Mejía et al., 2007) and CSR (Dyer and Whetten, 2006); this last strategy supports the 
maintenance of control and prevents the loss of the existing SEW within the firm. Gathering 
all the above mentioned in mind, in the following we proposed the second set of hypotheses 
for the first governance and contingency factor: 
H2: The presence of family members in the management team moderates the 
association between family firms and CSR performance.  
H2a: The presence of family members in the management team moderates the 
association between family firms and internal CSR performance. 
H2b: The presence of family members in the management team moderates the 
association between family firms and external CSR performance.  
On the other hand, among the distinct spheres of the company, we cannot forget the 
board of directors: it works on providing advice, connections, expertise and encouraging the 
company towards innovations and strategic change, but it also monitors the management on 
behalf of the principle and the minority shareholders (Hiller et al., 2011; Johnson et al., 1996). 
The composition of the board of directors has previously been studied by Voordeckers et al. 
(2006), integrating several dimensions of the family firms component into their model, as 
Corbetta and Salvato (2004) and Dyer (2003) introduced. Thus, when boards are dominated 
by family members—or family directors—there may appear insularity, which may leave the 
company aside of the current market situation (Ward, 2006) and lead to ignorance of the 
actual social responsibilities that the society requires in such a moment. 
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Despite the contradictory literature about the family directors and the CSR 
compromise of the firm, some authors (e.g., Block and Wagner, 2014), affirmed that family 
members in board posts have a deep influence on CSR performance because of their strong 
knowledge about the company and their powerful as owners. Again, Berrone et al. (2010) 
showed that the presence of family members on boards also implies pursuing SEW goals in 
their decision making. Deephouse and Jaskiewcz (2013) also supported the idea that if there 
is only one family member on the board of directors, there exist a positive relationship with 
CSR. In addition, other authors supported that, over financial considerations, the presence of 
family members on the board emphasizes the preservation of the existing SEW in the 
company (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2011; Minichilli et al., 2014) and avoid diluting the control of 
the firm trying to preserve it (Basco and Calabró, 2017; Feldman et al., 2016). Therefore, in 
the line with the above arguments, the following set of hypotheses are proposed: 
H3: The presence of family members on the board moderates the association between 
family firms and CSR performance.  
H3a: The presence of family members on the board moderates the association 
between family firms and internal CSR performance. 
H3b: The presence of family members on the board moderates the association 
between family firms and external CSR performance.  
II. 2.2.2. Environment 
In recent years, the interest of scholars to determine the role that the business environment 
plays on CSR has been enormous. In this regard, from the perspective of the institutional 
theory, it has been proven that organizations operating in similar contexts adopt uniform 
corporate behavior to ensure their institutional legitimization as a key factor in their survival 
(DiMaggio and Powel, 1987). Reinforcing prior literature about the business environment and 
CSR and expanding to the family firms context, we focus on two environment aspects: 
munificence (Liu et al., 2013; Tan and Litschert, 1994) and the long-term orientation of the 
firm’s country of origin (Chrisman and Patel, 2012; Cruz and Nordqvist, 2012; García-Sánchez 
et al., 2015). 
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On the one hand, prior research argues that the effect that the external context of an 
industry has on organizational structure, risk taking and different strategic decisions (Dess and 
Beard, 1984; Keats and Hitt, 1988; Walters et al., 2010) can be extrapolated to the CSR strategy 
(Chen et al., 2017; Martínez del Rio et al., 2015). In addition, the CSR compromise is a 
consequence not only of the need to legitimize itself to guarantee their survival but also of 
the need to adapt to those characteristics of the business environment that can favor or 
restrict the continuous growth of an organization (Goll and Rasheed, 2004). Then, as Goll and 
Rasheed (2004) and Chen et al. (2017) propose, CSR could respond to industry contexts. In 
this context, we respond to the research proposal of Young and Thyill (2014), which also 
explores the interrelationships between CSR and the industrial contexts, in particular, 
examining munificence as an environmental factor. Thus, we expand prior research by 
focusing on the family firm sphere.  
First of all, munificence has been defined in prior literature as a critical aspect of a 
firm’s operating environment (Liu et al., 2013), the scarcity or abundance of resources within 
an environment (Randolph and Dess, 1984) as well as the ability of the environment to support 
sustained growth of an organization (Aldrick, 1979). This ability helps companies to be able to 
face external and internal hostilities and to accumulate slack resources (Cyert and March, 
1963). Munificence can also help companies to notice the opportunities that may not exist for 
other firms that operate in lesser munificent contexts (Kirzner, 1979). Indeed, some scholars 
support the idea that slack of resources offers management the necessary autonomy to 
pursue a wide range of profitable activities (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; Cyer and March, 
1963; Grant, 1991). Moreover, others state that slack may also help companies prepare for 
possible environmental turbulences that may appear during the firms' life and help them in 
economic hardship (Chen and Kesner, 1997; Meyer, 1982; Thompson, 1967). 
At this respect, Rosenbusch et al. (2013), Martínez-del-Río et al. (2015), and Chen et 
al. (2017), among others, evidenced that munificent contexts— those rich in critical 
resources—favor the development of proactive environmental and social performance: 
performance that also occurs in dynamic but not complex contexts. As Martínez-del-Río et al. 
(2015) argue, in a lower munificent context, resources are limited, and the relative cost of 
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investing in environmental proactive strategies is greater when munificence is higher. 
Similarly, Goll and Rasheed (2004) argue that higher munificence firms are more likely to 
engage in socially responsible behaviour than are environments with scarce resources, whose 
economic conditions are deteriorating. That is, lower munificent contexts reduce the marginal 
profit that companies can obtain (Miller and Friesen, 1983) and offers fewer opportunities for 
growth will cause companies to be less focused on being socially responsible, even to the 
minimum degree expected by stakeholders, since positive economic returns are not 
guaranteed (Chen et al., 2017). 
Meanwhile, regarding the family firms´ behavior towards CSR in munificent contexts, 
it must be noted that the lack of munificence buffers a lower or null organizational slack and, 
then, a threat to the firms’ survival (Liu et al., 2013). The survival and growth of a family firm 
is influenced by munificence as environmental conditions. Therefore, family firms that 
perceive their environments to be supportive of survival, growth and preservation of their 
SEW behave differently from those that operate under hostility (Tan and Litschert, 1994). 
Gómez-Mejía et al. (2011) suggest how family firms can adopt strategies that lead to accepting 
more business risks—as in the case of lesser munificent markets—for the sake of protecting 
their SEW.  
In other words, in lesser munificent markets, family firms may be more focused on 
searching for resources and ensuring their survival and growth. There, family firms may be 
more inclined to promote more performance on CSR as a means of gaining legitimacy and, 
then, ensuring their continued control over the company. Thus, gathering all of these ideas in 
mind, regarding our subject of analysis, we state the following set of hypotheses: 
H4: The level of market munificence moderates the association between family firms 
and CSR performance.  
H4a: The level of market munificence moderates the association between family firms 
and internal CSR performance. 
H4b: The level of market munificence moderates the association between family firms 
and external CSR performance.  
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Another side of the environment that we analyzed in this chapter is the long-term 
orientation of the country of origin. Some authors have studied this orientation within the 
company, but we are going to focus this research on the analysis of the country’s long-term 
orientation dimension of the society that could be interpreted as the links of society with the 
past and the future. This dimension, among others previously studied, was introduced by 
Hofstede and Hofstede (2005), focusing on societies with a clear idea on future rewards and 
the adaptation to changes in the surrounding circumstances, among others. Societies with a 
long-term orientation believe that truth depends on situations, context, time and taking a 
more pragmatic approach. However, societies with a short-term orientation exhibit great 
respect for traditions, and they view changes with suspicion (Hofsede and Hofstede, 2005).  
In this sense, as an effect that the temporary orientation of a society may have on the 
behavior of a firm and also taking into account the way companies adapt to the environment, 
it could also be interesting to bear in mind the previous researches made on the long-term 
orientation of a society. This long-term orientation dimension was also studied by Garcia-
Sanchez et al. (2015), who found that there is a positive relationship between the long-term 
orientation of a country with CSR, posing that this makes sense due to the fact that this 
strategy is highly demanded by the society in which the company is located. According those 
authors, a company that follows a long-term orientation dimension is more focused on CSR 
performance and prefers a sustainability report form—as it informs them about the firm’s 
social and environmental behavior and their impact on our common future. Regarding CSR 
investments, Falck and Heblich (2007), also stated that these investments are more likely to 
generate a reward in the long run. It was also pointed out by Young et al. (2011) that long-
term investors look for an increase in the future company’s CSR rating. Nevertheless, 
individuals who are long-term orientated state that there is no real truth regarding all of these 
because it entirely depends on the context and time. However, at the end, they will expect 
transparency and good government.  
Moreover, one can think, as Cruz and Nordqvist (2012) or Chrisman and Patel (2012), 
that family firms focus more on the long term orientation than non- family firms due to the 
creator’s desire of the continuity of the company, so future generations can heritage a healthy 
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(James, 2006), profitable and viable firm. In line with this orientation, Miller and Le Breton-
Miller (2005) stated that family firms, in order to endure the lifespan of the business, adopted 
specific strategies to achieve such objective. The authors supported that these firms used to 
create favorable links with all the parties involved in their transaction so ‘everybody win’ at 
the end: subsequent generations, stakeholders (Arregle et al., 2007) and the future-
maintained society. 
Accordingly, we expect that societies with a short-term orientation are more worried about 
traditional reports and more focused on financial issues; thus, it is expected that family firms 
in societies with a long-term orientation will be more focused on commitment, sustainability 
and transparent governance—leading to an orientation towards good behavior and CSR 
activities. These environmentally focused activities, afterwards, would be translated to 
investors and stakeholders to clarify the company’s long-term prospects, in their efforts to 
manage a greater transparency (Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005). Therefore, based on the above 
arguments, the following set of hypotheses are proposed for analyzing the moderating effect 
of a society’s long-term orientation on the family firms -CSR relationship: 
H5: The extent of a society’s long-term orientation moderates the association between 
family firms and CSR performance.  
H5a: The extent of a society’s long-term orientation moderates the association 
between family firms and internal CSR performance. 
H5b: The extent of a society’s long-term orientation moderates the association 
between family firms and external CSR performance.  
II. 3. METHOD 
II. 3.1. Sample  
As was described in Chapter I, a sample of 6,442 firm-year observations (956 firms)—spanning 
nine years (from 2006 to 2014) and from 28 countries—was available to test the hypotheses.  
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II. 3.2. Measures 
CSR performance: External and internal stakeholders 
Chapter I contains the description of the CSR performance measure in detail. As was 
described, to obtain the level of CSR of companies, we make use of an aggregate measure that 
takes into consideration a range of important issues (i.e., environmental, human rights, 
stakeholders, employees and ethical) across companies, according to 26 issues; ‘CSR’ is 
determined based on the non-weighted sum of these 26 items, it ranges from 0 to 104. 
Moreover, our 26 items were grouped following the design used by these authors: orientation 
of the company towards internal stakeholders, including behaviour towards employees and 
ethical issues (‘Int_CSR’), and orientation towards external stakeholders, including strategies 
related to the environment, human rights and stakeholders, such as customers and suppliers 
(‘Ext_CSR’).  
Family firms  
Again, as was described in previous chapter, among the ample range of possibilities, in our 
chapter, the explanatory variable of ownership concentration is taken as ‘Family’, a dummy 
variable (Kashmiri and Mahajan, 2010; Landry et al., 2013) that takes the value of one (1) if 
the largest shareholder is a family member with more than 20% of the votes and, otherwise, 
zero (0) (Cruz et al., 2014; Martínez-Ferrero et al., 2016; Rodríguez-Ariza et al., 2017).  
Contingency factors  
Governance 
Governance goes along with the ownership structure of the business, the quality of its 
executives and the nature of the board of directors (Le Breton-Miller and Miller, 2016). Cruz 
et al. (2014), defined the governance category as the disclosure of policies and procedures, 
board independency and diversity, attention to stakeholders, compensation of executives and 
the evaluation of the company’s ethical behavior. Moreover, some authors considered the 
governance indicator as the independent variable of their research and denoted it as a dummy 
variable, which took into account the existence of a CEO who belongs to the family circle 
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(Laguir et al., 2014; Berrone et al., 2010). However, we are going to focus this in the analysis 
of the composition of the management team and the board of directors, not only the CEO. 
Regarding these variables and interconnecting them with social responsibilities, Jones et al. 
(2008) stated that the board and the management members are selected by the family 
ownership, which can lead to a favorable reputation protected by the family members 
pursuing CSR strategies (Deephouse and Jaskiewicz, 2013). In this way, we propose two 
indicator variables: (1) ‘Fam_Managers’, which corresponds to the proportion of managers 
that belong to the family circle; and, equally measured, (2) ‘Fam_Directors’, which is used to 
measure the number of family members that are included in the firm board of directors.  
Environment 
Munificence refers to the abundance of resources in an industry that supports growth, 
typically measured as the industry growth rate (Chen et al., 2017). Similar to Goll and Rasheed 
(2004), Withers and Fitka (2016), Lester et al. (2006), and Chen et al. (2017), among others, 
we use the measure of Keats and Hitt (1988)—originally developed by Dess and Beard 
(1984)—for operationalizing munificence. Following Keats and Hitt (1988), the five-year 
industry growth rate in net sales in one industry was designated as the indicator for 
munificence.3 To calculate it, we regress the natural log of industry sales on an indicator of 
years as an independent variable. The antilog of the regression slope coefficient was used as 
the measure for munificence (‘Munificence’) as the average growth (or decline) in an industry. 
Meanwhile, we base our environmental aspect, related to cultural dimensions, on some of 
those proposed by Hofstede (2011), who developed them to explain the general similarities 
and dissimilarities in cultures around the world. At this stage, following the dimensions 
proposed by Hofstede (2011), the cultural index adopted refers to long-term orientation. It 
describes the link of every society with its own past while dealing with the challenges of the 
present and future. In line with the above, the cultural dimension variable is the following (the 
data are available on the Geert HofstedeTM Cultural Dimensions website): ‘Long_Term’, which 
is a numerical variable that represents the orientation of a society towards the future.  
                                               
3 We acquired the total sales for each two-digit standard industrial classification (SIC) by year from the Thomson 
Reuters Eikon database.  
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II. 3.3. Control variables 
We also include a set of variables in the analyses to account for possible alternative 
explanations. These control variables were included in our regression models, according to 
previous CSR studies (Cascino et al., 2010; Cruz et al., 2014; Goll and Rasheed, 2004; Gómez-
Mejía et al., 2011). Regarding firm aspects, ‘Leverage’ represents firm leverage as the natural 
logarithm of the ratio of total debt to total equity; ‘Performance’ represents firm performance 
by using Tobin’s Q, calculated based on the most usual proxy: the book value of total assets 
minus the book value of common equity plus the market value of common equity divided by 
the book value of total assets. ‘Size’ represents firm sales and was measured as the natural 
logarithm of sales. ‘R&D_intensity’ represents the research and development investment 
effort as the ratio of research and development expenses to total assets. Finally, we also 
control for the industry, year and country by using dummy variables. ‘Industryj’ is a dummy 
variable, where j represents the different sectors of activity in which the companies in the 
sample operate; ‘Yearn’ is a dummy variable, where n represents the years of the sample; and 
‘Countryk’ is a dummy variable, where k represents the different countries in the sample. 
II. 3.4. Method and technique of analysis 
This research examines conditions that compromise towards CSR from firms in general, and 
from family firms in particular. Moreover, in the family firms’ sphere, we examine whether 
they exhibit a different level of compromise towards CSR associated with internal and external 
stakeholders. For these aims, in Model I, CSR is regressed on the family business indicator and 
control variables. In Models II and III, our internal and external stakeholders´ indicator 
replaces CSR, respectively.  
CSR/CSR_int/CSR_ext = β1Familyit + β2Leverageit + β3Performanceit + β4Sizeit +




j=6 3 ∑ αnCountryi
52
k=24 + μit + ηi  
(Models I, II and III, respectively) 
Once we have regressed our basic models, we aim to examine the moderating effect 
of the several contingency factors associated to governance and environment aspects. At this 
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respect, for Models I, II and III, respectively, we regressed our dependent variable (‘CSR’, 
‘CSR_int’ and ‘CSR_ext’) on our family business indicator, the moderating effect (i.e., the 
contingency factor examined) and the interaction between both variables for examining the 
joint effect. The following parent model is proposed for each contingency factor and for 
Models I, II and III, attending to the dependent variable. For instance, for family managers as 
a governance aspect, the following models are proposed: 
CSR/CSR_int/CSR_ext
= φ1Familyit + φ2Fam_Managersit + φ3Family ∗ Fam_Managersit
+ φ4Leverageit + φ5Performanceit + φ6Sizeit + φ7RD_Intensityit








+ μit + ηi 
(Models Ia, IIa and IIIa, respectively) 
All models incorporate a firm-specific effect, ηi, which controls the unobservable 
heterogeneity that affects firms’ decision-making processes, while μit represents the 
disturbance term. The firm is represented by i, and t refers to the time period. β and φ are the 
parameters to be estimated. The econometric models used are based on dependence 
techniques for panel data.  
We apply different regression models to the panel data, with the decision regarding 
which analytic technique to use, depending on the nature of the dependent variable and the 
type of function that is proposed to relate X and Y. In this case, because the dependent 
variables in this research (i.e., CSR, Ext_CSR and Int_CSR) take values in a specific range (i.e., 
0–104 for CSR, 0–60 for Ext_CSR and 0–44 for Int_CSR), it is left- and right-side censored. 
Using the maximum likelihood method, Tobit models provide efficient and consistent 
estimates of coefficients, because when the likelihood function is maximized, it incorporates 
information from both censored and uncensored observations. The basic Tobit model 





II. 4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
II. 4.1. Descriptive results 
Table II.1 presents the mean, standard deviation and correlation of the variables used in this 
chapter. Panel A reports the descriptive statistics where the mean value for CSR performance, 
also taking into account the division made between the types of stakeholders, and it shows 
that these strategies are more socially responsible in family firms than in their non- family 
firms counterparts (e.g., 33.1481 as the CSR mean for non-family firms vs. 37.1399 as the CSR 
mean for family firms). The greater socially responsible commitment of family firms remains 
when strategies are oriented towards external and internal stakeholders. Regarding the 
governance factors among family firms, there is not a great difference between positions in 
the managerial team or in the board of directors of family-owned firms; their means are 
0.9014 and 1.5344 with a standard deviation of 1.2674 and 1.4436, respectively. With respect 
to the remaining variables, there is no big variation from non-family firms to family firms; 
although, in general, superior mean values are observed for family firms with respect to firm 
leverage, size, performance and R&D intensity, for example.  
The correlation matrix, shown in Panel B, reports low or moderate correlation among 
variables, except for industry, country and year dummies used in our models as controls. In 
no cases are high values obtained for the coefficients between the dependent and 
independent variables or between the independent variables. Multicollinearity among these 
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N= 6,442 firm-year observations. 
Significance levels: * p<.10. **p<.05. ***p<.01 
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II. 4.2. Regression results on CSR of family firms under contingency factors 
Before examining the effect that all the contingency factors explained above have on the CSR 
performance within family firms, we examine the commitment of these firms towards CSR attending 
to the classification of internal and external stakeholders developed by Cruz et al. (2014). At this 
respect, Table II.2, Model Ia shows that the family firms indicator has a positive and significant effect 
on ‘CSR’ (coef. 6.422, p < 0.01). These results are similar for Models IIa and IIIa by classifying 
stakeholders as internal and external (Cruz et al., 2014). Then, Models IIa and IIIs report a positive 
and significant effect of family firms towards CSR associated with external (coef. 4.90, p < 0.01) and 
internal stakeholders (coef. 1.56, p < 0.01). This result leads us to support the set of hypotheses 1; 
that is, family firms behave towards sociable responsibilities, with all its parties.4 Family firms show 
a greater likelihood of promoting CSR, aiming for preserving their SEW and any reputational costs 
and for ensuring the family firms´ survival and growth. However, from our previous results for 
socially responsible dimensions associated with external and internal stakeholders, it is not possible 
to infer differences by comparing coefficients as a result of the different values for dependent 










                                               
4 We would like to point out that our evidence is robust by alternative measure of family firms that consider the 50% of 
voting rights as threshold. 





Table II.2. Regression results on CSR and family firms  
Dependent Variable CSR  External Stakeholders Internal Stakeholders  
Variables Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error  
Main effects       
Family 6.422*** 0.785 4.899*** 0.576 1.560*** 0.287  
Control variables        
Leverage  5.294*** 1.081 4.172*** 0.785 1.079*** 0.402  
Performance 7.617*** 1.651 6.676*** 1.207 6.450 0.605  
Size 4.582*** 0.179 3.507*** 0.132 1.114*** 0.063  
R&D_Intensity 2.074** 0.841 1.667*** 0.614 4.610 0.318  
Industry dummies Included Included Included   
Year dummies Included Included Included   
Country dummies Included Included Included   
sigma_u 12.517*** 0.311 9.569*** 0.236 3.787*** 0.963  
sigma_e 5.044*** 0.050 3.676 *** 0.037 1.942*** 0.194  
Rho 0.86 0.006 0.871 0.006 0.792 0.009  
N= 6,442 firm-year observations. 
Significance levels: * p<.10. **p<.05. ***p<.01 
The results are robust according to another alternative measure that considers 50% ownership. 
 
Supported the greater CSR commitment of family firms, in the following, we show the results 
of examining the possible moderating effect of several contingency factors: governance factors 
(reported in Table II.3), and environmental factors (reported in Table II.4). As we describe in Section 
3, in moderating models, we include the family firms indicator variable, each contingency effect and 
the interaction between both, which allows us to examine the moderation exerted.  
Table II.3, shows the moderating role that governance factors have on the relationship 
between CSR and family firms, attending to family managers and directors. Again, results of Model 
Ib (Panel A) show the positive and significant impact of family firms on CSR commitment (coef. 
2.236, p < 0.01). However, the main results are the support of the moderation of family members. 
The interaction ‘Family*Fam_Managers’ show a positive and significant effect on ‘CSR’ (coef. 2.233, 
p < 0.01). Operating with coefficients, the impact of family firms on CSR is greater when the 
proportion of family members is larger (2.236 + 2.233 = 4.469) than when the presence of them is 




Rho 0.922 0.015 0.930 0.013 0.834 0.029 
N= 6,442 firm-year observations. Significance levels: * p<.10. **p<.05. ***p<.01  
 
Similarly, Model Ic (Panel B) shows the positive impact of family firms on CSR (coef. 2.244, p 
< 0.01). Meanwhile, the effect of the interaction, ‘Family*Fam_Directors’, shows a positive and 
significant effect on ‘CSR’ (coef. 2.244, p < 0.05). Operating with coefficients, the impact of family 
firms on CSR is greater when the proportion of family directors on the board is larger (2.244 + 2.244 
= 4.488) than when the board has lesser directors with family ties (coef. 2.244). Results are similar 
for external and internal stakeholders, reporting the moderating effect of family managers on the 
impact of family ownership on CSR behavior. We cannot infer differences attending to the type of 
stakeholder. From the above, we support the moderating effect of family managers and directors 
as contingency governance factors on the impact of family firms towards CSR that we propose in 
the set of hypotheses 2 and 3.  
Our hypotheses 4 and 5 are analyzed in Table II.4, in which we summaries the effects that 
the environment can have on the relationship between family firms and CSR. Once again, we can 
observe in Model Id (Panel A) the positive and significant impact of family firms on CSR (coef. 89.687, 
p < 0.05). Nevertheless, we have to pay attention to the results of the moderating effect of the 
contingent factor associated with munificence. First, we must highlight that ‘Munificence’ has a 
negative and significant impact on CSR (coef. -79.724, p < 0.05); firms located in munificent contexts 
show a lower orientation towards CSR practices. The interaction, ‘Family*Munificence’, shows a 
negative and significant effect on CSR (coef. -82.111, p < 0.10). Operating with coefficients, the 
impact of family firms on CSR is smaller when the family firm is located in munificent environments 
(89.687 – 82.111= 7.576) than in lesser munificent ones (coef. 89.687). When making a 
differentiation between external and internal stakeholders, the relationship is more or less the same 
in the case of external stakeholders (coef. -54.664, p < 0.05); however, the interaction in the case of 
internal stakeholders shows no significant results. This is to say that when the company is focused 
on satisfying external stakeholders desires, if the family firm is established in munificent 
environments (60.251 – 54.664 = 5.587), their impact on CSR is smaller than in lesser munificent 
ones (60.251). Thus, the level of munificence, as an environment contingency factor, moderates the 
orientation and behavior of family firm towards CSR activities – particularly those oriented to 





Rho 0.856 0.007 0.866 0.007 0.791 0.009  
N= 6,442 firm-year observations. Significance levels: * p<.10. **p<.05. ***p<.01   
 
Equally, Model Id (Panel B) shows the positive impact of the main relationship of this 
research: family firm on CSR performance (coef. 5.234, p < 0.01); an effect that remains for internal 
and external CSR strategies. However, the effect of the interaction, ‘Family*LongTerm’, is not 
significant in neither of the cases, including also the differences attending to the type of 
stakeholders. Then, we cannot support our set of hypotheses 5. 
Similar to the results obtained by Tan and Litschert (1994), we can support the idea that 
companies who stand in munificent environments behave in a different way than those who 
develop their activity in hostile environments. Family firms’ attainment of more proactive CSR 
activities is smaller when companies are located in munificent contexts. This is to say, when there 
are more available resources in the environment, family firms are less proactive to support CSR 
activities. However, as we have seen in the results, the long-term orientation of a company makes 
no difference on whether a company may achieve more CSR-focused activities or not, as the 
information obtained is not significant.  
II. 4.3. Sensitive results: GMM estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991) for solving 
endogeneity, multicollinearity and heterocedasticity 
Regarding the method, previously, we have proposed Tobit regressions for panel data. However, 
we must be aware that our regression models may suffer from multicollinearity and 
heteroscedasticity problems. In order to check them and initially, a fixed- or random-effects 
estimator could be used to estimate our proposed models, but the errors must be conditionally 
homoscedastic and not serially correlated. Thus, first we test whether our model presents 
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation problems using the Breusch–Pagan test and the 
Wooldridge test, respectively. The p-values obtained for each test are 0.0000, which means that we 
must reject the null hypotheses of homoscedastic errors and no serially correlated errors.  
But, another problem, namely endogeneity, could appear in our models, due to reverse 
causality (Wooldridge, 2010); these econometric problems could biased our results (Hillier et al., 
2011). Instrumental variables (IVs) may solve endogeneity, but the conventional IV estimator 
(although consistent) is inefficient in the presence of heteroscedasticity (Baum et al., 2003). The 
dynamic panel estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991), based on the generalized method 
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of moments (GMM) introduced by Hansen (1982), overcomes this limitation. More concretely, we 
use the two-step estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991). Suitable instruments adopted in GMM are 
the lagged values of the right-hand side variables included in the model as instruments, because 
they are uncorrelated with the error term when deriving the estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991). 
The closest lags are the most appropriate as the furthest do not contain information on the current 
value of the variables; specifically, t-2 for the lagged value of the dependent variable and t-1 for the 
remaining explanatory variables that are not strictly exogenous (Rodríguez-Ariza et al., 2017; 
Villarón-Peramato et al., 2018; Martínez-Ferrero et al., 2016). 
Thereon, accounting for these econometric issues and in order to examine the robustness of 
our previous findings, we again regress our proposed models by using the GMM proposed by 
Arellano and Bond (1991). Results obtained by using the GMM estimator of Arellano and Bond 
(1991) – Table II.5 -provides robust evidence that family firms behave towards corporate social 
responsibility, aiming to preserve their socioemotional wealth and the firm´s survival. Moreover, 
results also report that several contingency factors moderate on this commitment. Concretely, the 
socially responsible behavior of family firms is greater: (i) under the large presence of family 
members on the management team and family directors on the board of directors (i.e., as 
governance factors) and (ii) in munificent contexts (i.e., as an environment factor). In other words, 
we robustly evidence the moderating effect of family managers and directors on the impact of 
family ownership on CSR behavior and how the level of munificence, as an environment contingency 
factor, moderates the orientation and behavior of family firm towards CSR activities6. 
 
                                               
6 We would like to point out that our evidence is robust by accounting for internal and external stakeholders.  
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Table II.5. Sensitive Results by using the GMM estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991) 
Dependent Variable CSR. Model I  Model Ia. 
 
 
Model Ib. Family 
  
Model Ic. Munificence Model Id. Long Term Orientation 
Variables Coef. Std. 
 




Coef. Std. Error 
Main effects         
Family 1.615*** 0.570 7.998*** 3.049 14.971** 6.088 53.653*** 11.182 24.409*** 7.213 
Moderating effects: Governance, Family Managers and Directors     
Fam_Managers/Fam_Directors omitted because of collinearity   
Family*Fam_Managers/Fam_Directors 1.347*** 0.312 1.281** 0.513     
Moderating effects: Environment, Munificence and Long Term Orientation       
Munificence/LongTerm      omitted because of collinearity 
Family*Munificence/LongTerm      -
 
10.546 -49.687*** 10.546 
Control variables           
Leverage  -1.153 1.555 34.381*** 0.312 45.782*** 4.099 11.656*** 1.077 0.717 1.435 
Performance 7.607*** 2.663 33.777*** 2.027 45.908** 5.664 .331*** 1.670 8.402*** 2.668 
Size 0.652*** 0.222 3.359*** 3.146 2.774** 0.273 6.365*** 1.422 1.549*** 0.249 
R&D_Intensity 0.383*** 0.146 46.729*** 0.193 49.899*** 14.064 4.623*** 0.338 0.840* 0.487 
Industry dummies Included Included Included Included    Included  
Year dummies Included Included Included Included    Included   
Country dummies Included Included Included Included    Included   
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first 
differences 
z =   0.41  Pr > z =  
0.680 
z =  -0.20  Pr > z =  
0.843 
z =  -0.39  Pr > z 
=  0.698 
z =   0.66  Pr > z =  
0.509 
z =  -0.47  Pr > z =  0.635 
N= 6,442 firm-year observations. 





II. 5. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
Overall, the empirical evidence of this chapter allows us to confirm that family firms 
have a positive impact on CSR performance, on the grounds of the SEW theory. It also 
allows us to pose that there exists a moderating effect of some contingency factors; 
concretely, the presence of family members in the management team and on the board 
of directors and the level of munificence in the firm’s market.  
On the basis of these, we can discuss the following results. Regarding the positive 
impact of the family in CSR, our results are in accordance with the SEW theory proposed 
by Gómez-Mejía et al. (2007). That is, we support the greater commitment of family 
firms regarding social and environmental matters and towards the satisfaction of the 
necessities of all stakeholders. We can affirm it because CSR allows them to guarantee 
the legitimacy and the survival of the company (Deephouse et al., 2013); moreover, as 
some authors state (e.g., Fombrun et al., 2000; Young and Marais, 2011), CSR increases 
the stakeholders’ general perception of the company leading to a greater confidence 
towards it and helps the firm to provide family employment and achieve their 
socioemotional objectives (Shulze et al., 2003; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2011). 
Thus, in line with Gomez-Mejía et al. (2014) and Minichelli et al. (2016), our 
finding supports that there exists a greater CSR commitment in family firms. Our results, 
however, behave against some previous results that determined that family firms paid 
less attention or were less focused on CSR performance; for example, Morck and Yeaung 
(2004) or Le Breton-Miller and Miller (2016) mentioned it regarding the emerged 
opportunism when firms reached a certain level in the society. 
Our main evidence and contribution to prior literature confirms the moderating 
effect of several contingency factors associated with the governance and environment 
factors. Concretely, our evidence documents the moderation played by family managers 
and family members on the board of directors in the relationship between family firms 
and CSR. We support the effect that was partially founded by Sharma and Sharma (2011) 
or Berrone et al. (2010): they stated that families who are involved in decision making 
and that take part in the board of directors show a greater commitment in pursuing and 
ensuring their SEW. The positive effect that the family involvement on the board has on 
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the relationship between family firm and CSR was also found by Deephouse and 
Jaskiewcz (2013). As these authors defend, due to their deep knowledge about the 
functioning of the society and their attachment to it, family members on the board 
influence the practice of CSR activities (Block and Wagner, 2014) even if there is only 
one member of the family on the board (Deephouse and Jaskiewez, 2013). Therefore, 
we can also affirm that family members on the management team and also on the board 
of directors creates an environmentally friendly company, which channel its 
transactions and activities towards CSR. Our results are in line with the reward argument 
that these provides to the family name, proposed by Berrone et al. (2010); the proud 
that taking the company to a glorious status can cause (Cialdini et al., 1976) and honor 
that causes giving it a good prestige (Bergami and Bagozzi, 2000).  
Moreover, as we have previously mentioned in the explanation of the results, 
the level of munificence—as an environmental contingency factor—also moderated the 
impact of family ownership on their CSR commitment. At this regard, as previous 
authors have stated (Tan and Litschert, 1994), the effect that the environment has on 
the relationship between family firms and CSR makes an inference on the behavior of 
family firms, in regard to CSR activities. The fact that the market where the company 
works on presents a munificent environment, moderates the effect of family firms on 
CSR, implying that as the munificence increases the effort that the family makes on 
pursuing these activities decreases.  Based on our findings, a higher munificence 
minimized the CSR orientation of a family firm. In munificent contexts, where a firm has 
superior growth opportunities and survival in the long-term, a family firm shows a lower 
commitment to the development of a proactive CSR strategy. These results are opposed 
to some previous literature, such as Rosenbusch et al. (2013), Martínez-del-Río et al. 
(2015) and Chen et al. (2017). Those authors posed that, in fact, the existence of 
munificent contexts (i.e., plenty of resources) allowed companies to develop their 
activities towards social and environmental activities.  
However, as Tan and Litschert (1994) stated and we evidence, companies that 
develop their activities in munificent markets behave differently than those who stand 
in hostile environments, in terms of CSR strategies. This can be explained by the fact 
that, the survival is set aside because one of the characteristics of munificent markets is 
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that the survival of the company is guaranteed, due to the fact that there exist more 
resources available for the company and less competence; thus, that is the reason why 
companies may not pay attention to the practice of CSR activities to ensure this 
objective, and our results encompasses this reasoning. In addition, the existence of 
abundant resources in munificent environments that improve and ensure the survival 
of the company reduce the need to seek additional resources (e.g., those obtained from 
CSR). Recall that all family firms aims to ensure and strengthen their SEW (Gomez-Mejía 
et al., 2007); our results confirm that in munificent environments, where survival is 
guaranteed (i.e., one of the SEW aspects), they may pursue additional objectives, leaving 
aside the importance of CSR activities for this aim. 
On the other hand, we cannot confirm the moderating effect that a society’s 
long-term orientation may have on the family relationship and CSR. It could be logical 
to think that this orientation may vary the behaviour of family firms towards social and 
environmental activities, as García-Sanchez et al. (2015) suggested or Hofstede and 
Hofstede introduced in 2005. Nevertheless, with our results, we can only confirm that 
there is not a moderating effect when the firm stands in this type of orientated society. 
II. 6. SYNTHESIS  
For an international sample from 2006 to 2014, this chapter provides the following 
evidence. According to the proposals of the SEW model, family firms show a greater 
focus on the promotion of a socially responsible strategy in order to preserve their 
socioemotional endowments and to avoid any loss of reputation and image caused by 
non-responsible strategies. Family firms are more focused on social and environmental 
performance as a means of supporting their survival under hostile environments. In 
addition, several contingency factors are found as moderating on this commitment. 
Concretely, the socially responsible behavior of family firms is greater: (i) under the 
presence of a large number of family members in management and family directors on 
the board of directors (i.e., as governance factors) and (ii) in munificent contexts (i.e., as 
an environment factor). 
This chapter makes a number of contributions to academia. First of all, it sheds 
some light on the non-conclusive topic of social responsibility in family firms, due to the 
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fact that there are contradictory results in this area; ones in favor of the moderation role 
that family firms represent on CSR schemes and opposite to it. So, trying to shed light in 
this respect, similar to Gómez-Mejía et al. (2014), we report how family firms will act to 
preserve their SEW, avoiding any potential SEW losses and supporting a greater CSR 
orientation. De Massis et al. (2012) and Campopiano and De Massis (2015) highlighted 
that family scholars have only recently investigated the socially responsible behavior of 
family firms (Sánchez-Medina and Díaz-Pichardo, 2017). However, as we said before, the 
results are not clear and provide mixed evidence, it is true that although recently, the 
influence of the family ownership on CSR has been examined in prior literature (Berrone 
et al., 2010; Cruz et al., 2014; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2011).  
Secondly, one of the novelties of our research, regarding existing literature in 
this field, is the inclusion of the moderation role of contingent factors in the analysis of 
the CSR commitment of family firms. We follow the argument that Minichilli et al. (2010) 
introduced regarding the involvement of the family in the management team. We 
contribute to this by examining how governance and environment conditions impact 
CSR performance, conditioning to the family ownership. This chapter thus contributes 
to the literature by providing new insights into socially responsible behavior as result of 
contingent conditions. 
Third, as a new inclusion in the literature, we try to fill the gap between opposite 
results in the analysis of the relationship between CSR and family firms, extending the 
analysis introducing the differentiation made by Cruz et al. (2012). So, we also make a 
difference between internal and external stakeholders in this analysis. Thus, we 
contribute to prior literature that examines the family firms that are responsive to 
external and internal stakeholders (Berrone et al., 2010; Cruz et al., 2014); family 
businesses act differently, not only depending on the above-mentioned contingencies 
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III.1 INTRODUCTION  
In previous chapter II, we have clearly evidenced the greater socially responsible 
commitment in family firms. However: do socially responsible companies meet with 
their economic responsibilities regarding tax payments? Considering that not all 
organizations behave in the same way, does this balance between economic and ethical 
objectives vary according to family ownership?. These are the research questions 
examined in this chapter with the aim of reinforcing the understanding about the role 
played by socially responsible commitment in tax saving practices and with the aim of 
exploring the research gap about the moderating impact of family business.  
It is generally known that one of the most important or significant cost in firms 
is taxes; being object of a stream of previous literature (e.g. Moore et al., 2017). Taxes 
are directly correlated with profitability and shareholders value. In this vein, Graham 
(2003) enumerated a large number of taxes effects on firm decision-making process. 
There are several studies regarding the incentives to adopt discretionary strategies for 
minimizing taxes (Sikka, 2010; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). However, there are also others 
who support the idea that, instead of minimizing them, firms prefer to pay as much as 
it should; with it, firms could conserve their public image and reputation (Randøy and 
Goes, 2003; Schulze, Lubatkin and Dino, 2003; Zahra, 2005; Steijvers and Niskanen, 
2014). 
At this regard, during years, prior literature agrees in supporting how firms caring 
about their CSR performance are more prone to ensure and preserve their good 
reputation/image (Dyer and Whetten, 2006; Godfrey, 2005). In fact, these companies 
build their reputation based on that effect; therefore, their greater CSR reputation 
constitutes ones of the most important aspects for them (Fombrun, 2001). Because tax 
avoidance activities may have negative consequences that can damage a company’s 
image, socially responsible companies should not undertake tax saving activities. 
However and from an opposite perspective, tax avoidance actions are even adopted 
when companies appear to be socially responsible (Sikka, 2010; Preuss, 2010). At this 
respect, evidence have offered contradictory results being a growing debate about 
whether and how socially responsible firms behave in terms of tax payment.  
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The debate around CSR-tax avoidance merges with the research gap found in 
grounds of ownership structure; concretely, for family ownership. In general, and as we 
have found in previous chapter II, previous literature agrees in supporting the greater 
CSR commitment of family firms (e.g. Berrone et al., 2010; Cruz et al., 2014); family firms 
show higher social and environmental performance by meeting stakeholder’s demands 
and preserving their socioemotional endowments (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007; 2010; Cruz 
et al., 2014). However, firms may have differences in their involvement regarding tax 
avoidance activities. In family-owned firms, tax aggressiveness/avoidance is originated, 
generally, under agency conflicts where managers behave opportunistically and extract 
rents from tax saving, even by expropriating minority shareholders´ wealth (Desai and 
Dharmapala, 2006). Tax saving strategies could exacerbate conflicts of interests and 
create managerial opportunities from majority shareholders to engage in activities to 
deceive investors (Desai and Dharmapala, 2008); such disputes between majority – 
owners - and minority shareholders derive in rent extractions (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1986). Nevertheless, other studies provide quite opposite results, stating that 
companies prefer to perpetuate their existence and their image, reputation or family 
name; thus, they are less proactive to undertake hazardous actions as tax avoidance 
practices pursuing CSR activities (James, 1999; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Steijvers and 
Niskanen, 2014; Chen et al., 2010). 
According to the existence of mixed results on the link between CSR and tax 
avoidance (Landry et al., 2013; Laguir et al., 2015; Lin et al., 2017) and in particular, 
within a family firm’s framework (Chen et al., 2010; Steijvers and Niskanen, 2014; Moore 
et al., 2017; Gaaya et al., 2017), our chapter examines on the following. It brings 
evidence about the impact that CSR could have on corporate tax avoidance and, thus, 
the balance between economic objectives and CSR activities. Moreover, we also include 
the analysis on the moderating effect that family ownership may cause in the 
relationship of CSR and tax avoidance practices. 
As was tested in Chapter II, these relationships are examined for the same 
sample of 6,442 firm-year observations from 2006 to 2014. Briefly, the results show that 
firms with higher CSR commitment and performance are less tax aggressiveness; the 
greater social and environmental performance, the lower the level of tax 
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aggressiveness/avoidance. The main evidence supports the moderating effect played by 
family ownership. Family ownership is positively associated with a greater CSR 
commitment but also with firm tax avoidance practices. These findings suggest that 
family-owned firms find in CSR actions a tool for tax saving, expropriating wealth to 
minority shareholders. Overall, this chapter confirms the moderating role played by 
family ownership on the positive relation between CSR performance and tax avoidance.  
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In section two, we 
describe the theoretical background that supports our research hypotheses. Section 
three describes the research model, data and sample. Finally, Sections four and five 
present the results obtained and the conclusions drawn, respectively. 
III.2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
III.2.1 Corporate social performance and tax avoidance 
According to the agency theory, a company can be defined as an agreement or contract 
between shareholders and managers, with the single objective of shareholder´ wealth 
creation (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Nonetheless, society concerns about social and 
environmental issues have increased during the last decades; these concerns have also 
been transposed to companies, where it is expected a behavior focused on friendly and 
socially environmental activities. Over last years and opposite to Friedman´s (1970) 
premise 7 , the number of firms engaging in voluntary CSR strategies has increased 
greatly, attracting considerable attention from the research community (e.g. Hoi et al., 
2013; Chen et al., 2017; Lin et al., 2017).  
Among the possible range of CSR definitions reported in previous chapters, 
literature agrees in presented CSR strategy as an emerging alternative management 
model and considers the company as a set of relationships, not just between owners 
and managers, but also with parties or groups interested in the evolution of the 
                                               
7  Friedman (1970) argued that “engaging in CSR is symptomatic of an agency problem or a conflict 
between the interests of managers and shareholders”. The author also affirmed that CSR engagement is 
employed by managers aimed to obtained private benefits, going over the shareholders’ interests and 




company: employees, customers, suppliers, competitors, the environment and society 
in general (Adams, 2002). Meanwhile, the World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development (2000) define CSR as “the continuing commitment by business to behave 
ethically and contribute to economic development while improving the quality of life of 
the workforce and their families as well as of the local community and society at large”. 
Moreover, previous studies (Orlitzky et al., 2003; Petersen and Vredenburg, 2009; 
Mason and Simmons, 2013) agree in defending that one of the most important 
consequences of a proactive CSR strategy is increasing firm´s reputation. This 
reputation/image leads to a positive reinforce of the stakeholders´ perception and 
confidence about the firm (Deephouse and Carter, 2005; Fombrun et al, 2000; Young 
and Marais, 2011). 
But, the balance between societal objectives and economic concerns is always 
given by the need of maximizing shareholders´ wealth. In this vein and beyond the CSR 
concerns, there is also a growing concern about the percentage that taxes represent in 
corporate costs because of they could imply a reduction on shareholders´ wealth. In this 
vein, there is a considerable growth in the literature concerning CSR and tax 
avoidance/aggressiveness; however, academic researchers that empirically examined 
both topics are limited and even, without finding a consensus in their relationship 
(Landry et al., 2013; Laguir et al., 2015; Lin et al., 2017). The source of the relationship 
may be positive or negative attending to the agency perspective adopted (Laguir et al., 
2015). 
On the one hand, previous researches suggests that CSR and tax avoidance can 
also be aligned. Here, this approach for the agency theory focuses on a stakeholders’ 
perspective and constitutes the first literature or stream about the association between 
CSR and tax avoidance. Hoi et al. (2013) and Laguir et al. (2015) refer to this perspective 
in their studies. Although the main firm objective is the maximization of shareholder’s´ 
value, these authors confirm that firms should try to meet all the stakeholders´ demands 
for increasing their image and reputation (Hill and Jones, 1992; Meiseberg and Ehrmann, 
2012). Freeman and Reed (1983) were the first ones to realize and clarify the importance 
of groups and individuals as local communities, environmentalists, governments, 
competitors and the social media, among others. They emphasized the importance of 
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the management of stakeholders for ensuring firm´s survival and the achievement of 
corporate goals. At this regard, some academics (Mahon, 2002; Preuss, 2010; Sikka, 
2010) found that even when companies behave tax aggressively they seem to be 
ethically and socially responsible. Huseynov and Klamm (2012) confirm it by reporting 
that even when firms are tax aggressive by developing tax saving strategies, they are 
also committed to reinforce their social and environmental performance. From this 
approach, previous researched support a positive connection between CSR and tax 
saving strategies. 
Nevertheless, as Lin et al. (2017) argue, it is necessary an adjustment between 
economic, social and environmental goals. At this respect, the second literature stream 
posits that corporate taxes can only be associated with social and environmental 
performance when their payment implies benefits for the society. In fact, tax avoidance 
runs against this approach because tax saving actions might be contrary to society 
interests. What’s more, tax avoidance behavior may generate a negative effect on a 
company´s reputation, a fundamental firm´s asset (Landry et al, 2013)8. Note that as was 
premised in the agency theory, reputation and/or political are the associated costs to 
the implementation and development of a CSR strategy (Chen et al., 2010). In this vein, 
Landry et al (2013) affirmed that tax savings resulting from avoidance strategies 
planning can be way less than the cost of loss of reputation that these activities may 
imply. These authors confirm it by supporting how tax assessment may encourage the 
managerial team to make fiscal decisions that benefit shareholders in the short-term 
(Owens, 2005). CSR could increase the shareholders´ value because the negative effects 
that tax avoidance may lay on shareholders can be compensated by CSR activities (Laguir 
et al., 2015; Hoi et al., 2013); but, they still prefer to support tax savings and therefore 
increasing their wealth. Thus, a negative relationship between CSR and tax avoidance is 
supported by this approach. The greater CSR commitment, the lower corporate tax 
avoidance. 
                                               
8  As Mahon (2002) defined, firm reputation is the result along time of a complex combination of 
interrelationships and exchanges between the firms and its stakeholders. As Freeman (1984) stated, this 
individuals and groups can negatively stress these relationships, and thus interfere in the company’s 
outcome and management. 
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Despite of the mixed previous evidence, it is clear that a connection between 
CSR and tax avoidance depends on the conflicts between stakeholders and 
shareholders´ interests (Lin et al, 2017). We argue that firms should take care of their 
CSR activities in order to ensure/create a good image (Godfrey, 2005) and positive 
relations with stakeholders that lead to greater firm and shareholder´ value. We also 
expect a balance between economic and social/environmental benefits by propping that 
CSR responsible firms are less tax aggressive; socially responsible firms avoid any 
hazardous action that could compromise the firm reputation and image. The following 
hypothesis is proposed: 
H1: CSR performance negatively affects corporate tax avoidance.  
III.2.2 The moderation effect of family ownership  
Understanding the relation between CSR and tax avoidance leads to examine this 
research in the family firms´ sphere; they are greater contributors to the economic 
activity around the world (Duh et al, 2009; IFERA 2003). It cannot be forgotten that not 
all organizations respond in the same way to CSR performance and tax avoidance 
strategies. According to Berrone et al. (2010), this variability may respond by whomever 
controls the firm (ownership structure and concentration) and how much value these 
agents give to social and environmental dimensions rather than to economic 
dimensions.  
We must not forget that as was reported in previous chapters, Chen et al. (2008) 
clearly pointed out how family founders continue in a top managerial position, are 
present on the board, or are able to act as blockholders. This means that they have great 
power and hold fundamental positions that affect the management and decision-
making processes; then, the CSR commitment and tax avoidance practices.  
Regarding the promotion of CSR strategies in family business, the inherent 
argument of the greater orientation of them to socially responsible behavior responds 
to the SEW model proposed by Wiseman and Gómez-Mejía (1998) and Gómez-Mejía et 
al. (2007) and previously discussed in Chapter I and II. These authors defend that 
decisions made within family firms respond primarily to the preservation of social-
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emotional endowment, which becomes the reference point for management decisions. 
There has also been empirical evidence documented a lower compromise towards CSR 
practices of family business or the lack of differences among family and non-family 
companies (Hirigoyen and Poulain-Rehm, 2014). Nonetheless, the general approach and 
our previous evidence agree in suggesting that family business are more prone to meet 
with non-financial aims; for instance, reputation, survival, image (Anderson and Reeb, 
2003; Berrone et al., 2010; Marques et al., 2014). Building upon the SEW perspective, 
family firms usually are more responsible towards CSR issues and stakeholders´ 
demands (Marques et al., 2014; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2014).  
However, the impact of family ownership and management on firm tax 
avoidance finds support in two different perspectives. Regarding the family ownership 
impact on tax avoidance, two opposite arguments arise from an agency perspective. On 
the one hand, a section of previous literature that bases their premise on the 
maintenance of the family firm reputation for future successors (James, 1999). Family 
firms are concerned about fines, penalties and all types of costs in which they may incur. 
As a general rule, family firms are less proactive to undertake risky actions as tax 
avoidance positions due to their concern about their “family name”. Family 
shareholders admit firm name and reputation as a heritage to transmit to their 
descendants (James, 1999). In this way, they are clearly aware about the long-term 
existence of their patrimony, instead of their short-term profitability or benefits. At this 
respect, Jensen and Meckling (1976) affirmed that the agency costs between 
management and ownership are limited by the presence of a substantially high family 
ownership and long term investment horizons (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Some authors 
have referred as the alignment hypothesis; it posits that family firms behave acting in a 
less opportunistic way, are likely to avoid any short of risk activity including those 
focused on tax avoidance (Steijvers and Niskanen, 2014). In this vein, Chen et al. (2010), 
based on the agency approach, found that family business are less tax aggressive than 
non-family business. Previously, Anderson and Reeb (2003) supported this alignment 
idea of management and ownership. Ang et al (2000) stated that families can be 
classified into the most efficient way of organization with low agent costs. 
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Under the above perspective, in family firms the owners’ and firm objectives are 
the same (Randøy and Goes, 2003; Zahra, 2005; Schulze, Lubatkin and Dino, 2003). But, 
they differ from non-family firms in part because of their concerns about their SEW. 
From a SEW perspective, they adopt policies, strategies and decisions that are not based 
only in the economic consequences for the firm (Berrone et al., 2012; Gómez-Mejía et 
al., 2007, 2010; Chrisman and Patel, 2012; Zellleger et al, 2012). Family firms usually 
avoid risky decisions that could endanger their SEW and family endowment, even 
though this actions may not give direct or short term economic benefits (Chrisman and 
Patel, 2012). Thus, they do not want to assume the risk of being caught for not clear tax 
activities. In this line of research, Dyer and Whetten (2006) stated that family members’ 
firms bet for a tradition of socially responsible businesses, avoiding activities that may 
disgrace the firm’s image and, thus, the family name. All these actions are focused on 
preserving or enhancing SEW. Thereon, family firms is expected to be negative related 
to tax saving actions for preserving and ensuring their SEW. 
On the other hand, family firms, indeed, endeavor tax avoidance practices. 
According to this view, disputes of interests arise in family firms between majority and 
minority shareholders. Under this conflict, private benefits are expropriated by the 
family, which acts as a controlling shareholder, to the detriment of the minority ones 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Although some studies have not found evidence of this rent 
extracts of managers (Blaylock, 2015), several authors document how firms use tax 
avoidance to cover losses or any type of rent extraction; with it, they delude minority 
investors, even though these type of activities generate high level of potential costs (Kim 
et al, 2011; Desai and Dharmapala, 2006).  
This agency approach has been previously examined by other academics (Desai 
and Dharmapala, 2006; Desai et al., 2007); for them, the rent extraction by managers 
and shareholders is considered to be included in the benefits we were talking about. 
Because of the high family ownership, rent extraction becomes more opportunistic and 
families are likely to increase the benefits provided by this activity (Gaaya et al., 2017). 
At this point we refer to the called entrenchment hypothesis; it states that, because of 
their high voting rights, families as majority shareholders could increase their power in 
the company to entrench themselves. Moreover, they can expropriate benefits from the 
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owners with less shareholder representation (La Porta et al, 1999) or to extract higher 
rents due to their engagement to tax-saving positions (Steijvers and Niskanen, 2014). 
Thereon, it is expected a positive relationship between family ownership and tax 
avoidance strategies.  
From the above, previous literature is not quite clear about the relationship 
between family firms and tax avoidance. We aim to reinforce and clarify the 
understanding of this relationship. But, we have based our premise on two issues: (i) the 
greater CSR commitment of family firms; and (ii) the greater agency conflict between 
owners with greater and lesser shareholder representation that lead to greater tax 
avoidance practices. Thus, the following hypothesis is proposed about the moderation 
plays by family ownership: 
H2: Family ownership moderates the negative relationship between CSR 
performance and corporate tax avoidance. 
III.3. METHOD 
III.3.1 Sample  
As in previous empirical chapter, the sample of 6,442 firm-year observations (956 firms) 
spanning nine years (2006–2014) was available to test the hypotheses (see Chapter I for 
more details). 
III.3.2 Measures  
Tax avoidance 
In line with Dyreng et al. (2010), Chen et al. (2010) and Badertscher et al. (2013), we are 
confident on proxies of tax avoidance based on effective tax rates, discussing below each 
measure in turn.  
The first measures is the effective tax rate “ETR” widely used by prior literature 
(Chen et al., 2010; Steijvers et al., 2014; Gaaya et al., 2017; Lin et al., 2017). It is 
represented as the total income tax expense divided by pretax book income. As Chen et 
al. (2010, p. 46) suggest “this measure reflects aggressive tax planning through 
 
96 
permanent book-tax differences”. More tax aggressive firms have lower effective tax 





The cash effective tax rate “CETR” previously employed by Dyreng et al. (2010), 
Chen et al. (2010), and Moore et al. (2017) is the second measure used. It is defined as 





Corporate social responsibility performance and family firms  
Again, the measurement of CSR and family firms remain the same detailed along this 
PhD. “CSR” is determined based on the non-weighted sum of 26 items (Table I.3, 
Chapter 1), it is in the range 0 to 104. While, “Family” is a dummy variable that takes the 
value 1 if the largest shareholder is a family member with more than 20% of the votes, 
and 0 otherwise. 
III.3.3 Control variables 
As in Chapter II, we also include a set of variables in the analyses to account for possible 
alternative explanations according to previous studies (Chen et al., 2010; Steijvers et al., 
2014; Laguir et al., 2015; Lin et al., 2017; Moore et al., 2017). Regarding firm aspects, 
“Leverage”; “Performance”; “Size”; “R&D_intensity”; and “Loss” is an indicator variable 
coded 1 if income before extraordinary items is less than zero and 0 otherwise. Finally, 
we again control for industry, year, and country using dummy variables.  
3.4 Method and technique of analysis 
As Figure III.1 shows, this research examines how CSR performance could affects tax 
avoidance. Even more, in the family firms´ sphere, we examine the moderating role 













For these aims, in Model Ia and Ib, tax avoidance through the different measures 
“ETR” and “CETR” is regressed on CSR indicator and control variables, respectively.  
ETR/CETRit = β1CSRit + β2Leverageit + β3Performanceit + β4Sizeit +







k=24 + μit + ηi    
(Model Ia and Ib, respectively) 
Once we have regressed our basic models, we aim to examine the moderating 
effect of family ownership under the premise that family firms exhibit a greater CSR 
commitment and performance and lower tax avoidance. At this respect, for Model IIa 
and IIb respectively, we regressed our dependent variables of tax avoidance on CSR 
indicator variable, on our family business indicator and the interaction between both 
variables for examining the moderation effect.  
ETR/CETRit = φ1CSRit + φ2Familyit + φ3CSR/CSR_int/CSR_ext ∗ Familyit +
φ4Leverageit + φ5Performanceit + φ6Sizeit + φ7RD_Intensityit + φ8Lossit +




j=9 + ∑ φnCountryi
55
k=26 + μit + ηi     
(Model IIa and IIb, respectively) 
We again propose econometric models based on dependence techniques for 
panel data. In this chapter, the dynamic panel estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond 






(1991), based on the generalized method of moments (GMM) is used. Concretely, we 
use the two-step estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991).  
III. 4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
III.4.1 Descriptive results 
Table III.1, presents the mean, standard deviation, and correlation of the variables used 
in this chapter. Panel A reports the descriptive statistics. The mean data of “ETR” and 
“CETR” are 0.3025 and 0.1866, respectively. But, the main result is that this values are 
lower in family firms sub-sample. The lower the “ETR” and “CETR” values, the higher tax 
avoidance practices. This result offers a first approximation about the greater tax 
avoidance of family firms. The rest of the variables have been described in previous 
















In the following, we move forward to find an answer for our hypotheses. In this 
regard, Table III.2 shows the results of the relationship between CSR and tax avoidance. 
Model IA shows that the “CSR” indicator has a positive and significant effect on “ETR” 
(coef. 0.0054, p < 0.01); while, Model IB also reports a positive and significant effect of 
“CSR” towards “CETR" (coef. 0.0053, p < 0.01). The positive connection between CSR 
and these indicators – negative association with tax avoidance actions – shows support 
for hypotheses 1; that is, the greater social and environmental performance is negatively 
associated tax avoidance activities.  
Table III.2. Regression results on CSR and tax avoidance 
Dependent Variable 
Tax Avoidance “ETR”  
Model IA 
Tax Avoidance “CETR” 
Model IB 
Variables Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error  
Main effects     
CSR 0.0054*** 0.0013 0.0053*** 0.0016  
Control variables      
Leverage  0.0791 0.0726 0.2779*** 0.0470  
Performance -0.4185*** 0.1498 0.4480*** 0.0877  
Sales 0.1240*** 0.0260 -0.1035*** 0.0239  
R&D_Intensity -0.2376*** 0.0107 0.0048 0.0051  
Loss -0.4905*** 0.0289 -0.2388*** 0.0300  
Industry dummies Included Included  
Year dummies Included Included  
Country dummies Included Included 
AR(2) Arellano-Bond test  
Hansen test 
Pr > z = 0.955 
Prob > chi2 = 0.106 
Pr > z = 0.834 
Prob > chi2 =0.244 
N= 6,442 firm-year observations. 
Significance levels: * p<.10. **p<.05. ***p<.01 
 
Supporting our hypothesis 1 about the smaller tax avoidance commitment of 
companies that engage CSR activities, then, we discuss the findings of analyzing the 
moderating effect of family ownership in this relationship. Table III.3 shows the 
relationship of CSR and family firms with tax avoidance as well as their interaction. Once 
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again, “CSR” has a positive and significant effect on the “ETR” and “CETR” indicators 
(coef. 0.0059, p < 0.01 and coef. 0.0056, p < 0.01, respectively). That is, CSR is negatively 
related to tax avoidance actions.  
Accounting for the association between CSR and tax avoidance and the 
moderation played by family ownership implies operating with coefficients. In Model 
IIA, the interaction “CSR_Family” shows a negative and significant effect on “ETR” (coef. 
-0.0034, p < 0.10) and “CETR” (coef. -0.0033, p < 0.10); thus, greater tax avoidance 
actions. Operating with coefficients, we can conclude the following. There is a 
moderating impact of family ownership on the relationship CSR-tax avoidance because 
those firms showing a greater social and environmental performance that, in fact, show 
a lower “ETR” value, which means higher tax avoidance practices, change their behavior 
depending on their property. Thus, in family-owned firms “ETR” is greater (coef. 0.0059 
+ (-0.0034) = 0.0025) than in non-family firms (coef. 0.0059). In other words, despite of 
firms exhibit a lower tax saving actions when CSR performance is greater, family 
ownership modifies this behavior by being more tax aggressiveness. Overall, the results 
allow us to empirically support our hypothesis 2 about the moderating role played by 
family ownership on the relationship between CSR and tax avoidance strategies. Results 
are similar for the additional “CETR” indicator of tax avoidance.  
These findings contribute by advancing in the understanding about the impact 
of family ownership on tax saving strategies, where there are two opposite streams. At 
this respect, we clearly support the “entrenchment hypothesis” from which family firms 
exhibit greater tax saving actions. Family – as majority shareholders – behave 








Table III.3. Regression results on CSR and tax avoidance and the moderating effect of family ownership  
Dependent Variable 
Tax Avoidance “ETR” 
Model IIA 
Tax Avoidance “CETR” 
Model IIB 
Variables Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error 
Main effects    
CSR 0.0059*** 0.0013 0.0056*** 0.0017 
Family 0.0931 0.0699 0.1616** 0.0815 
CSR_Family -0.0034* 0.0020 -0.0033* 0.0019 
Control variables     
Leverage  0.0843 0.0726 0.2783*** 0.0474 
Performance -0.4161*** 0.1499 0.4357*** 0.0885 
Sales 0.1232*** 0.0261 -0.1032*** 0.0242 
R&D_Intensity -0.2375*** 0.0107 0.0045 0.0052 
Loss -0.4920*** 0.0289 -0.2386*** 0.0301 
Industry dummies Included Included 
Year dummies Included Included 
Country dummies Included Included 
AR(2) Arellano-Bond test  
Hansen test 
Pr > z = 0.955 
Prob > chi2 = 0.105 
Pr > z = 0.835 
Prob > chi2 =0.114 
N= 6,442 firm-year observations. 
Significance levels: * p<.10. **p<.05. ***p<.01 
 
 
III.5. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
The main findings of this chapter show that firms that have a higher CSR commitment 
and performance are less prone to adopt tax avoidance strategies; the greater social 
and environmental performance, the lower the level of tax aggressiveness/avoidance.  
The main evidence supports the moderating effect played by family ownership. The 
results also show that family ownership is positively associated with a greater CSR 
commitment but also with firm tax avoidance practices. This result suggest that family-
owned firms find in CSR actions a mechanism for tax saving, appropriating shareholder 
wealth of minority shareholders. Overall, this chapter confirms the moderating role 
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played by family ownership on the positive relation between CSR performance and tax 
avoidance.  
First, the main results support that firms highly focused on promoting CSR 
activities are likely to reduce their tax avoidance activities; in line with the argument of 
Dyer and Whether (2006) and Godfrey (2005), firms aim to preserve their reputation 
and image. At this regard, we can affirm that a positive reputation may increase 
shareholders value; thus, firms find in their CSR commitment and behavior a powerful 
strategy that allows them to maintain their good image (Godfrey, 2005) and reputation. 
Thereon, our chapter supports the perspective that Freeman and Reed stated in 1983, 
when they defend the importance of stakeholders (communities, social medial…) for 
ensuring the survival of the firm. This is the reason why some other authors (Laguir et 
al., 2015; Hoi et al., 2013), emphasized the importance of CSR activities to maintain their 
reputation in front of these group of people. This idea was also promoted by some other 
authors (Hill and Jones, 1992; Meiseberg and Ehrmann, 2012) highlighting the 
importance of corporate decisions based on this social and environmental issues. The 
results are also in accordance with the perspective adopted by Lin et al. (2017) who 
support the necessary balance between social and environmental and economic issues. 
Concretely, we confirm previous – although limited – evidence about how firms engage 
in CSR activities to maintain their reputation, through minimizing tax avoidance 
activities (e.g. Godfrey, 2005). Similar to Chen et al. (2010), Landry et al. (2013) and Lin 
et al. (2010), we document that tax saving resulting from avoidance practices are lower 
when firms show a greater CSR performance; firms avoid any action that could affect to 
their firm reputation and image. 
Second, the moderating role played by family ownership on the connection 
between CSR and tax avoidance is in accordance with previous evidence about how 
majority shareholders expropriate rents from minority shareholders by tax saving 
actions (in line with the findings of Desai and Dharmapala (2006), Blaylock (2015), 
Stejvers and Niskanen (2014), Gaaya et al. (2017), among others). In this vein, we 
support that the greater tax avoidance in family firms arise from the conflict of interests 
between majority and minority shareholders (in line with the premise of Shleifer and 
Vishny [1983]). Our results, thereon, are opposite to those reported by previous studies 
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that found how family ownership and management are related to less tax aggressive 
(e.g. Steijvers and Niskanen (2004); Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Dyer and Whetten 
(2006). Some of them defended that family firms avoid any action that could damage 
their reputation, image, survival and the transmission of legacy to their descendants. 
However, our evidence is quite opposite. Even though the use of tax avoidance methods 
generates high levels of potential costs, family firms are more prone to adopt tax 
avoidance activities to cover losses or any type of rent extractions (Kim et al, 2001; Desai 
and Dharmapala, 2006; Steijvers and Niskanen, 2014). 
Our results again support the greater social and environmental commitment of 
family firms. We confirm how family firms are more incentive to invest in CSR strategies 
for responding to the preservation of their SEW (in line with evidence reported by 
Wiseman and Gómez-Mejía [1998), Gómez-Mejía et al. [2007; 2014], Marques et al. 
[2014] and Cruz et al. [2014], among others). We clearly shed light to the positive 
association between family ownership and social and environmental performance.  
 
III.6. SYNTHESIS  
The objective of this chapter was to shed light of the effect of CSR performance on firm 
tax avoidance. It also examines whether family ownership impacts tax avoidance 
practices by socially responsible performance. Using a sample composed by 956 
international firms from 2006 to 2014, we applied several GMM regressions models for 
panel data.  
This chapter provides the following evidence. Firms with great commitment to 
CSR activities show a greater focus on the reduction of tax avoidance activities, achieving 
a balance between social/environmental and economic objectives and avoiding any loss 
of reputation and image caused by non-responsible practices. However, family 
ownership moderates this effect. That is, family owned companies showing a greater 
commitment to CSR, are proactive to tax avoidance activities. For them, benefits 
obtained from these activities are higher or more important than the possible 
reputational loss. We support then, that family owners as majority group expropriate 
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wealth from minority shareholders by tax saving actions. Thereon, our results suggest 
that, in the sample of family firms chosen, it is true that family-owned firms engage in 
CSR activities according to the SEW perspective; however, they also adopt tax aggressive 
positions as result of the greater agency conflict between shareholders depending on 
their volume of ownership. 
We contribute then to prior literature by advancing in the consequences of the 
higher agency conflict. As we evidenced, the main shareholders’ objective is achieving 
the maximum profit as possible. In order to do so, they turn to extract rents from the 
minority shareholders (as Shleifer and Vishny (1986) defended) and to diminish their tax 
payments (Steijvers and Niskanen, 2014). Family-owned firms are highly tax 
aggressiveness even though these types of activities generate high levels of potential 
costs (Kim et al., 2001). For this reason, family-owned firms find in CSR practices a 
possible greenwashing strategy for their tax saving actions; CSR avoids yielding negative 
outcomes that can highly affect their SEW and therefore on family’s name and 
reputation. In this vein, it would be interesting to study whether there is a threshold 
from which this situation changes and the family would be, in deed, more worried about 
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IV.1. INTRODUCTION  
Building upon our results of Chapter II and III, family-owned firms engage in CSR 
activities according to the SEW perspective; however, they also adopt tax aggressive 
positions given of the higher agency problem between majority and minority 
shareholders. However: do socially responsible companies follow the same behavior 
around earning management (EM) practices? Considering that not all organizations 
behave in the same way, does this balance vary according to family ownership? Are 
there any difference in the family firms behavior towards tax avoidance and EM?. These 
are the research questions examined in this chapter, with the aim of reinforcing the 
understanding of the effect played by socially responsible commitment in EM practices 
– understood as the reporting of financial and accounting results that do not correspond 
to those actually achieved (Kim et al., 2012) -  and with the aim of exploring the research 
gap about the moderating effect of family businesses. 
As we have discussed along this research, firms can take different strategies for 
enhancing and maintaining their legitimacy (Suchman, 1995) and their image in markets 
and society. They may also release information with the aim of improving CSR 
performance (Lindblom, 2010); they could also use CSR to influence the society and 
stakeholders’ perceptions regarding their behavior (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975).  A 
stream of prior literature suggests that companies may mask their EM practices by 
providing loads of CSR information (Salewski and Zülch, 2014). What’s more, Martinez-
Ferrero et al. (2015) argued that companies might use CSR information to ensure and 
enhance their legitimacy, aimed to alleviate the lower financial reporting quality. 
Investors are interested in financial information and CSR one (Anderson and Frankle, 
1980; Dhaliwal et al., 2014); therefore, according to Gavana et al (2017) those 
companies which are involved in EM activities may be more predisposed to provide CSR 
information as an expectation for the investors and markets to receive a good image of 
the company and, in this way, minimize the risk of financial monitoring.  Given the 
importance of EM potential damage (Chih et al., 2008), it is quite relevant to examine 
the connection between CSR performance and EM as an unethical strategy that masks 
the real financial and economic data of the firm.  
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Moreover, this chapter also contributes by focusing on family ownership; the aim 
is to examine if it acts as mechanism of control and supervision that affects the 
relationship CSR-EM (La Porta et al., 1998). Previous studies agree in defending that the 
presence of family blockholders in a firm constitute a mechanism that limits EM practice 
(La Porta et al., 1998; Surroca and Tribó, 2008). But also and in general, previous 
literature and our evidence of Chapter II support the greater CSR commitment of family 
firms (e.g. Berrone et al., 2010; Cruz et al., 2014); family firms show higher social and 
environmental performance by meeting stakeholder’s demands and preserving their 
socioemotional endowments (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). 
A large number of previous studies have addressed on the moderating effect of 
family business in several aspects by comparing whether they behave differently from 
non-family firms. Although family firms have several similarities with non-family owned 
firms (Sharma, 2004), they are characterized by other features that make them unique 
and, therefore, explains the attention paid to this type of organizations. 
According to the existence of mixed results on the link between CSR and EM 
(Hong and Andersen, 2011; Kim et al., 2011; Gargouri et al, 2010; Shen and Chih, 2005; 
Shleifer, 2004; Prior et al., 2008) and in particular, within the family firm framework 
where evidence is scarce (Nekhili et al, 2017; Martin et al.,2016; Achleitner et al. 2014; 
Pazzaglia et al, 2013; Fisher et al., 2001), our chapter focuses on the following. First, this 
research analyzes the effect that CSR may have on EM; is socially responsible 
commitment really ethical? Second, we also focus on the moderating role played by 
family ownership in the connection between CSR and EM practices; are family firms 
moderating the relationship between CSR and EM mainly because they tend to be more 
socially responsible and show lower EM? 
These propositions are examined for the sample composed of 6,442 
observations for the period 2006 to 2014. The results show that more socially 
responsible firms are more proactive to make use of EM activities. In addition, the main 
evidence supports the moderating role played by family ownership. The findings also 
document that family ownership is negatively related with a greater EM commitment, 
also its interaction with corporate socially responsible practices. This result suggests that 
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family-owned firms are more conscious in terms of maintaining their wealth and image 
in the society by “making well”, by means of responsible actions and a correct disclosure 
of their accountancy states. Overall, this chapter confirms the moderating role of family 
ownership on the positive relation between CSR and EM practices.  
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 2, we describe 
the theoretical background that supports our research hypotheses. Section 3 describes 
the research model, data and sample. Finally, Sections 4 and 5 present the results 
obtained and the conclusions drawn, respectively. 
IV.2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
IV.2.1 Corporate social performance and earnings management 
As we discussed in Chapter III, several authors defend the higher firm´s reputation that 
results from a CSR strategy (e.g. Orlitzky et al., 2003; Petersen and Vredenburg, 2009; El 
Ghoul et al., 2011; Mason and Simmons, 2013). With it, firms also benefit from an 
enhancement of the stakeholders´ perception of and confidence in them (Fombrun et 
al, 2000; Young and Marais, 2011). In fact, in order to achieve this perception, financial 
transparency and accountability are becoming more crucial for CSR, being able to reduce 
the power that insiders have over outsiders, using their information advantage (Chih et 
al., 2008). In order to bear in mind for later analysis, firms communicate stakeholders 
the way they are responding to CSR activities by disclosing it, because it does affect their 
perceptions and they seem to believe that it is useful (Dierkes and Antal, 1985; Gray, 
Kouhy and Lavers, 1995).  
On the other hand, given the importance that financial transparency and 
accountability have for CSR, we analyze several issues concerning EM. EM can be 
understood as those activities carried out in an intentional way by firm’s managers to 
report accounting results that do not disclose a reliable image or situation of the firm 
(Garcia-Osma et al., 2005). In this regard, two streams – opposite - coexist in the 
literature on the possible link between CSR and EM. What’s more, authors like Chih et 
al. (2008) explained that the association between CSR and EM could be positive, 
negative or even no existing.  
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On the one hand, firms have started to take care or pay attention to the adoption 
of different mechanisms of behavior, whose aim is to reconcile business with ethical or 
social goals. In this regard and in our matter of chapter, different authors (Hong and 
Andersen, 2011; Kim et al., 2011; Shen and Chih, 2005; Shleifer, 2004) have found a good 
connection between CSR practices and the level of EM; these authors state that these 
practices are less common in companies with a great commitment to responsible 
practices, on accounting of their emphasis on providing a reliable and confident image 
of the firm and its management. Moreover, several studies have found that companies 
have accepted their social obligations and, therefore, managers feel the need of doing 
what is right; to carry transparent and honest management activities (Phillips et al., 
2003; Jones, 1995). This is the reason why, a smaller use of EM actions from managers 
that behave more ethically and transparent responsible could be expected. Therefore, 
CSR is used to win support and protection from stakeholders, trying to show the market 
their good behavior, providing an extensive disclosure of information (Gelb and 
Strawser, 2001).  
Thus, as Chih et al. (2008) argue, for high CSR firms, in order to maintain financial 
transparency, they must not promote EM or, at lease, engage less, which could be 
translated into a negative relationship between these variables. However, while the 
support for the negative relationship between CSR and EM has recently gained value, 
there also exists a different point of view, stating that CSR practices may hide managers’ 
behavior, because they try to hide the fact that they are focused on EM activities 
(Gargouri et al, 2010; Prior et al., 2008). In this line, studies have adopted, the traditional 
agency problem, playing an important role for managers (agents) to make use of 
opportunistic actions, whose objectives might be different from those of shareholders 
(principals). In this context, it has been noted that CSR can enhance agency conflicts and 
disputes (Leuz et al., 2003) and motivate managers to use the information they possess 
to make decisions according to their personal interests, even they are against the 
interests of external groups. 
In this vein, Chih et al. (2008) state that if socially responsible firms are prone to meet 
the multiple stakeholders´ demands; they can damage their financial performance, and 
therefore, manage EM in order to upward the expected results. Meanwhile, Riahi-
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Belkaoui (2004) also found that more socially responsible firms made use of more EM 
actions.  
Building our hypothesis under the above argument we analyze the effect that 
CSR has on EM and propose the following hypothesis: 
H1: CSR performance positively affects EM.  
IV.2.2 The moderating effect of family firms  
Once the possible relationship between CSR and EM has been proposed, we continue 
examining this relationship within the family business sphere. In general, along previous 
literature, several are the authors that argue how family blockholders and their 
presence on a firm could be a control mechanism that limits and avoids discretionary 
behaviors (La Porta et al., 1998; Surroca and Tribó, 2008). Thus, family ownership could 
moderate the expected positive relationship between CSR and EM. 
According to Chua et al. (1999) and Déniz ad Cabrera (2005), one of the 
uniqueness of a family firm is the influence of a family or family group on ownership, 
management, governance and succession, and on the definition of the objectives and 
strategies. We suggest there are two strategies that are closely affected by the family: 
the use and final objective of CSR practices and the attitude towards managerial control 
of earnings, i.e. the likelihood of managers can use in their decision-making process their 
discretionary behavior in order to satisfy their own interests.  
Furthermore, in regard to the institutional theory, it can be said that one of the 
main mechanism that firms utilize to show their behavior to the society or stakeholders, 
or even to affect their perception, is CSR. Therefore, as was previously suggested, CSR 
information disclosure might be disclosed as a mechanism to manage the risk of 
reputational losses and prevent doubts about unethical practices (Bebbington et al., 
2008). 
The motivations which could be under CSR information revealing (Campopiano 
and Massis, 2015) from an unethical conduct - EM included - (Martin et al., 2016; 
Pazzaglia et al., 2013) in family firms, have been effectively managed in line with the 
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SEW approach. In other words, the moderating role played by family ownership 
responds to this perspective.  
Regarding this perspective, the behavior of family business is focused on financial 
or economic objectives, but it is also affected by the family wish to maintain and ensure 
the SEW; this concept is translated into those factors that meet the affective needs of 
the family itself (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). According to Kepner (1983), talking about 
belonging and affect, the place where family members satisfy their needs is the family 
firm. What’s more, in line with Berrone et al. (2012), these firms constitute a tool for 
perpetuating their dynasty, by inheriting the business, family values and reputation.  
As far as we know, previous studies have not addressed the relationship between 
CSR and EM in the family firm sphere, although some studies suggest the difference CSR 
and EM practices between family and non-family companies for each of them 
separately.  
Regarding EM, there is a stream which supports the idea that family managers 
and owners – as majority - may be incentive to use EM practices for maintaining the 
owning family’s wealth in detriment of the minority shareholders’ wealth (Fan and 
Wong, 2002). It might manage EM downwards as a way of reducing taxation and/or 
dividends, keeping their self-finance and, so, the family control (Achleitner et al. 2014). 
Even, they can also manage earnings upwards to decrease the capability of incrementing 
debt financing and to avoid lenders interfering with appointments of the members of 
the board or covenant restrictions, which might all put the influence and control of the 
family in a risky position (Prencipe et al., 2008; Stockmans et al., 2010). Nonetheless, a 
vast of prior literature agree on defending that, in general family firms appoint a family 
member as CEO or director, exerting more control over the board and thereby reducing 
the incentives to manipulate earnings in their own interests (Ali et al., 2007). It is logical 
to think that in family firms, any member will be in favor of avoiding unethical practices 
like EM because of the close relation of the owners with the firm. The lower level of EM 
practices protects the family firms´ reputation, and consequently the family, from the 
possible detrimental effects that these practices may lay on the firm’s reputation 
(Pazzaglia et al, 2013). This argument was also found by Martin et al. (2016), who stated 
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that family firms are companies characterized by show a high risk aversion than non-
family firms to be detected using EM; therefore, they are not likely to engage in EM 
practices that cause any detrimental effect of firm’s value, performance, image and so 
on. Being caught like this can cause the loss of SEW and the damage of their image and, 
what’s more it would get them to further economic implications for the family because 
their wealth is highly concentrated in the firm’s asset. So, in this sense and with respect 
to the agency theory, for some researchers (Khan et al., 2013; Landry et al., 2013), family 
ownership can be seen as the mechanism that restricts the use of managerial earnings 
by decreasing the classical agency conflict.   
Regarding the promotion of CSR strategies in family firms, the inherent argument 
that we have defended along this research corresponds to the orientation of family firms 
to socially responsible behavior arises from the SEW model proposed by Wiseman and 
Gómez-Mejía (1998) and Gómez-Mejía et al. (2007). These authors argue that decisions 
made within family businesses respond primarily to the preservation of social-emotional 
endowment, which becomes the reference point for management decisions particularly 
those related to social and environmental concessions. As theoretically supported by 
SEW theory, they tend to be more responsive to social issues and stakeholders than non-
family firms (Marques et al., 2014; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2014). 
From the above, we base our premise on two issues: (i) the greater CSR 
commitment of family firms; and (ii) that family firms exhibit a lower level of EM. Thus, 
we analyze the effect that CSR has on EM, in family business and propose the following 
hypothesis. 
H2: Family ownership moderates the positive relationship between CSR 
performance and corporate tax avoidance. 
IV.3. METHOD 
IV.3.1 Sample  
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Again and as in previous empirical chapters II and III, a final unbalanced sample of 6,442 
firm-year observations spanning nine years (2006–2014) was available to test the 
hypotheses (see Chapter I for more details). 
IV.3.2 Measures 
Earnings Management 
Following previous studies about the topic, the discretionary component of accrual 
adjustment is adopted as proxy of EM. Accrual adjustments are defined as the difference 
between profit and cash flows from operations and in view of the inherent difficulty of 
manipulating cash flows, the use of accrual adjustments would be the most feasible 
means for managers to modify the accounting result.  
As postulated by Garcia-Osma et al. (2005), it is necessary to differentiate the 
discretionary part from the non-discretionary one in order to determine EM. The study 
by Jones (1991) represented a landmark in this line of research. 
The model applied in the present analysis is a modification of that proposed by 
Jones. All models include dummy variables identifying the country of origin, because the 
sample size precludes estimating models by sector and country, following Prior et al. 
(2008). 
Jones (1991) proposed that the components of accrual adjustments should be 
separated using a linear regression model. This model accounted for the total 
adjustment in terms of two variables: the change in sales and gross fixed assets.  
Subsequently, Defond and Jiambalvo (1994) corrected the main drawback of the 
standard Jones model, concerning its use of time series and the need for a large number 
of observations per firm, by proposing that the model should be obtained using annual 
cross-sectional data, grouping firms by sectors. Methodologically, following Jones 
(1991) and Dechow et al. (1995), total accrual adjustments (TAA) are defined as: 
TAAit = [(∆CAit) − (∆CASHit)] − [(∆CLit) − (∆RLTPit)] − DAit (1) 
where ∆CAit
 
 is the change in current assets, ∆CASHit is the change in cash held and 
short term financial investments, ∆CLit is the change in current liabilities, ∆RLTPit is the 
 
117 
change in reclassified long term obligations, and DAit  is the depreciation and 
amortization.  
Building upon in previous equation (1), accruals are obtained by adopting an 
explanatory model. The difference between actual and expected accrual adjustments is 
the discretionary component of accrual; then, EM. The standard Jones model uses the 












) + εt (2) 
where  TAAit is the total accrual adjustments; Ai,t−1 is firm´s assets; ∆Salesit is 










)  represents the non-discretionary 
component while εt the discretionary one as the residuals. 
 Non-discretionary accruals (NDAA) are calculated by replacing the coefficients 
in equation (2) with the values obtained by OLS.  
The modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995, equation 3) is the most common 
method for calculating EM. In it, it is assumed that not all sales are necessarily non-
discretionary and that this will depend on the item to be received. The modified 
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where A*R represents accounts receivable, and the other variables are as 
defined in equation 2. Again, the DAA are the residuals of this calculation an as termed 
as “EM_Dechow”.  
In order to include robust analyses in the present chapter, we also calculate the 
DAA using other models, such as Kothari et al. (2005). Following Prior et al. (2008), Sun 
et al. (2010) and Kim et al. (2012), we use the Kothari et al. (2005) model to determine 
the performance effect within DAA, thus improving the Jones model modified by 
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Dechow et al. (1995).  
This model provides resolves the doubts about differences in DAA can respond 
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The NDAA are obtained by removing the coefficients in equation (5) for those 























) εt (5) 
The DAA are then obtained by subtracting the NDAA from the TAA value 
obtained in equation (1), as shown in equation (6). The DAA is termed as “EM_Kothari”.  
DAAit = TAAit − NDAAit  (6) 
Corporate social responsibility performance and family firms  
Again, the measurement of CSR and family firms remain the same detailed along this 
PhD. “CSR” is determined based on the non-weighted sum of 26 items, it is in the range 
0 to 104. While, “Family” is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the largest 
shareholder is a family member with more than 20% of the votes, and 0 otherwise. 
IV.3.3 Control variables 
As in Chapter II and III, we also include control variables according to previous studies 
(Prior et al., 2008; Surroca and Tribó, 2008; Kim et al., 2012; Laguir et al., 2015; Lin et al., 
2017; Moore et al., 2017). Again, we include as controls: firm leverage “Leverage”; firm 
performance “Performance”; firm size “Size”; the research and development 
investment “R&D_intensity”; and an indicator of firm losses “Loss”. Finally, we again 





IV.3.4 Method and technique of analysis 
This chapter examines how CSR performance could affect EM. Even more, it also 
examines the moderating effect of family ownership, as Figure IV.1 summarizes: 
 
For these aims, in Model Ia and Ib, EM through the different measures 
“EM_Dechow” and “EM_Kothari” is regressed on CSR indicator and control variables, 
respectively.  
EM_Dechow/EM_Kothariit = β1CSRit + β2Leverageit + β3Performanceit +








k=24 + μit + ηi    
(Model IA and IB, respectively) 
The objective is also to analyze the moderating effect of family ownership. At 
this respect, for Model IIA and IIB respectively, we regressed our dependent variables 
of EM on CSR indicator variable, on our family business indicator and the interaction 
between both variables for examining the moderation effect.  
EM_Dechow/EM_Kothariit = φ1CSRit + φ2Familyit + φ3CSR ∗ Familyit +
φ4Leverageit + φ5Performanceit + φ6Sizeit + φ7RD_Intensityit + φ8Lossit +







k=26 + μit + ηi   
(Model IIA and IIB, respectively) 
 
+ - 
Figure IV.1. Research hypotheses 
 






As in previous chapters, the above models used are based on dependence 
techniques for panel data. Similar to regression models proposed in Chapter III for 
examining tax avoidance as dependent variable, we use the two-step estimator of 
Arellano and Bond (1991) as technique of analysis. 
IV.4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
IV.4.1 Descriptive results 
Table IV.1 reports the mean, standard deviation, and bivariate correlation of the 
variables of this chapter. The mean values of “EM_Dechow” and “EM_Kothari” are -
0.002 and 0.001, respectively. But, the results change if we examine the family and non-
family firms sub-sample. This result offers a first approximation of the lower use of EM 
activities in the environment of family firms in comparison with the non-family 
counterparts. The rest of the descriptive values have been discussed in previous 
chapters. The correlation matrix shown in Panel B reports that in no cases are high 














IV.4.2 CSR and earnings management: evidence on family-owned firms 
This research examines the following questions: does CSR affect EM?; how is this 
relationship in family-owned firms?. The possible moderating effect of family ownership 
in the relationship between CSR and EM is based on the premise that family firms exhibit 
a greater CSR commitment and lower EM.  
We move forward to find answers to our hypotheses 1 and 2. In this regard, Table 
IV.2 provides the results of the relationship between CSR and EM. Model IA shows that 
the “CSR” indicator has a positive and significant impact on “EM_Dechow” (coef. 0.001, 
p<0.01); Model IB also reports a positive and significant effect of “CSR” towards 
“EM_Kothari” (coef. 0.001, p<0.01). The positive link between CSR and these indicators 
allows us to support hypotheses 1; that is, the higher the EM engagement the higher 
the use of CSR practices. 
Table IV.2. Regression results on CSR and EM  
Dependent Variable Earnings Management 
“EM Dechow” Model IA 
Earnings Management 
“EM Kothari” Model IB 
Variables Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error 
Main effects    
CSR 0.001*** 0.001 0.001*** 0.001 
Control variables     
Leverage  -0.005 0.004 -0.007* 0.004 
Performance -0.019*** 0.006 -0.029*** 0.006 
Size -0.005*** 0.001 -0.005*** 0.001 
R&D_Intensity 0.002 0.001 -0.002* 0.001 
Loss 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 
Industry dummies Included Included 
Year dummies Included Included 
Country dummies Included Included 
AR(2) Arellano-Bond test  
Hansen test 
Pr > z = 0.373 
Prob > chi2 = 1.000 
Pr > z = 0.337 
Prob > chi2 = 1.000 
N= 6,442 firm-year observations. 






Supporting our hypothesis 1 about the greater level of EM actions in firms highly 
committed to CSR, we also show the findings of the examination of the possible 
moderating effect of family ownership in this relationship. Table IV.3 shows the 
relationship of CSR and EM with family firms, focusing on the interaction term between 
CSR and family ownership. Once again, “CSR” has a positive and significant impact on 
the “EM_Dechow” and “EM_Kothari” indicators (coef. 0.001, p< 0.05 and coef. 0.001, 
p<0.01, respectively). That is, the higher CSR performance, the higher level of EM 
practices. Accounting for the moderating role played by family ownership implies 
operating with coefficients. In Model IIA, the interaction “CSR_Family” shows a negative 
and significant effect on “EM_Dechow” (coef. -0.001, p<0.01) and “EM_Kothari” (coef. 
-0.001, p<0.01), so the robustness measure is fulfilled. This means the following – 
accounting for Dechow et al. (1995)´s measure -: the positive effect of CSR on EM 
practices is lower in family firms (coef. 0.001 + coef. -0.001= 0.000) than in non-family 
firms (coef. 0.001). 
Overall, the above results allow us to empirically support our hypothesis 2; there 
is a moderating effect of family ownership on the connection between CSR and EM. This 
moderating effect responds to the lower EM and greater CSR performance in family 
firms. First, the agency problem is supposed to be reduced when we are in a family firm 
context because of the fact that the agent and principal are the same. Second, we 
presume and evidence the higher CSR commitment of family firms aimed to meet with 













Table IV.3. Regression results on CSR and EM  and the moderating effect of family ownership 
Dependent Variable 





Variables Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error 
Main effects    
CSR 0.001** 0.000 0.001*** 0.001 
Family -0.010*** 0.002 -0.010*** 0.002 
CSR_Family -0.001*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.001 
Control variables     
Leverage  -0.004 0.004 -0.006 0.004 
Performance -0.019*** 0.006 -0.024*** 0.006 
SIZE -0.005*** 0.001 -0.005*** 0.001 
R&D_Intensity 0.002 0.001 -0.002* 0.001 
Loss 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Industry dummies Included Included 
Year dummies Included Included 
Country dummies Included Included 
AR(2) Arellano-Bond test  
Hansen test 
Pr > z = 0.375 
Prob > chi2 = 1.000 
Pr > z = 0.338 
Prob > chi2 = 1.000 
N= 6,442 firm-year observations. 




IV.5. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
Our initial evidence suggests that firms with higher CSR are those more oriented to 
report financial and economic data that do not correspond to those really achieved and 
using CSR as discretionary tool. As Gargouri et al. (2012), Prior et al. (2008) and Chih et 
al. (2008), we support the positive association between CSR and the level of EM. As 
these authors, we document how managers try to mask EM practices by CSR 
performance and thus, avoiding that shareholders and stakeholders identify and detect 
these discretionary actions which could lead to disciplinary actions by outside investors. 
As Chih et al. (2008), the positive impact of CSR on EM is in accordance with their 
multiple objectives hypothesis; that is, socially responsible firms are prone to satisfy the 
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interests of several stakeholders, because they can damage their financial performance, 
and therefore, manage EM in order to upward the expected results. 
We find that firms that engage in EM practices are those more proactive to invest 
in CSR activities with the aim of avoiding the negative effect that those unethical 
practices may give to the company. So, although the support for the negative 
relationship between CSR and EM has recently gained value, with these results, we 
found ourselves in the stream that Gargouri et al. (2010) and Prior et al. (2008) 
proposed; these authors stated that CSR practices may hide managers’ use of EM 
activities. This stream has adopted the traditional agency problem, where the 
separation of ownership and control is done. In this context, CSR can exacerbate agency 
problems and motivate managers to use the information to make decisions based on 
their own interests and against of those of external groups, using EM practices (Chih et 
al, 2008) and, thus, exposing all the parties of the company to the risk of legal or other 
disciplinary actions by outside investors (Leuz et al., 2003). Moreover, regarding the 
moderating effect, our results show that family ownership decreases the risk of 
discretionary actions being used (Fields et al., 2001; Wang, 2006; Ali et al., 2007; Landry 
et al, 2013).  
We also document the moderating role played by family ownership on the 
positive association between CSR and EM. In line with Chua et al. (1999) and Déniz ad 
Cabrera (2005), we provide evidence that confirms the impact of family on the definition 
of the objectives and strategies (like CSR and EM).  
On the one hand, we support previous studies around how family firms show 
lower EM strategies. Overall, our findings contribute by advancing in the understanding 
of the effect of family ownership on EM actions, where there are two opposing streams. 
In this respect, we provide evidence in line with the alignment effect proposed by Wang 
(2006); this effect defends that a higher level of managerial ownership decreases the 
disputes of demands between owners and managers. In line with Ali et al. (2007) and 
Martin et al. (2016), family firms exhibit a lower agency problem between managers and 
owners, showing a lower orientation to the adoption of EM practices. Our evidence 
allows us to support how family firms avoid any unethical practices like EM that damage 
 
126 
their reputation, image, and so on, and thus, their socio-emotional endowments. In line 
with agency theory and previous studies (like Khan et al. [2013] and Landry et al. [2013]), 
family ownership restricts the use of managerial earnings by decreasing the classical 
agency conflict.   
On the other hand and along the present research, we again confirm the greater 
social and environmental commitment of family firms. We document how family firms 
are more incentive to invest in CSR strategies for responding to the preservation of their 
SEW (as Wiseman and Gómez-Mejía [1998), Gómez-Mejía et al. [2007; 2014], Marques 
et al. [2014] and Cruz et al. [2014], among others). Again, we clearly shed light on the 
positive association between family ownership and social and environmental 
performance.  
 
IV.6. SYNTHESIS  
The objective of this chapter is to examine the effect of CSR performance on firm EM 
and the moderating effect of family ownership. We have used an international sample 
composed of 956 international firms during the period 2006 to 2014.   
We evidence that social and environmental performance is positively related 
with EM; firms with a greater socially responsible performance show a higher 
discretionary behavior by promoting actions that mask the real financial and economic 
performance of the firm. However, we find that this positive relation is lower – 
moderate - in family firms, mainly because of the fact that family firms show a greater 
socially responsible behavior aimed to preserve their socio-emotional endowments and 
are negatively associated with EM practices. This result suggests that family-owned 
firms are more conscious in terms of maintaining their wealth and image in the society 
by “making well”, by means of responsible actions and a correct disclosure of their 
accountancy states. Overall, this chapter confirms the moderating effect of family 
ownership on the positive relation between CSR and EM practices.  
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This research contributes to previous literature as follows. First, we explore the 
relationship between CSR and EM in family business, as prevalent among listed 
companies around the world (Burkart et al., 2003). Previous studies have addressed the 
relationship of family firms with CSR and EM, separately. However, they have found 
mixed evidence and, sometimes, the findings are not generalizable; a possible cause 
could be the lack of study of additional variables that clearly affect the relationship, like 
ownership concentration. Second, this research sheds some light on the two streams do 
not previously established by several authors in the family business context: CSR 
performance and EM activities. However, we clearly contribute by providing additional 
evidence about the link between CSR and EM by documenting how socially responsible 
firms are more predisposed to promote EM practices. Third, this research also 
contributes to the family business literature in the following ways. This research 
contributes to the literature by providing new insights into socially responsible behavior 























































































































As have been highlight along this research, in recent years, extensive research is related 
to the field of family business. Its objective has been to analyze not only its commitment 
and orientation towards social and environmental issues, but also to establish a 
comparison with respect to its non-family competitors. Although, as we indicated, there 
is a wide literature on this subject, it is accompanied by a diversity of results and a lack 
of consensus on the major or minor socially responsible commitment of family firms. 
That is why the main objective of this research is to respond the following question: how 
is the social and environmental commitment in family firms and what are their main 
consequences? 
Several aspects have been considered in this research with the main goal of 
responding the abovementioned questions. Regarding the first question, the wide 
heterogeneity in findings is result of the possible differentiation between family firms 
along their life; for it, the disparities of governance and environmental factors of family 
firms could affect the commitment of family firms towards social and environmental 
practices. At this respect, this PhD addresses the analysis of the family firm commitment 
to CSR performance accounting for how environmental and governance characteristics 
influence in such behavior.  
Regarding the second question proposed, it is generally known that one of the 
most important or significant cost in firms is taxes, which are directly correlated with 
profitability and shareholders’ value. In this regard and under a tax saving perspective, 
over last years, prior literature agrees in supporting how firms caring about their CSR 
performance and particularly, how these firms behave towards tax avoidance policies. 
Again, evidence have offered contradictory results being a growing debate about 
whether and how socially responsible firms behave in terms of tax payment. But even, 
the debate around CSR-tax avoidance merges with the research gap found in grounds of 
ownership structure; concretely, for family ownership.  
In addition, and beyond tax avoidance, other agency manifestation resulted from 
the separation between property and control is the risk of earnings management (EM) 
practices understood as discretionary actions from which financial statements do not 
represent the real economic and financial performance of a firm. Given the accounting 
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scandals and fraud over last years (e.g. Enron and Parmalat case), a large number of 
previous studies have been interested on examining this issues and how, earnings 
management could be determined by the socially responsible commitment of the firm. 
It is true that several are the studies that link CSR with EM by proposing a discretionary 
commitment of the first strategy. A stream of prior literature suggests that companies 
may use CSR to hide their EM practices by providing loads of socially responsible 
information. As was proposed, because of the importance of EM potential damage as 
result of CSR actions on company and shareholders´ wealth and stakeholders´ 
satisfaction, it is relevant to examine the link between CSR performance and EM a 
discretionary strategy that mask the real financial and economic data of the firm. Again, 
we analyze the moderating role played by family control that could act as mechanism 
that moderated the CSR-EM association.  
From the above, we examine several closely related issues in the family business 
sphere. The first objective of this research is to bring evidence the conditions that 
compromise towards CSR from family firms. Moreover, this research also examines 
whether family firms exhibit a disparate scale of compromise towards CSR by accounting 
for internal and external stakeholders. It also examines how several contingency factors 
associated to governance and environment aspects could play a moderating role. The 
second objective of this research is to shed light on the effect of CSR on tax avoidance. 
We also examine whether family ownership affects tax avoidance practices by socially 
responsible performance. The third and last objective is to examine how CSR 
performance could affect earnings management (EM) accounting for different proxies. 
Even more, in the family firms´ sphere, we also analyze the moderating role played by 
family ownership, under the premise that family-owned firms exhibit a greater CSR 
commitment and performance and lower EM. 
The above objectives are examined for a sample of analysis composed by 956 
firms from 28 different countries. The period of analysis starts on 2006 and finalizes on 
2016. Our results are obtained by proposing and regressing several models for panel 
data. Concretely, we used as technique of analysis Tobit and GMM estimators. This 
research brings the following evidence related to each objective. From now on, we 
proceed to numerate the main conclusions of this research: 
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Conclusion 1. Family firms positively behave towards corporate social responsibility, 
on the grounds of the socioemotional wealth theory, aimed to preserve the firm’s 
survival. 
Family firms, in almost countries, represent the majority of all the business world (IFERA, 
2003). In our studied sample, family firms have a great commitment on social and 
environmental matters and, what’s more, they try to achieve their objectives towards 
the satisfaction of all stakeholders. We can support the above because of CSR allows 
them to guarantee the legitimacy and the survival of the company; one of the most 
important consequences of developing a proactive CSR performance is the increase in 
the firm’s reputation. 
Furthermore, CSR increases the stakeholders’ general perception of the 
company leading to a greater confidence from them towards the firm and helps to 
provide family employment and achieves all their socioemotional objectives. It also 
helps stakeholders understand the way family firms meet their social and environmental 
demands. 
The above conclusion is clearly related to a widely accepted theoretical 
framework of the CSR commitment of family firms, the SEW perspective. At this respect, 
the SEW theory is transferred to or applied in the family firm environment, in those firms 
where the decision making is based in socioemotional endowment and not only in 
economic objectives. Therefore, when a family is willing to make a decision, they are 
usually driven by the risk undertaken to preserve their endowment (Gómez-Mejia et al, 
2007). Sometimes, the uniqueness of family firms may be the result of considering the 
SEW as the key aspect in the decision-making process (Berrone et al, 2010). What’s 
more, there are situations where there exist uncertain economic benefits or no clear 
economic profitability and the risk of the operation is adjusted by the gain of the SEW. 
Conclusion 2. The presence of family members on the management team and on the 
board of directors influence the practice of CSR. 
It is true that there is no clear and generalized definition of family business (Miller et al., 
2007). However, we could affirm that family firms’ definition usually refers to 
 
134 
management, ownership or succession-related issues. In this way, due to the deep 
knowledge that family members have about the functioning of the society and their 
attachment to it, they have a great influence in the practice of CSR activities.  
In this regard, our results note that family members create an environmentally 
friendly company which channels its transactions and activities towards CSR behavior. 
The rewards family members feel when acting in this way derives from the 
consequences of CSR previously mention above. In this vein, CSR makes them feel proud 
of getting the company a top and prestige status and honored of the prestige that the 
firm might take.  
These results have implications whereas we point out how family ownership 
impacts on CSR; family managers and directors (as governance factors) play a 
moderating role on this behaviour. For investors, this is useful information and should 
be a considered implication about how CSR could be promoted when family presence is 
higher in order to preserve and reinforce their socio-emotional endowments. What’s 
more, as we discussed before, it should also serve as guidelines to investors and 
shareholders in order to decide about the composition of the management teams and 
boards that are in favor of CSR strategies. They should realize the presence of family 
members can provide additional advantages and benefits in CSR performance. It can be 
also considered an implication for stakeholders, who are able to understand now, with 
our findings, the benefits associated with this family presence in the firm because they 
meet the stakeholders’ environmental demands. 
Conclusion 3. The level of munificence in the firm’s market reduces commitment of 
family firms to CSR activities. 
Munificence can be considered as an environmental contingency factor. As it has been 
seen before by previous studies, the impact of the context makes an inference on the 
behavior of family business on their achievement of CSR; CSR performance is clearly 
influenced by environment conditions. The objective, then, was to examine how the 
level of munificence could moderate or impacted the CSR commitment of family firms. 
In munificent contexts, how is the effort that the family makes on pursuing CSR 
activities?. Based on our findings, a higher level of munificence in the context where the 
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firms operates minimizes their CSR orientation. In other words, despite of munificent 
contexts is clearly characterized by a higher availability of resources to be allocated in 
numerous projects, our evidence support he lower CSR performance in these contexts. 
This may be a result of in more munificent industries, companies have greater 
opportunities to grow and survive in a long-term horizon. Since survival is somewhat 
guaranteed, companies are less incentivized to invest in CSR activities due to the 
existence of more available resources and less competition. Thus, it reduces the need to 
seek for additional resources, as CSR activities. 
At this respect, for investors our findings will help them in order to diversify their 
investments in family firms locating in munificent industries to those more socially 
responsible firms and for stakeholders will make them aware of paying attention to the 
context where their company operates and therefore, take into account the 
consequences of munificent environments on CSR objectives. 
Conclusion 4. Family firms are responsible to external and internal stakeholders. 
Along previous studies, it is clear that stakeholders represent groups of different 
participants that may be considered in the decision-making process of an organization 
but who can also be affected by them. Thus, stakeholders are indispensable on the 
promotion and development of a CSR strategy by companies; a proactive CSR 
performance might lead to an increase in the general perception that stakeholders have 
on the frim. Therefore, they will increase the confidence towards this firm in comparison 
with other firms in the market. But, along this research, a clear distinction between 
external and internal stakeholders have been proposed.  
Our findings confirm how family owners are likely to guarantee and meet the 
expectations of the internal stakeholders. Family firms adopt responsible work actions 
and promote socially responsible strategies. Meanwhile, they also consider in their 
decision-making process external stakeholders. Do not forger that CSR practices 
associated to external users allow firms to create and maintain long relationships; with 
it, family firms ensure a good reputation, image and other intangible assets. This result 
offers an important implication for stakeholders in order to be able to understand how 
family controlled firms react and meet the objectives that they demand. 
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Conclusion 5. Those firms clearly committed towards corporate social responsibility 
activities are likely to reduce their tax avoidance activities.  
Firms are aware of the consequences that tax avoidance activities may cause. Among 
the possible consequences, we cite the loss of reputation and support of stakeholders 
or the damage of their image, among others. Precisely, the abovementioned 
consequences are some of the reasons that explain why firms are in favor of the 
utilization of CSR activities; they clearly achieves positive outcomes. Companies find in 
CSR practices and behavior a number of powerful strategies that allows them to 
maintain their good image and reputation. What’s more, this reputation may be able to 
increase shareholders’ value. Note that, as was highlighted along the PhD and by a large 
amount of previous studies, CSR achieves several positive outcomes. We refer not only 
to the higher stakeholders’ satisfaction, the lower activism of them, but also to a higher 
firm performance, better access to internal and external finance, lower private 
information, higher firm reputation and image, lower managerial discretionary 
behavior… And, as we support, lower incentives to develop and promote a tax saving 
strategy. 
Conclusion 6. Family firms exhibit greater tax saving actions. This greater tax 
avoidance is resulted of the divergence of interests between majority and minority 
shareholders. 
As in Conclusion 5 was pointed, our firms exhibit fewer tax saving actions when CSR 
performance is greater. However, the above relationship is moderated in family firms. 
The inclusion of family ownership moderates the negative link between CSR and tax 
avoidance. That is, there is a lower tax avoidance policy when CSR is higher, except when 
family ownership is greater. We should refer to the “entrenchment hypothesis”, in 
which family firms exhibit greater tax saving activities. As majority shareholder, the 
family works in an opportunistic way by extracting rents from minority shareholders 
using tax avoidance strategies. We could say that this tax avoidance is result of the 
divergence of interests and objectives between shareholders.  
Thus, at this point, because of their extensive voting rights, families as majority 
shareholders tend to increase their power in the company by expropriating private 
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benefits. Therefore, they have ensured the control of the firm; they can act even 
damaging the minorities´ wealth. These firms could promote tax avoidance activities to 
cover losses, or any type of rent extractions like the ones previously mentioned, which 
in fact become more opportunistic. In this sense, they relegate the interests of minority 
shareholders to a second position. 
Conclusion 7. Socially responsible firms are oriented to increase their earnings 
management practices, using CSR as a discretionary tool. 
In general, it is expected a negative link between CSR and EM by proposing that more 
socially responsible companies will behave in a transparent way. However, as opposed 
to what one might expect, our evidence confirms that firms with higher CSR 
commitment are those with a higher EM level. In other words, those companies that 
engage managerial accruals are those that, in fact, try to hide manager’s behavior by 
reporting CSR performance and therefore taking the attention to another side of the 
company.  
With this evidence, when we can discuss building upon on the traditional agency 
conflict that helps managers to adopt and make use of opportunistic actions. The 
objective of these actions are, in fact, generally different from those of shareholders. 
Under an agency perspective and context, CSR motivates managers to use the 
information they hold to take decisions which carry their own interests and not those of 
external groups.  
Conclusion 8. However, family firms exhibit a lower use of earning management 
strategies.  
It is logical to think that in family firms, any member of the cited firm will be in favor of 
avoiding EM as discretionary actions. There is a closely relationship of the owners with 
the firm, avoiding any action that could damage or endanger the survival of the firm. So, 
a low level of EM practices allows them to ensure their image and reputation. This is to 
say that, if the company’s reputation is smeared with the idea of an unclear 
management, it will also smear the family’s reputation and therefore it will damage the 
family as a whole, because the company is also their main source of income. 
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We could support the higher risk aversion of family firms of being detected using 
EM. Therefore, as we were discussing, they are not oriented to promote these type of 
actions because of any detrimental effect of firm’s value, performance, image and so 
on. Precisely, if the family firm is caught like EM, some of the consequences would be 
the loss of the SEW and endowments; or, the damage of their image and, further 
economic implications for the family because of the fact that their wealth is highly 
concentrated in the firm’s assets. So, we could consider that family ownership limits the 
use of EM by the lower classic agency conflict between managers and owners.  
Conclusion 9. Family ownership moderates the impact of CSR on tax avoidance and 
earnings management. 
As we have highlighted and proposed along this pages, the proposed relationships in 
this PhD are highly different when there exists presence of family in the company or 
when there is not. Thereon, as a general conclusion, the family implication changes the 
way that the firm behaves in CSR matters, tax activities and managerial decisions. The 
family firm objectives and decision-making process clearly differ from non-family firms. 
We can start citing the SEW endowments and perspective of managers and directors; 
the long horizon perspective of the firm; how these firms try to limit and restrict any 
action that could put at risk their survival and legitimacy, and so on. These particular 
characteristics make that the decision-making process and their CSR commitment vary 
with respect to non-family firms.  
Limitations 
This research is subject to certain limitations. First of all, in relation to the CSR measure, 
it is measured as the non-weighted sum of different indicators, which are based on 
numerical scales. Despite of we have tested the reliability of our instrument, we are 
cautious about the possible bias included in it, because it may not capture the true 
underlying performance. Thus, the main limitation responds to the impossibility of 
performing sensitive analyses based on different empirical proxies of CSR using 
alternative databases because we did not have access to additional data.  
 
139 
Second, the variable that represents family businesses is a dummy in which the 
companies in the sample are classified as family, or non-family-owned firms, applying a 
20% cut-off point for ownership. Because of the lack of available information, it was not 
possible to perform a sensitivity analysis by considering alternative family firms, 
considering other aspects, such as succession. What’s more, deriving from the previous 
limitation, we are not able to confirm the existence of a threshold at which point our 
results could be modified or could operate in a different way. 
Finally, we complement prior literature with evidence drawn from an 
international sample beyond the predominant US analysis. However, our sample 
consists only of public firms from 28 countries, with a notable bias towards Anglo-Saxon 
countries: US (42.21% of observations from the total), UK firms (8.12% of observations 
from the total), Canada (7.79% of observations from the total) and Australia (7.31% of 
observations from the total). We must be cautious to generalize the evidence here 
reported. To generalize our findings, future studies must solve this limitation by 
including a higher representativeness of European and Asian, mainly, regions, or maybe, 
by developing studies focused on specific areas (e.g. European Union). However, reliable 
data on non-listed firms are difficult to obtain. 
Future research 
Future research should be carefully considered in different aspects of this study. In view 
of the controversy surrounding the validity of several proxies for capturing CSR along 
the literature, and given the lack of data availability, further research is needed to 
validate the results obtained here, using alternative measures. For example, by 
accounting for strengths and concerns of CSR (like those provided by KLD database) or 
by using environmental, social and governance scores (ESG, provided by Bloomberg).  
Thus, regarding family aspects, future research in this regard could confirm the 
evidence obtained here proposing other definitions of family firms. Because of the 
impossibility to standardize a threshold at which our results would be modified, further 
research could examine if a percentage of family ownership exists or a level of family 
involvement that may shape the results obtained in the present research. Furthermore, 
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it should be also of interest to consider possible family ties within the managers or 
directors, the generation of the family, or, the gender diversity among family members. 
Future studies could also advance in the results here obtained by increasing the 
period and the sample of analysis to additional countries, as well as considering some 
other industry-level factors, the country economic development or analyzing the 
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En un contexto empresarial a nivel internacional y dada la actual situación 
medioambiental, financiera y económica, el objetivo principal de esta tesis doctoral es 
analizar la posible relación existente entre la denominada Responsabilidad Social 
Corporativa (RSC), la agresividad fiscal y la manipulación contable, así como el papel 
moderador que la inclusión de la empresa familiar puede desempeñar en estas 
relaciones. 
Las organizaciones, hoy en día, se encuentran bajo un creciente escrutinio por 
parte de la sociedad en términos de comportamiento y compromiso con las normas 
legales existentes, la actitud medioambiental, los patrones de conducta y todas las 
especificaciones no escritas que deben seguir. Las empresas deben adoptar diferentes 
estrategias para diseñar y promover actividades sociales, éticas y respetuosas con el 
medio ambiente. Estas actividades son las que les permiten mantener su legitimidad y 
su buena imagen en los mercados y sociedades. En general, existe en la sociedad una 
creciente preocupación por mejorar el desempeño social y medioambiental, lo que lleva 
a las empresas a utilizar las actividades de RSC con el fin de influir en las percepciones 
del público en general sobre sí mismas. 
Así pues, también existe un equilibrio entre los objetivos sociales y 
medioambientales y las preocupaciones económicas a la hora de maximizar la riqueza 
de los accionistas. Por ello, en este sentido y dejando de lado los asuntos sociales y 
medioambientales, la preocupación por el porcentaje que representan los impuestos en 
los costes corporativos está ganando importancia desde hace ya algún tiempo. Es en 
este momento cuando las empresas y el mundo académico comienzan a utilizar el 
término agresividad fiscal. Aunque existen varias definiciones, según Chen et al. (2010) 
la agresividad fiscal se define como una “gestión a la baja de los ingresos imponibles a 
través de actividades de planificación fiscal”; mientras que, Frischmann et al. (2008) lo 
definieron de una manera más simple como el acto de “participar en posiciones 
tributarias significativas con datos de respaldo relativamente débiles”. 
Hoy en día, existe una gran variedad de oportunidades para la investigación 
sobre la agresividad fiscal debido a la fertilidad de este campo de estudio. Pero, además, 
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no solo las autoridades fiscales están prestando atención, sino que también goza de 
interés para otro tipo de audiencia, como, por ejemplo, gerentes, inversores y otros 
reguladores (Beng et al., 2016), que también centran su atención en términos fiscales; 
una atención, por otra parte, que puede orientarse a analizar el nivel de compromiso de 
la RSC de las empresas con mayor agresividad fiscal. 
Cuando analizamos este término junto con el comportamiento de la RSC, se ha 
evidenciado a lo largo de varios y numerosos estudios que las empresas socialmente 
responsables tienen incentivos o motivación para mantener su buena reputación e 
imagen; por lo tanto, debido a las consecuencias que la agresividad fiscal puede tener 
en su reputación, las empresas socialmente responsables podrían ser menos agresivas 
en materia fiscal. Sin embargo, este no es siempre el caso y algunas empresas, 
aparentemente, se comportan de una manera socialmente responsable incluso cuando 
realizan actividades fiscalmente agresivas (por ejemplo, Preuss, 2010; Sikka, 2010). 
Debido a la ausencia de resultados homogéneos, centramos nuestra investigación en 
este campo para intentar llenar este gap. 
Además, a lo largo de los años, ha habido un número considerable de escándalos 
contables y financieros derivados de la toma de decisiones del gerente y la separación 
entre propiedad y control. En general, esta mala toma de decisiones de los gerentes es 
causada por su voluntad de satisfacer sus propios intereses y necesidades en lugar de 
las de los accionistas. Para ello, suelen promover diferentes actividades, entre las cuales 
podemos encontrar el hecho de que pueden modificar la contabilidad con el objetivo de 
enmascarar su comportamiento discrecional. Estas actividades se denominan 
generalmente como manipulación contable o earnings management. 
A este respecto, los gerentes también pueden divulgar información con el 
objetivo de mejorar el desempeño social y medioambiental o también pueden usar las 
actividades de RSC para influir en las percepciones generales que terceros pueden tener 
con respecto a su comportamiento dentro de la empresa (Dowling y Pfeffer, 1975). Esto 
ha sido sugerido previamente por diferentes autores (Salewski y Zülch, 2014; Martínez-
Ferrero et al., 2015, entre otros). Como afirman estos autores, las empresas con dichos 
gerentes pueden enmascarar el comportamiento discrecional y las prácticas de 
manipulación contable; de hecho, pueden conseguirlo al proporcionar enormes 
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cantidades de información de RSC y, por lo tanto, garantizar su legitimidad, 
compensando así su información financiera de baja calidad. Sin embargo, en este 
sentido, dado que existen flujos opuestos y dada la importancia del daño potencial de 
la manipulación contable (Chih et al., 2008), nuestro objetivo con esta investigación es 
tratar de arrojar luz sobre tan variados resultados.  
Por lo tanto, el objetivo de esta tesis doctoral es investigar en el campo de la RSC 
su relación con algunos otros conceptos, como la agresividad fiscal y la manipulación 
contable. La finalidad es resolver esos research gap donde las relaciones mencionadas 
no son claras. 
No obstante, la principal contribución y foco de atención de esta tesis es su 
estudio desde la perspectiva de la empresa familiar debido a la enorme importancia que 
este tipo de organización posee en la actualidad: creación de empleo, desarrollo 
económico, representación empresarial, etc (IFERA, 2003).  Si bien las relaciones 
propuestas con anteriores variables contribuyen notablemente a la literatura, esta tesis 
tiene como punto fuerte analizar la empresa familiar como factor moderador. Hasta la 
fecha, diversos estudios se han centrado en analizar y realizar una comparativa de 
empresa familiar vs. no familiar y aspectos de gobierno corporativo, sucesión, 
legitimidad, etc. Pero, escasa es la investigación previa que vincula y expande esta 
comparativa hacia la RSC, la agresividad fiscal y la manipulación contable.  
Así, a lo largo de la tesis doctoral, los capítulos empíricos que se han desarrollado 
tienen por finalidad analizar los siguientes objetivos que serán expuestos a 
continuación.  
Objetivos 
La tesis doctoral tiene por finalidad dar respuesta a tres objetivos relacionados 
entre sí, todos ellos examinados de manera teórica y empírica. La línea principal de esta 
tesis es analizar si existe una diferencia en el espectro de empresas familiares o si se 
comportan en la misma línea que las empresas no familiares. En general, los objetivos 
de esta investigación son los siguientes: 
1. Examinar el comportamiento de la empresa familiar hacia los enfoques de RSC 
y, por lo tanto, su enfoque en actividades orientadas hacia la sociedad y el medio 
 
172 
ambiente, incluido el efecto que existe entre acciones orientadas hacia el exterior – por 
ejemplo, consumidores – y hacia el interior – por ejemplo, empleados o inversores -. Al 
mismo tiempo, enfocamos nuestro análisis en la moderación que esta relación puede 
experimentar con respecto a diferentes factores de contingencia relacionados con la 
gobernanza y los factores del entorno. 
2. Examinar el impacto del desempeño de la RSC en la agresividad fiscal, debido 
a la existencia de resultados mixtos en este campo y, en particular, en el marco de la 
empresa familiar. Al igual que en el objetivo anterior, también examinamos la 
moderación que la propiedad familiar puede exhibir en la relación. 
3. Examinar el efecto moderador de las empresas familiares sobre el impacto del 
desempeño de la RSC en la manipulación contable. ¿Es el compromiso responsable 
realmente ético? Esta pregunta de investigación se ha incluido para comprender el 
efecto que el compromiso socialmente responsable ejerce en las prácticas manipulación 
contable y con el objetivo de reforzar la brecha existente sobre el efecto moderador del 
espectro familiar. 
Las hipótesis y objetivos de investigación se han examinado para una muestra 
internacional de análisis compuesta por 6.442 observaciones para el periodo 
comprendido entre 2006 y 2014. Metodológicamente, se proponen diversas regresiones 
de datos de panel.  
Conclusiones 
El principal objetivo de la tesis doctoral ha sido responder a la siguiente cuestión: 
¿Cómo es el compromiso social y ambiental en las empresas familiares y cuáles son sus 
principales consecuencias?. A este respecto, las cuestiones de investigación analizadas 
se corresponden con: (i) analizar el compromiso en RSC de la empresa familiar y 
examinar factores de contingencia que moderen esta relación – atendiendo a su 
naturaleza de gobierno y del entorno -; (ii) analizar cómo influye el compromiso de RSC 
en las prácticas de agresividad fiscal y de manipulación contable y el efecto moderador 
de la empresa familiar en estas relaciones.  
Los objetivos anteriores se examinan para una muestra de análisis compuesta 
por 956 empresas de 28 países diferentes. El período de análisis comienza en 2006 y 
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finaliza en 2016. Nuestros resultados se obtienen proponiendo y regresando varios 
modelos para datos de panel. Concretamente, utilizamos como técnica de análisis los 
estimadores de Tobit y GMM. Esta investigación trae la siguiente evidencia relacionada 
con cada objetivo. A partir de ahora, procederemos a enumerar las principales 
conclusiones de esta investigación: 
Conclusión 1. Las empresas familiares se comportan positivamente hacia la 
responsabilidad social corporativa, sobre la base de la teoría de la riqueza 
socioemocional, destinada a preservar la supervivencia de la empresa. 
En nuestra muestra estudiada, las empresas familiares tienen un gran 
compromiso con los asuntos sociales y medioambientales y, lo que es más, intentan 
lograr sus objetivos para la satisfacción de todos los stakeholders. Podemos confirmar 
lo anterior debido a que la RSC les permite garantizar la legitimidad y la supervivencia 
de la empresa; una de las consecuencias más importantes de desarrollar un desempeño 
proactivo de RSC es el aumento de la reputación de la empresa. Además, la RSC aumenta 
la percepción general de la empresa por parte de los interesados, lo que lleva a una 
mayor confianza de ellos hacia la empresa y ayuda a proporcionar empleo familiar y 
logra todos sus objetivos socioemocionales. También ayuda a las partes interesadas a 
comprender la manera en que las empresas familiares satisfacen sus demandas sociales 
y ambientales. 
La conclusión anterior está claramente relacionada con un marco teórico 
ampliamente aceptado del compromiso de RSC de las empresas familiares, la 
perspectiva de la SEW. A este respecto, la teoría de SEW se transfiere o se aplica en el 
entorno de la empresa familiar, en aquellas empresas donde la toma de decisiones se 
basa en la dotación socioemocional y no solo en los objetivos económicos. Por lo tanto, 
cuando una familia está dispuesta a tomar una decisión, por lo general se ve impulsada 
por el riesgo asumido para preservar su herencia (Gómez-Mejia et al, 2007). A veces, la 
singularidad de las empresas familiares puede ser el resultado de considerar a la SEW 
como el aspecto clave en el proceso de toma de decisiones (Berrone et al, 2010). 
Además, hay situaciones en las que existen beneficios económicos inciertos o no hay 
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una rentabilidad económica clara y el riesgo de la operación se ajusta por la ganancia de 
la SEW. 
Conclusión 2. La presencia de miembros de la familia en el equipo directivo y en la junta 
directiva influye en la práctica de la RSC. 
Es cierto que no existe una definición clara y generalizada de empresa familiar 
(Miller et al., 2007). Sin embargo, podríamos afirmar que la definición de empresas 
familiares generalmente se refiere a cuestiones relacionadas con la administración, la 
propiedad o la sucesión. De esta manera, debido al profundo conocimiento que tienen 
los miembros de la familia sobre el funcionamiento de la sociedad y su apego a ella, 
poseen una gran influencia en la práctica de las actividades de RSC. 
En este sentido, nuestros resultados señalan que los miembros de la familia 
crean una empresa respetuosa con el medio ambiente que canaliza sus transacciones y 
actividades hacia el comportamiento de la RSC. Las recompensas que sienten los 
miembros de la familia cuando actúan de esta manera se derivan de las consecuencias 
de la RSC que se mencionaron anteriormente. En este sentido, la RSC los hace sentir 
orgullosos por haber hecho posible la obtención de un estatus de prestigio y honrar así 
a la empresa y lo que ello conlleva. 
Estos resultados tienen una serie de implicaciones a la hora de señalar cómo la 
propiedad familiar impacta en la RSC. Los gerentes y directores de familia (como 
factores de gobierno) desempeñan un papel moderador en este comportamiento. Para 
los inversores, esto ofrece una información útil y debería considerarse como una 
implicación acerca de cómo podría promoverse la RSC cuando la presencia familiar es 
mayor para preservar y reforzar sus dotaciones socioemocionales. Además, como 
hemos discutido anteriormente, también debería servir como una guía para los 
inversores y accionistas a fin de decidir sobre la composición de los equipos de 
administración y las juntas directivas que están a favor de las estrategias de RSC. Hay 
que tener en cuenta que la presencia de miembros de la familia puede proporcionar 
ventajas y beneficios adicionales en el desempeño de la RSC. También se puede 
considerar una implicación para los stakeholders, que pueden entender ahora, con 
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nuestros hallazgos, los beneficios asociados con esta presencia familiar en la empresa 
porque satisfacen las demandas medioambientales de las partes interesadas. 
Conclusión 3. El nivel de munificencia en el mercado de la empresa reduce el compromiso 
de las empresas familiares con las actividades de RSE. 
La munificencia puede ser considerada como un factor de contingencia 
medioambiental. Como se ha confirmado en estudios anteriores, el impacto del 
contexto genera una inferencia sobre el comportamiento de las empresas familiares en 
el logro de la RSC. El desempeño de la RSC está claramente influenciado por las 
condiciones del entorno. El objetivo, entonces, ha sido analizar cómo el nivel de 
munificencia podría moderar o impactar el compromiso de RSC de las empresas 
familiares. En contextos de mayor munificencia, ¿cuál es el esfuerzo que hace la familia 
para realizar actividades de RSC? Según nuestros hallazgos, un mayor nivel de 
munificencia en el contexto en el que operan las empresas minimiza su orientación a la 
RSC. En otras palabras, a pesar de que los contextos munificentes se caracterizan 
claramente por una mayor disponibilidad de recursos para ser asignados en numerosos 
proyectos, nuestra evidencia apoya el bajo rendimiento de la RSC en estos contextos. 
Esto puede ser el resultado de que en industrias munificentes, las empresas tienen 
mayores oportunidades de crecer y sobrevivir en un horizonte a largo plazo. Dado que 
la supervivencia está ciertamente garantizada, las empresas están menos incentivadas 
para invertir en actividades de RSC debido a la existencia de más recursos disponibles y 
menos competencia. Por lo tanto, reduce la necesidad de buscar recursos adicionales, 
como actividades de RSC. 
A este respecto, para los inversores, nuestros resultados les proporcionan 
información sobre cómo diversificar sus inversiones en empresas familiares ubicadas en 
industrias munificentes en aquellas empresas más responsables socialmente y para las 
partes interesadas, les ayudará a cómo prestar atención al contexto donde opera su 
empresa y, por lo tanto, tener en cuenta las consecuencias de los entornos urbanos en 
los objetivos de la RSC. 




A lo largo de los estudios previos a esta tesis, ha quedado de manifiesto que las 
partes interesadas –stakeholders - representan grupos de diferentes participantes que 
pueden considerarse en el proceso de toma de decisiones de una organización, pero 
que también pueden verse afectados por ellos. Por lo tanto, los stakeholders son 
indispensables en la promoción y el desarrollo de una estrategia de RSC por parte de las 
empresas; un desempeño proactivo de la RSC podría llevar a un aumento en la 
percepción general que los stakeholders tienen al margen. Por lo tanto, aumentarán la 
confianza hacia esta empresa en comparación con otras empresas en el mercado. Pero, 
a lo largo de esta investigación, se ha propuesto una clara distinción entre las partes 
interesadas externas e internas. 
Nuestros hallazgos confirman cómo es probable que los propietarios familiares 
garanticen y cumplan con las expectativas de las partes interesadas internas – por 
ejemplo, empleados - . Las empresas familiares adoptan acciones de trabajo 
responsable y promueven estrategias socialmente responsables. Mientras tanto, 
también consideran en su proceso de toma de decisiones a las partes interesadas 
externas – por ejemplo, proveedores o clientes -. No debemos olvidar que las prácticas 
de RSC asociadas a usuarios externos permiten que las empresas creen y mantengan 
relaciones duraderas con ellos. Así, las empresas familiares garantizan una buena 
reputación, imagen y otros activos intangibles. Este resultado ofrece una implicación 
importante para los stakeholders al poder comprender cómo reaccionan las empresas 
controladas por las familias y cumplir con los objetivos que exigen. 
Conclusión 5. Es probable que aquellas empresas claramente comprometidas con las 
actividades de responsabilidad social corporativa reduzcan sus actividades de 
agresividad fiscal. 
Las empresas son conscientes de las consecuencias que pueden tener las 
actividades fiscales más agresivas en materia de impuestos. Entre las posibles 
consecuencias, citamos la pérdida de reputación y el apoyo de las partes interesadas o 
el daño de su imagen, entre otros. Precisamente, las consecuencias mencionadas 
anteriormente son algunas de las razones que explican por qué las empresas estarían a 
favor de la utilización de las actividades de RSC; claramente con ello logran resultados 
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positivos. Las empresas encuentran en las prácticas y el compromiso en RSC una serie 
de estrategias poderosas que les permiten mantener su buena imagen y reputación. 
Además, esta reputación puede aumentar el valor de los accionistas. Hay que tener en 
cuenta que, como se destacó a lo largo de la tesis doctoral, y por una gran cantidad de 
estudios previos, la RSC conduce a diferentes resultados positivos. Nos referimos no solo 
a la mayor satisfacción de los stakeholders, a su menor activismo, sino también a un 
mayor rendimiento de las empresas, un mejor acceso a las finanzas internas y externas, 
una menor información privada, una mayor reputación e imagen de las empresas, un 
menor comportamiento administrativo discrecional... Y, tal y como evidenciamos, 
menores incentivos para desarrollar y promover una estrategia de ahorro fiscal. 
Conclusión 6. Las empresas familiares exhiben mayores acciones de ahorro fiscal. Esta 
mayor agresividad fiscal se debe a la divergencia de intereses entre los accionistas 
mayoritarios y minoritarios. 
Como se señaló en la Conclusión 5, las empresas analizadas exhiben menos 
acciones de ahorro fiscal cuando el desempeño de la RSC es mayor. Sin embargo, la 
relación anterior es moderada en las empresas familiares. La inclusión de la propiedad 
familiar modera el vínculo negativo entre la RSC y la agresividad fiscal. Es decir, hay una 
política de menor agresividad fiscal cuando la RSC es mayor, excepto cuando la 
propiedad familiar es mayor. Deberíamos referirnos con ello a la “hipótesis del 
atrincheramiento”, en la cual las empresas familiares exhiben mayores actividades de 
ahorro de impuestos. Como accionista mayoritario, la familia trabaja de manera 
oportunista extrayendo rentas de accionistas minoritarios utilizando estrategias de 
evasión fiscal. Podríamos decir que esta agresividad fiscal es el resultado de la 
divergencia de intereses y objetivos entre los accionistas. 
Así, en este punto, debido a sus amplios derechos de voto, las familias como 
accionistas mayoritarios tienden a aumentar su poder en la empresa mediante la 
expropiación de beneficios privados. Por lo tanto, han asegurado el control de la 
empresa y pueden actuar incluso dañando la riqueza de las minorías. Estas empresas 
podrían promover actividades de agresividad fiscal para cubrir pérdidas, o cualquier tipo 
de extracciones de renta como las mencionadas anteriormente, que de hecho se 
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vuelven más oportunistas. En este sentido, relegan los intereses de los accionistas 
minoritarios a una segunda posición. 
Conclusión 7. Las empresas socialmente responsables están orientadas a aumentar sus 
prácticas de manipulación contable, utilizando la RSC como una herramienta 
discrecional. 
En general, se espera un vínculo negativo entre la RSC y la manipulación contable 
al considerar que las empresas responsables socialmente se comportarán de manera 
transparente. Sin embargo, a diferencia de lo que uno podría esperar, nuestra evidencia 
confirma que las empresas con un mayor compromiso con la RSC son aquellas con un 
mayor nivel de manipulación contable. En otras palabras, aquellas empresas que 
realizan y promueven prácticas de manipulación contable son aquellas que, de hecho, 
intentan ocultar el comportamiento del gerente por medio de prácticas de RSC y, así, 
enmascarar el comportamiento discrecional del directivo. 
Con esta evidencia, podemos discutir sobre el conflicto de la agencia tradicional 
que ayuda a los gerentes a adoptar y hacer uso de las acciones oportunistas. El objetivo 
de estas acciones es, de hecho, generalmente diferente de los de los accionistas. Bajo la 
perspectiva y el contexto de la teoría de la agencia, la RSC motiva a los gerentes a usar 
la información que tienen para tomar decisiones que van encaminados a la consecución 
de sus propios intereses y no los de grupos externos. 
Conclusión 8. Sin embargo, las empresas familiares muestran un menor uso de las 
estrategias de manipulación contable. 
Es lógico pensar que en las empresas familiares, cualquier miembro de la 
empresa citada estará a favor de evitar la manipulación contable como acciones 
discrecionales. Existe una estrecha relación de los propietarios familiares con la 
empresa, evitando cualquier acción que pueda dañar o poner en peligro la supervivencia 
de la empresa. Por lo tanto, un bajo nivel de prácticas de manipulación contable les 
permite garantizar su imagen y reputación. Esto quiere decir que, si la reputación de la 
empresa está manchada con la idea de una administración poco clara, dudosa o errónea, 
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también afectará a la reputación de la familia y, por lo tanto, dañará a la familia en 
general, porque la compañía también es su principal fuente de ingresos. 
Podemos confirmar, así, la mayor aversión al riesgo de las empresas familiares 
de ser detectadas usando manipulación contable. Por lo tanto, no están orientadas a 
promover este tipo de acciones debido a cualquier efecto perjudicial del valor, el 
rendimiento, la imagen, etc. de la empresa. Precisamente, si la empresa familiar es 
señalada como empresa que promueve acciones de manipulación contable, algunas de 
las consecuencias serían la pérdida de la SEW y las dotaciones familiares; o, el daño de 
su imagen y, otras implicaciones económicas debido al hecho de que su riqueza está 
altamente concentrada en los activos de la empresa. Por lo tanto, podemos considerar 
que la propiedad familiar limita el uso de manipulación contable por el menor conflicto 
de la agencia entre los directivos y los propietarios. 
Conclusión 9. La propiedad familiar modera el impacto de la RSC sobre la agresividad 
fiscal y la manipulación contable. 
Como hemos destacado y propuesto a lo largo de estas páginas, las relaciones 
propuestas en esta tesis doctoral son muy diferentes cuando existe presencia de familia 
en la empresa o cuando no existe. En consecuencia, como conclusión general, la 
implicación de la familia modifica la forma en que la empresa se comporta con respecto 
a asuntos relacionados con RSC, actividades fiscales y de manipulación contable. Los 
objetivos de la empresa familiar y el proceso de toma de decisiones difieren claramente 
de las empresas no familiares. Podemos comenzar citando las dotaciones de SEW y la 
perspectiva de los gerentes y directores; así como su perspectiva largoplacistas. Las 
empresas intentan limitar y restringir cualquier acción que pueda poner en riesgo su 
supervivencia y legitimidad, y así sucesivamente. Estas características particulares hacen 
que el proceso de toma de decisiones y su compromiso con la RSC varíen con respecto 
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